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Abstract 
This thesis synthesises material from contemporary cognitive science, analytic 
philosophy of mind continental phenomenology to defend a view of the mind as 
embodied and extended. The first three chapters focus primarily on embodiment, 
while the last two chapters focus more on factors external to the body. In chapter I, I 
introduce Merleau-Ponty's concept of the body schema and argue that we should 
resist reducing the body schema to an internal representation of the body, and also 
that it does not always coincide with the boundaries of the biological body. In 
chapter II, I explicate and defend the sensorimotor approach to visual perception, 
further invoking Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to support the arguments therein 
and to address certain worries internal to the sensorimotor approach. Chapter III 
builds on the conclusions of chapters I and II to explore one way in which 
technological extensions of the body can lead to novel perceptual experiences, and 
tentatively suggests a limited sense in which these experience may still be said to be 
visual in character. In chapter IV, I move beyond the body to explicate and defend 
the extended mind thesis, according to which cognition can and often does take place 
partly outside of brain and body via the active use of external aids and props. Finally, 
in chapter V, I consider the question of whether, given the perceptual 
phenomenology described in chapter II and the case for cognitive extension 
presented in chapter IV, consciousness might also be said to be extended, and argue 
that if certain assumptions are granted, it can.  
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Introduction 
 
1. Summary of the project 
This thesis defends the claim that minds are embodied and, often, extended. Though 
we can and do engage in private reflection, the lion's share of our mental lives do not 
take place in our heads, but in the world, and this is owed to the way in which we are 
embodied and situated. To do so, it synthesises elements of analytical philosophy of 
mind, empirical and theoretical work in the cognitive sciences, and insights from 
continental phenomenology.  
The claim that the mind is embodied and/or extended is not unique to this thesis. On 
the contrary, a good deal of it shall be occupied by the defence of arguments and 
claims already made by a variety of philosophers. Its intended original contribution is 
twofold. Firstly, each chapter contains counterarguments to objections to its central 
claims that, to the best of my knowledge, are not to be found in the extant literature. 
Secondly, it contributes to an emerging tradition that seeks to reconcile our lived 
experience with the findings of cognitive science, and illuminate the ways in which 
the two might be mutually informing and constraining (see e.g. Wheeler 2007, 
Gallagher 2005, Dreyfus 1992).  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. I begin at the boundaries of the body, and 
gradually move outwards.  The first three chapters focus primarily on embodiment, 
while the last two chapters focus more on factors external to the body. In chapter I, 
taking Husserl's account of the 'lived body' as my starting point, I introduce Merleau-
Ponty's concept of the body schema and situate it in relation to empirical case studies 
of bodily disorders and adaptations. I argue that we should resist assimilating the 
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body schema to an internal representation of the body, and also that it does not 
always coincide with the boundaries of the biological body. In chapter II, I explicate 
and defend the sensorimotor approach to visual perception, further invoking 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to support the arguments therein and to address 
certain worries internal to the sensorimotor approach. Chapter III builds on the 
conclusions of chapters I and II to explore one way in which technological 
extensions of the body can lead to novel perceptual experiences, and tentatively 
suggests a limited sense in which these experience may still be said to be visual in 
character. In chapter IV, I move beyond the body to explicate and defend the 
extended mind thesis, according to which cognition can and often does take place 
partly outside of brain and body via the active use of external aids and props. Finally, 
in chapter V, I consider the question of whether, given the perceptual 
phenomenology described in chapter II and the case for cognitive extension 
presented in chapter IV, consciousness might also be said to be extended. I argue that 
if certain assumptions are granted, it can.  
 
2. Obligatory methodological preamble  
This thesis is, by nature of its subject matter, a work in the philosophy of mind. 
However, throughout the thesis, particularly in the first three chapters, I will be 
appealing to arguments and descriptions found in literature from the European 
phenomenological tradition. I will make considerable use of Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenomenology of Perception, and shall also delve into the works of the discipline's 
founder, Husserl, as well as some limited appeal to Heidegger. My decision to appeal 
to these philosophers, as opposed to others who may share similar views, is largely a 
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pragmatic affair. For better or worse, these are the historical philosophers I have 
studied more than any others. As such they are the philosophers whose work has 
most shaped my own thinking on topics such as consciousness, perception and 
action. Rather than defend this in advance, it is hoped that the relevance of the 
aspects of phenomenological philosophy to which I appeal will be demonstrated by 
their utilisation in the substantive chapters that follow, but the essential guiding 
thought behind my appropriation of phenomenology is this: analytical philosophy of 
mind and the cognitive sciences face the task of accurately classifying and explaining 
the phenomena that purvey our mental lives. If these accounts rest on a 
phenomenologically inadequate conception of these phenomena, then they are 
flawed. Phenomenology is therefore an invaluable tool in guarding philosophy of 
mind against  straw man conceptions of experience and behaviour by ensuring, in 
Husserl's words, that, insofar as this is possible, its accounts 'satisfy the principle of 
freedom from presuppositions' (Husserl 2001 p.97).  
Though interest in phenomenology is steadily on the rise in contemporary 
Anglophone philosophy, it is still viewed with a mix of suspicion and outright 
disdain in some staunchly analytic circles. Though I suspect nothing I could say 
would suffice to dispel these anti-phenomenological sentiments altogether, the 
prevalence of such a negative bias does introduce an obligation to say something 
about what phenomenology is not. The use of the term 'phenomenology' as deployed 
in analytic philosophy generally refers to a certain kind of subject matter reserved for 
a particular domain of the philosophy of mind, namely, what is variably and 
interchangeably referred to as the 'qualia', 'raw feel', 'phenomenal character' or 'what-
it-is-likeness' of conscious mental episodes. 'Phenomenology' in this sense designates 
a class of entities or properties of entities that it is the job of philosophers and 
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cognitive scientists to reconcile with our naturalistic worldview. I will on occasion 
also use the term in this way, and I hope that the context of usage is sufficiently 
instructive with respect to the term's desired sense. In the research program initiated 
by Husserl and continued by Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others, however, 
'phenomenology' refers not to a particular subject matter, but to a broadly shared 
approach to philosophical problems that takes as its starting point the first-person 
perspective of lived experience, prior to its being subjected to the abstract 
topographies inherited from particular scientific and/or philosophical theories.  
Because of its emphasis on describing experience qua experience, there are 
philosophers who are wont to characterise phenomenology as a species of 
introspection. On such a conception, phenomenology should go the way of the 
introspectionist school of psychology associated with (inter alios) Brentano, Wundt 
and Titchener, long since superseded by behaviourism and now, thankfully, 
contemporary cognitive science. Hence, Dennett, who characterises Husserl's 
philosophy as advocating as 'a special technique of introspection' (Dennett 1991 
p.44), dismisses the entire phenomenological movement thus: '[T]here really are no 
phenomenologists: uncontroversial experts on the nature of things that swim in the 
stream of consciousness' (ibid. pp.44-5). We can agree that there are no 
'uncontroversial experts' in phenomenology, but this is true in the humanities and 
sciences generally. But Dennett's caricature of phenomenology as an introspective 
enterprise attacks a straw man, albeit one born of his quite justifiable worries about 
Husserl's insistence on philosophy's autonomy from natural science.1 Husserl and 
subsequent phenomenologists reject this kind of Cartesian divide between an 
                                                          
1 Deep down, I think Dennett knows this, and he does go some way toward 
acknowledging it in (Dennett 2007). 
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external world-in-itself and an internal realm of consciousness precisely because 
belief in such a divide is a), precisely the sort of ontological or metaphysical 
commitment to be deliberately bracketed out of phenomenological analysis and b), is 
not evident in experience; when I describe my perception of a tree, qua 
phenomenological description, it is an appearance of the tree itself that I am 
describing, and not a private mental image inside my head, cut off from the external 
world. The phenomenologist describes the world as it is experienced, not the 
inventory of some private stream of mind-stuff, as Husserl himself makes clear 
I perceive the physical thing, the Object belonging to nature, the tree there in 
the garden; that and nothing else is the actual Object of the perceptual 
"intention". A second immanental tree [i.e. an representation of a tree], or 
even an "internal image" of the tree, is in no way given, and to suppose that 
hypothetically leads to an absurdity. (Husserl 1999a p.90) 
Indeed, the 'absurdity' to which Husserl refers in this passage is the very homunculus 
fallacy, and the infinite regress it incurs, that Dennett attacks in his critique of 
dualism.2Merleau-Ponty too, rejects introspection as a method for both 
phenomenology and psychology (Merleau-Ponty 1964a).  
                                                          
2 'The image as a really inherent component in the psychologically real perception 
would be again something real - something real that would function as a depicturing 
of another something real. But that can only be by virtue of a depicturing 
consciousness in which something first appears - with which we would have a first 
intentionality - and this would function again in consciousness as a "picture Object" 
representing another "picture Object" - for which a second intentionality founded in 
the first intentionality would be necessary [...] [If] perception and, then consequently, 
every mental process, requires a depictive function, [this] unavoidably (...) leads to 
an infinite regress. In contradistinction to such errors we have to abide by what is 
given in the pure mental process.' (Husserl 1999a. p.90-1) 
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Still, having dealt with these misgivings I must qualify my use of phenomenology 
somewhat. There is, of course, a huge array of deeply problematic aspects of 
individual phenomenologists' work. As with any philosophical school, differences 
and disagreements abound between its major figures (for a map of the conceptual 
terrain, see Moran 1999). I shall largely be ignoring the more problematic aspects of 
these phenomenologists' work and their multifarious points of disagreement in order 
to focus on their areas of overlap as they pertain to the topics of embodied and 
extended cognition. There is also a great wealth of technical detail in all of the major 
phenomenological texts I shall cite that are far beyond the scope of what might 
appear to scholars of phenomenology to be a rather superficial engagement, picking 
and choosing the relevant aspects of these philosophers' thinking to suit my own 
more philosophy of mind-oriented ends. My appropriation of phenomenology is 
therefore admittedly somewhat textually promiscuous, but it is undertaken towards 
the honest end of analysing mental phenomena with a degree of phenomenological 
accuracy often lacking in more orthodox analytical treatments. That phenomenology 
has much to offer the analyses of cognitive science is a belief I shall unapologetically 
leave undefended. Evidence enough for this can be found in the vast majority of 
articles published in the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences since its 
inception in 2002, the fundamental ethos of which is beautifully illustrated and 
defended at length in Gallagher and Zahavi's (2007) seminal textbook, The 
Phenomenological Mind. 
In addition to raiding the pantry of phenomenology I shall also, where appropriate, 
make extensive use of empirical work from the cognitive sciences, especially 
experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Although I have no formal 
scientific training, I have endeavoured to comprehend the relevant empirical details 
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to the best of my ability and to deploy these in a way free from distortion, 
oversimplification or overstatement. The more empirically-oriented parts of the 
thesis are largely necessitated by the data-driven nature of much of the philosophical 
literature I shall be engaging with. But also, just as I cannot bring myself to take 
seriously any philosophical or psychological analysis which rests on a 
phenomenologically false account of the phenomena under investigation, I find it 
virtually impossible to see how a satisfactory account of any mental phenomenon can 
be genuinely achieved without due care and attention to at least some of the 
fascinating and deeply pertinent insights to be garnered from the rapidly advancing 
field(s) of contemporary cognitive science. A philosopher who pursued such a line of 
research would, in my view, be in the same boat as an art historian who avoided 
viewing art or a literary critic who neglected to read literature.    
Phenomenology is not at odds with cognitive science. As Merleau-Ponty himself 
remarks 'Psychology and philosophy are nourished by the same phenomena; it is 
only that the problems become more formalized at the philosophical level' (Merleau-
Ponty 1964b p.24). Though phenomenological analysis might consequently prompt 
us to question some of the more philosophical claims made by scientists or 
philosophers on their behalf, if say, in the light of phenomenological considerations 
these claims seem to presuppose a phenomenologically false characterisation of the 
phenomena they purport to explain, we need not and should not doubt or deny any 
scientifically-established facts  in order to describe experience qua experience, just as 
we should not contradict ordinary experience for the sake of rendering an account or 
explanation more palatable to naturalistic dogma. Hopefully in what follows I shall 
do neither. 
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I. Being-in-the-World and the Body Schema 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the general theme of embodiment. I begin with a brief 
discussion of Husserl's account of the lived body and its shortcomings, paving the 
way for a phenomenological outlook that is closer in spirit to that of Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty. I then introduce the concept of the body schema, which will play an 
important role in chapters II and III. This is subsequently contrasted with the related 
but different notion of a body image, and I distinguish between two notions of 
'representation' as it pertains to this distinction. I then discuss some insights from 
cognitive neuroscience to support the claim that the body schema, as I have defined 
it, is flexible with respect to the boundaries of the organism. I argue that we should 
resist assimilating the body schema to underlying neural states or processes.  
 
2. Making room for the body 
Traditionally, philosophy has struggled to know quite what to do with the body. In 
Plato's Phaedo, Socrates tells Simmias that for true philosophers, the body is a 
distracting obstacle standing in the way of the pursuit of knowledge and truth, even 
going so far as to suggest that only upon death, defined as the separation of the 
psyche from the body, does genuine philosophical insight become possible. In the 
meantime,  
While we live, we shall be closest to knowledge if we refrain as much as possible 
from association with the body and do not join with it more than we must, if we 
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are not infected with its nature but purify ourselves from it until the god himself 
frees us. (Plato 2002 p.104) 
Fortunately for we mere mortals, the asceticism Socrates advocates with respect to 
the body is a barely conceivable philosophical fantasy. Beyond the basic biological 
necessities of digestion and respiration, the mental lives of human subjects - their 
perceptions, actions, and experiences - are profoundly and inescapably intermingled 
with, and highly dependent upon, their embodiment. But this statement, perhaps, is 
uninformative and uncontroversial for even the most ardent of mind-body dualists. 
Even Descartes, for whom minds and organisms are two entirely distinct substances, 
happily admits that 'it is not enough for [the mind] to be lodged in the human body 
like a pilot in his ship' (Descartes 1998 p.33). To fully appreciate the scope of the 
claim that we are embodied, we need to illuminate what it means to be a bodily 
subject, rather than a subject that is merely housed in a body. In essence, this is the 
project of Merleau-Ponty's landmark text Phenomenology of Perception. 
Husserl's discussion of the body in the second volume of his Ideas Pertaining to a 
Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy is an important 
precursor to the phenomenology of embodiment developed by Merleau-Ponty. 
Though I shall not attempt to explicate it fully, a few key points of Husserl's 
understanding of embodiment provide a natural starting point for this chapter. For 
Husserl, the Body is 'doubly constituted', meaning that we can experience our own 
bodies in either of two ways. One way in which we experience the body is as an 
object of external perception bound up in the causal nexus of other material things. 
Another way in which we experience the body is as the field of sensitivity  where 
bodily sensations occur, and as a unique object which we can move at will from the 
inside. Hence, Husserl distinguishes between the lived body (Leib) - the animate 
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body as experienced from the inside, and the objective body (Korper) - the body 
understood as a mere material object among others. Husserl's distinction is echoed by 
Merleau-Ponty's own distinction between 'phenomenal' and 'objective' conceptions of 
the body3. 
Husserl's interest in the body is motivated by the question of how perceiving subjects 
can experience successive percepts as presentations of one and the same object 
(Zahavi 2003 p.99). Husserl's answer is that successive visual presentations of 
objects are endowed with their unified appearance, which he calls their 'schemata', by 
virtue of their occurring simultaneously with schemas of kinaesthetic sensations 
localised in the body 
Those sensations which undergo extensional apprehension (leading to the 
extended features of the thing) are motivated as regards the courses they take 
either actually or possibly and are kinaesthetically related to motivating 
series, to systems, of kinaesthetic sensations, which freely unfold in the nexus 
of their familiar order in such a way that if a free unfolding of one series of 
this system occurs (e.g. any movement of the eyes or fingers), then from the 
interwoven manifold as motive, the corresponding series must unfold as 
motivated…We constantly find here this two-fold articulation: kinaesthetic 
sensations on the one side, the motivating; and the sensations of features on 
the other, the motivated. (Husserl 1989 p.62-3, italics in original) 
                                                          
3 'We never move our objective body, we move our phenomenal body, and we do so 
without mystery, since it is our body as a power of various regions of the world that 
already rises up toward the objects to be grasped and perceives them.' (Merleau-
Ponty 2012 p.108) 
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Husserl's understanding of 'kinaesthesia' is somewhat broader than contemporary 
technical usage. As well as the sense of bodily movement, Husserl seems to have in 
mind what we would now refer to as proprioception (the sense of bodily positioning 
and posture) and equilibrioception (the sense of balance, also referred to as the 
vestibular sense). Husserl argue that every presentation of an object's perceptible 
features (colour, surface, aspect, etc) - a 'motivated sensation' - must be accompanied 
by a 'motivating sensation' localised in or on the lived body, and it is only by virtue 
of the localisation of sensations that a subject can have a lived body, because it is by 
virtue of the localisation of bodily sensations that the body imposes a perspective on 
the perceived world 
Obviously, the Body is also to be seen just like any other thing, but it 
becomes a Body [Leib] only be incorporating tactile sensations, pain 
sensations, etc - in short, by the localisation of the sensations as sensations. In 
that case the visual Body also participates in the localisation, because it 
coincides with the tactual Body, just as other things (...) coincide, ones which 
are constituted both visually and tactually, and thus there arises the idea of a 
sensing thing which "has" and which can have, under certain circumstances, 
certain sensations (...) and, in particular, have them as localised in itself 
primarily and properly. (Husserl 1989 p.158-9)  
The phenomenological significance of the lived body, for Husserl, then, is that it 
provides the 'zero point' of all perception by virtue of its being the bearer of localised 
tactile and/or kinaesthetic sensations (ibd. p.166). We can therefore discriminate two 
distinct claims in Husserl's treatment of the body. The first is that all perceptual 
contents are accompanied by kinaesthetic sensations, broadly construed. The second 
is that a body is only a lived body insofar as it bears localised sensations. The first 
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claim is false. There are plenty of people who enjoy perfectly normal perceptual 
experience who are physically incapable of experiencing anything corresponding to 
Husserl's notion of kinaesthetic sensation, even if this is read liberally to include 
proprioception and equilibrioception. Paralysis is an obvious example, and I shall 
discuss the extreme case of locked in syndrome in the next chapter to argue that their 
lack of bodily sensation does not suffice to discredit the more general claim that 
perception is fundamentally an embodied phenomenon. The second claim is of more 
immediate interest in the context of this chapter. 
There is far more to being embodied than feeling sensations. Husserl's emphasis on 
sensation leads him to neglect the ways in which our experience of the world is 
structured pre-noetically, that is, prior to explicit conscious awareness, by the 
organisation of the body (Gallagher 2005 p.24). Hence, according to what I take to 
be a fairly standard reading, though a step in the right direction, Husserl's account of 
the lived body suffers from an overemphasis on the ways in which we can attend to 
our bodies and an overstatement of the extent to which the body shows up as an 
object of immediate awareness in our mental lives, due his overly mentalistic 
methodology (Dreyfus 2000; 1992, Carman 1999, cf. Smith 2007; Zahavi 2003 
pp.98-109). Husserl's analyses takes place within his phenomenological reduction, 
the outcome of a systematic bracketing of the empirical and ontological 
commitments of our commonsense beliefs about the natural world which is 
undertaken in order to describe experience directly, that is to describe experience qua 
experience, which he explains thus:  
This universal depriving of acceptance, this “inhibiting” or “putting out of 
play” of all positions taken toward the already-given objective world and, in 
the first place, all existential positions (those concerning being, illusion, 
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possible being, being likely, probable, etc), -or as it is also called, this 
“phenomenological epoché” and “parenthesising” of the Objective world- 
therefore does not leaves us confronting nothing. On the contrary we gain 
possession of something by it; and what we (or, to speak more precisely, what 
I, the one who is meditating) acquire by it is pure living, with all the 
subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as 
meant in them: the universe of “phenomena” in the particular (…) 
phenomenological sense. (Husserl 1988 p.20-1, italics in original) 
Perhaps as a result of this self-professed Cartesian method (Husserl 1988), Husserl's 
analyses are largely restricted to the contents of particular mental acts. By reducing 
experience to the 'purely meant' intentional objects and their corresponding cognitive 
acts, Husserl in effect removes the subject under investigation from the practical 
context in which their behaviour occurs and in which they exercise a great deal of 
situational understanding. In essence, this is the implicit critique of Husserl's whole 
project that runs throughout Heidegger's Being and Time. Heidegger draws attention 
to the fact that Husserl's Cartesian method of systematic belief suspension, which 
even in his analyses of social phenomena and the development of modern science 
always leads back to a constituting transcendental ego (see, e.g. ibid.89-150), is 
impotent to accommodate the more basic, pre-reflective ('primordial' in Heidegger's 
terminology) level of experience human subjects enjoy prior to engaging in the sort 
of reflective theorising which enables metaphysics, natural science, and the would-be 
'rigorous science' of Husserlian phenomenology (Husserl 1970). This underlying 
'being-in-the-world', as Heidegger calls it, is the true default starting point for any 
genuine account of lived experience. In other words, phenomenology should not 
bracket away the practical world in order to uncover the conscious subject behind it, 
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but illuminate the nature of this subject by describing and exploring the ways in 
which it is inescapably embodied and embedded in its world 
When Dasein [i.e. beings like us, literally ‘being-there’] directs itself towards 
something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere 
in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is 
such that it is always ‘outside’ alongside entities which it encounters and 
which belong to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere 
abandoned when Dasein dwells among the entity to be known...but even in 
this ‘Being-outside’ alongside the object, Dasein is still ‘inside’, if we 
understand this in its correct sense; that is to say, it is itself ‘inside’ as a 
Being-in-the-world which knows. (Heidegger 1962 p.89) 
The most basic mode of encounter human beings have with their environment is a 
pre-reflective familiarity rather than an interrogative attitude. Whenever we begin to 
withdraw from our practical engagements with the world by reflecting on our 
experience and behaviour, we find ourselves always-already in a situation of sorts, 
embedded in a network of familiar practices which is lived through prior to being 
made thematic as an object of analysis. When we do engage in the activity of 
interpreting our experience of the world and our behaviour in it, we do not, as 
Heidegger puts it, 'throw a signification over some naked thing' by 'sticking a value 
on it' (ibid. p.190), but rather try to make explicit the tacit practical understanding 
that was already present in our dealings with our surroundings (ibid. p.191). Hence, 
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in what could just as well be a slogan for the research program of embodied 
cognition4, Heidegger summarises the point thus 
The kind of dealing which is closest to us is...not a bare perceptual cognition, 
but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to 
use; and this has its own kind of knowledge. (ibid. p95) 
This Heideggerian sentiment - that phenomenology cannot succeed by abstracting 
the subject out of their world, is taken up by Merleau-Ponty and is the meaning of his 
remark in the preface to Phenomenology of Perception that '[t]he most important 
lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction' (Merleau-Ponty 
2012 p.Ixxii). Hence, in a review of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's respective accounts 
of the lived body, Carman writes 
In his posthumous works Husserl calls attention to the role of the body in 
perception, but he takes it for granted that cognitive attitudes rather than 
bodily skills must bridge the intentional gap between mind and world. He 
therefore attempts to ground bodily self awareness in what he takes to be a 
more basic form of intentionality: the quasi-objective localization of 
subjective tactile sensations in the body. But to tie the body’s intentional 
constitution specifically to the sense of touch in this way [...] amounts to a 
fundamental misunderstanding of its significance for phenomenology. 
(Carman 1999 p.206).  
 
                                                          
4 Strikingly, Heidegger himself has virtually nothing to say about the body, with the 
exception of the writings published as The Zollikon Seminars, where he applies the 
project of Being and Time in relation to certain neuropathologies (Heidegger 2001).  
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For present purposes, it doesn't really matter whether the Carmanean interpretation of 
Husserl I have espoused is accurate or, if not, what Husserl's precise position might 
have amounted to. The moral is that the errors of such a view of the body are 
instructive with respect to an adequate account of embodiment. To get a better grip 
on the ways in which our ordinary experience is structured by our embodiment, we 
need to make a concerted effort to avoid treating the body as though it were either a 
continual object of perception, or as something an explicit awareness of which 
accompanies all our experience. Of course, the body can be an object of a mental 
state. We can and do visually and tactually inspect our bodies, we can think about it 
in myriad ways, and it routinely shows up in our experience when we are injured or 
trying to perfect a new skill. But, in the ordinary flow of things, the body, qua 
intentional object, is highly recessive, and what bodily awareness there is when 
immersed in some behaviour or other is generally non-observational in character 
(Marcel 2003). As Wittgenstein famously remarked, 'voluntary movement is marked 
by the absence of surprise' (Wittgenstein 1958 p.162, my italics). They key to doing 
phenomenological justice to our experience, without skipping over the essential 
contributions of the body, then, is to articulate the ways in which embodiment 
structures experience pre-reflectively. In the next section, I introduce the concept of 
the body schema, which forms an integral part of such an account. The body schema 
will feature prominently in the discussions of perceptual experience and the senses 
that follow in chapters II and III. 
 
3. The scheming body 
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Prior to engaging in reflection on experience, the human (or animal) organism is 
always-already attuned to its environment. Our encounters with the world are made 
possible by having at our immediate disposal certain motor habits which alleviate the 
requirement for acts of judgement on our part. Ceteris paribus, people act without 
needing to consciously think through or attentively observe each individual limb 
movement. The individual bodily movements implicated in the performance of 
simple actions like grasping a cup to take a drink or taking a phone from one’s 
pocket to answer it occur without attention or perceptual monitoring. Insofar as we 
are conscious of our actions, our experience is one of general bodily movement and a 
directedness towards the wider project at hand ('drinking', ''answering the phone', 
etc), but not as a linear succession of sub-routines in accordance with a mentally 
represented list of instructions.  
Dreyfus (1992) calls this kind of immersed bodily engagement with the world 
'absorbed coping'5. Neurotypical6 subjects engaged in absorbed coping will find that 
their hand and fingers naturally shape themselves around the object to be grasped 
without the need to feel their way around it. This is because they have at their 
disposal a system of either learned or innate motor abilities governed by low-level 
proprioceptive, kinaesthetic and vestibular processing that renders explicit  
judgements concerning their hand and arm movement redundant. They merely act on 
their impulsion to grasp the coffee cup and before they know it (so to speak), their 
                                                          
5 There is a whole host of problems with Dreyfus's developed account of the 
phenomenon of absorbed coping (see e.g. Hoffding forthcoming, Romdenh-Romluc 
2007), but the term itself is helpful, so I shall continue to use it with the proviso that 
it is Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, and not Dreyfus's, that I have in mind. 
 
6 The term 'neurotypical' was originally coined by the autistic community to refer to 
non-autistics, but now enjoys a broader usage to denote anyone fortunate enough to 
have a normally functioning brain. I thank Susan Albinson for teaching me this term. 
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hand is being raised accurately towards their mouth. As Merleau-Ponty stresses, the 
organisation of the body is such that it, and not the subject qua detached observer, 
orients itself in relation to the object to be grasped before any reflective perceptual 
judgement is made 
[M]y movements anticipate directly their final position, my intention only 
sketches out a trajectory in order to meet up with  goal that is already given in 
its location, and there is something like a seed of movement that only grows 
later though its objective trajectory [...] I have no need of looking for it 
because it is always with me. I have no need of directing it toward the goal of 
the movement, in a sense it touches the goal from the very begging and 
throws itself towards it. (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.96-7) 
Merleau-Ponty calls this bodily system by which this happens the body schema.7 The 
origin of the term 'body schema' is commonly attributed to classical neurologists 
Henry Head and Gordon Holmes, who coined it to denote a continually-updated 
internal map of bodily posture  
Every recognizable change enters into consciousness already charged with its 
relation to something that has gone before [...] So the final product of the tests 
for the appreciation of posture or passive movement rises into consciousness 
as a measured postural change. For this combined standard, against which all 
subsequent changes of posture are measured before they enter consciousness, 
we propose the word "schema". By means of perpetual alterations in position 
we are always building up a postural model of ourselves which constantly 
                                                          
7 '[M]y entire body is not for me an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space. I hold 
my body as an indivisible possession and I know the position of each of my limbs 
through a body schema [un schema corporel].' (ibid. pp.100-1, translator's italics) 
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changes. Every new posture or movement is recorded on this plastic schema, 
and the activity of the cortex brings every fresh group of sensations evoked 
by altered posture into relation with it. (Head & Holmes 1911 p.187) 
 
The term is adopted and modified by Merleau-Ponty to denote not an internal mental 
map of the body, but an integrated network of motor capacities that structure 
perception and action. In Merleau-Ponty's usage, the functioning of the body schema 
constitutes a fundamental kind of practical understanding that is exercised by 
subjects pre-reflectively. The body schema is an enabling condition of absorbed 
coping; without prior deliberation, the body comports itself toward the world. 
 
By denying that absorbed coping is the outcome of a judgement, or a series of 
judgements, we do not  thereby lapse back into a behaviouristic view of action, 
whereby the bodily movements required to (say) grasp the cup on the basis of visual 
perception are mere stimulus-response reflexes. (Merleau-Ponty calls these views of 
action 'intellectualist' and 'empiricist' respectively.) Watson, for example, famously 
held that psychology 'can be done in terms of stimulus and response, in terms of 
habit formation, habit integrations and the like' alone (Watson 1913 p.167). What the 
behaviourist misses, according to Merleau-Ponty, is the fact that reflexive 
movements of this kind 'are never blind processes: they adjust to the “sense” of the 
situation' (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.81). Bodily responses to our surroundings are 
already meaningful for the agent; they make practical sense given the demands of 
one's present situation as one perceives it. We instinctively raise our hands to cover 
our face when an object is thrown in our direction, brace ourselves when we fall, turn 
our heads upon hearing a crashing sound behind us, and so forth. Hence, channelling 
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Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty writes, 'Reflex, insofar as it opens itself to the sense of a 
situation, and perception, insofar as it is an intention of our total being, are modalities 
of a pre-objective perspective that we call “being in the world' (ibid.). On Merleau-
Ponty's account it is therefore habit,  not thought, which is primarily constitutive of 
our being-in-the-world 
[I]n the acquisition of a habit, it is the body that "understands". This formula 
will seem absurd if "understanding" is the act of subsuming a sensory given 
under an idea, and if the body is a mere object. But the phenomenon of habit 
in fact leads us to rework our notion of "understanding" and our notion of the 
body. To understand is to experience [...] the accord between what we aim at 
and what is given, between the intention and the realisation - and the body is 
our anchorage in the world. (Merleau-Ponty 2012 pp.145-6).  
This implicit 'sense' of motor habits is indicative of a primordial grasp on the world. 
Our body schematic routines orient themselves in accordance with the motor tasks in 
which we engage - making a cup of coffee, answering a buzzing phone, defending 
ourselves from blows, playing the guitar, etc. The body schema therefore exhibits its 
own kind of 'world-directness' or 'aboutness' in the absence of a pre-conceptualised 
goal, that is, its own particular kind of intentionality, which Merleau-Ponty calls 
operative or motor intentionality (ibid. p.112-4). As I read Merleau-Ponty, operative 
intentionality consists in a minimalistic intentional relation between subject and 
world which does not have a determinate object, but is dependent for its content on a 
present context of action, and operates largely below the level of conscious attention 
or explicit awareness. This contrasts with what might be called the 'object' 
intentionality which Husserl (e.g. 2001) following Brentano, emphasises as the 
defining feature of consciousness. This kind of intentionality involves having a 
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determinate object present to the mind via a mediating cognitive act. Here we recall 
the oft-quoted 'Brentano's thesis' 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a 
content, direction toward an object (...),or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they 
do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in 
judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in 
desire desired and so on. (Brentano 1995 p.68) 
Object intentionality is the kind of intentionality proper to propositional thought. 
Operative intentionality, on the other hand, provides the intelligible background 
against which our own behaviour  unfolds prior to thought. It can therefore be 
glossed as a kind of non-conceptual or pre-conceptual intentionality (Jensen 2009). 
For reasons clarified below, however, unlike some philosophers I shall resist 
describing it as non-representational (see e.g. Mooney 2011, Romdenh-Romluc 
2011a, Jensen 2009). There are many philosophers for whom 'representation' and 
'intentionality' are synonymous (e.g. Crane 2009; 1995), so the notion of 'non-
representational  intentionality' borders on the oxymoronic and has the potential to 
create unnecessary confusion. Moreover, although the operative intentionality of the 
body schema is certainly non-representational in the sense in that, unlike object 
intentionality, it does not represent any particular object or fact, there are other, more 
empirical, technical uses of 'representation' which are germane to the concept of 
operative intentionality, which I discuss below. First though, I juxtapose the notion 
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of a body schema to that of a body image, which serves to further illustrate the 
distinction between object and operative intentionality as it pertains to the body. 
 
4. Body schema vs. body image 
The body schema, as I am using the term, differs from what is popularly called a 
'body image'. As Gallagher notes, the terms 'body schema' and 'body image' are often 
used interchangeably in discussions of the body across academic disciplines 
(Gallagher 2005 ch. I; 1986a). This is unfortunate, as there are sound 
phenomenological, conceptual and empirical grounds for distinguishing between the 
two (ibid.). To avoid conflation, Gallagher provides useful criteria by which to make 
this distinction,  
A body image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes and beliefs 
pertaining to one's own body. In contrast, a body schema is a system of 
sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of 
perceptual monitoring [...] A body image [...] can include mental 
representations, beliefs, and attitudes where the object of such intentional 
states (...) is or concerns ones' own body. The body schema, in contrast, 
involves certain motor capacities, abilities and habits that both enable and 
constrain movement and the maintenance of posture. It continues to operate, 
and in many cases operates best, when the intentional object of perception is 
something other than one's own body. (Gallagher 2005 p.24, italics in 
original) 
Following Gallagher, then, we can make the following summarisation. To have a 
body image is to have a mental state or perception, the object of which is one's own 
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body. For example, forms of body dysmorphia, a form of anxiety disorder, are 
essentially disorders relating to a subject's body image. People suffering from 
anorexia are plagued by the worry that they are overweight (for a clinical review, see 
Morris & Twaddle (2007)), while people suffering from muscle dysmorphia 
(colloquially known as 'bigorexia'), which is especially prevalent among male 
bodybuilders, suffer from anxiety over a perceived lack of muscle mass  (see e.g. 
Mosley 2009). The anxieties of body dysmorphics stem from how they perceive or 
feel about their bodies and/or how they judge them to be relative to an idealistic 
aesthetic standard, that is, how their bodies are given to them as objects of thought or 
perception. The body schema, is contrast, is neither a mental state nor the content of 
a mental state, but a network of largely unconscious integrated bodily capacities.  
Reflection on body dysmorphia bolsters the conceptual distinction between body 
image and body schema. The body dysmporphic bodybuilder has misconceptions 
about the size and shape of his body, but while slaving away in the gym has no 
trouble coordinating his actions. On the contrary, through his training he builds up 
bodily habits which enable him to perfect the correct form of the exercise(s). His 
false beliefs and erroneous perceptual judgements about his own body do not prevent 
him from, say, accurately grasping a dumbbell and expertly performing repetitions of 
an exercise. And anorexics, who cannot shake the feeling that their bodies are too 
large and are prone to misjudge their size and build when, say, looking in a mirror, 
do not overcompensate for their perceived additional body mass in their daily 
negotiations with their surroundings. Despite their disorder of body image, their body 
schemas remain intact and unaffected.  
The case of Ian Waterman, who lost touch and proprioception below the neck to 
acute sensory neuropathy caused by a rare infection, provides further, empirical, 
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support for the schema/image distinction.. His case has been documented at length 
by clinicians, psychologists and philosophers (Gallagher 2005, Cole, Gallagher & 
McNeil 2002, Cole 1995, Cole & Paillard 1995, Gallagher & Cole 1995) and even a 
BBC documentary, 'The Man Who Lost His Body', which at the time of writing is 
still available on Youtube8.  Upon his initial hospitalisation, Waterman could not 
even sit upright. If he tried to move one of his limbs it would flail wildly and the rest 
of his body would also move in unpredictable ways. Though his muscles still worked 
and he could tense them, he had lost the prioprioceptive feedback that informs his 
brain where his body parts are. Eventually, through an amazing feat of willpower, 
Waterman learned to not only sit upright, but to live an active life that to casual 
observers, appears close to normal. He walks, drives, works and pursues hobbies. But 
his nerves remain severed. He succeeds in controlling his movement by the use of an 
often exhaustingly high degree of visual attention, and maintains posture by tensing 
his muscles and relying on memory of where he last saw his limbs to be (Gallagher 
2005 pp.43-5). Though Waterman gestures seemingly normally in conversation, 
experiments reveal that this too relies on close visual monitoring. Cole, Gallagher 
and McNeil (2002) asked Waterman to watch a short cartoon and relay the narrative. 
When describing the events depicted in the video he gesticulated with his hands in an 
apparently ordinary manner. But when set the same task with his hands shielded 
from view he did not, the absence of visual feedback preventing him from doing so, 
and kept his hands clasped in his lap (ibid.). Waterman relies on his preserved 
capacity to feel sensations of heat and uses these to clasp his hands together to keep 
them still (Gallagher 2005 p.112).  
                                                          
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AvLRwRAAoww (last accessed 31/8/14). 
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Waterman’s deficiency consists not in an inability to make judgements about his 
bodily location and positioning as he can do so on the basis of observation and 
inference. Rather, he has lost the low-level bodily awareness that typically renders 
such judgements unnecessary, owing to an almost total loss of body schema. (I say 
‘almost’, because Waterman has retained proprioception in his head and face, and is 
still able to tense his muscles, allowing him to freeze his position when, for example, 
sitting upright. He has also retained some visual proprioception - feedback about 
bodily movement and posture via visual information). In its place, he relies heavily 
on a continually maintained (perceptual) body image, as Gallagher explains 
In place of the missing schema processes, we might say that Ian has 
substituted a virtual body schema - a set of cognitively driven motor 
processes. This virtual schema seems to function only within the framework 
of a body image that is consciously and continually maintained. If he is 
denied access to a visual awareness of his body's position in the [visual] 
perceptual field, or denied the ability to think about his body, then, without 
the framework of the body image, the virtual body schema ceases to function 
- it cannot stand on its own. (Gallagher 2005. p.52) 
Waterman's body must always feature in his experience as a third term between his 
intention to act and the world in which he acts. It wouldn't be strictly correct to claim 
that his body is now entirely devoid of the operative intentionality Merleau-Ponty 
ascribes to the body schema, as he does not need to consciously think through 
individual muscle contractions, but he does have to attend closely to what each body 
part is doing in order to judge whether or not his movements correspond to his 
intentions (ibid. p.52-3) and he has lost the ability to form new motor programs (ibid. 
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p.62). As such Waterman's body is only present for him when it is the intentional 
object of an occurrent conscious mental state (ibid. p.64).  
Sacks (1985) describes an even more extreme case. A patient of his referred to as 
'Christina' suffered a complete loss of proprioception caused by sensory neuritis on 
the roots of her spinal and cranial nerves. Like Waterman, Christina can now only 
locate her limbs by continually visually attending to them. In contrast to Ian 
Waterman, her loss of proprioception extended to her head, making speech 
modulation initially impossible, though she eventually learned to reply on auditory 
feedback. Through the use of strict visual attention to her movement and posture, 
Christina regained the ability to coordinate her body, return to work, and lead what 
can appear to outsiders to be a relatively normal life, though her movements and 
speech now look like unnatural ‘theatrical performances’ (ibid. p. 54) due to the 
exaggerated nature of her visually-guided compensatory movements. On hearing her 
prognosis, Christina remarks 
I’ve already noticed…that I may ‘lose’ my arms. I think they’re one place, 
and I find they’re another. This ‘proprioception’ is like the eyes of the body, 
the way the body sees itself. And if it’s gone, as it’s gone with me, it’s like 
the body’s blind. (ibid. pp.51-2) 
Again, a body percept must be continually maintained in order to compensate 
(indeed, overcompensate) for the loss of body-schematic motor routines. Christina 
goes so far as to describe herself as ‘disembodied’ but because she no longer 
identifies with her body as hers, and struggles to remember or even imagine (ibid. 
p.56), indicating one way in which a lost body schema can have a profound long-
term effect on a body image. In a dramatic choice of words, Sartre compares the 
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objective conception of the body as a body modelled on the anatomical 
understanding of a corpse (Sartre 2003 p.327). Christina, who describes herself as 
'pithed like a grog' (Sacks 1985 p.56) presents one case where the phenomenal body 
has for her, in a certain sense, died. Both cases illustrate the extent to which the body 
schema, though generally recessive, plays a vital structural role in our mental lives. 
 
5. 'Representation' and 'representation' 
Neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists, influenced by Head and Holmes, 
generally use the term 'body schema' to refer to a neurally encoded internal map of 
the body (see e.g. Cardinali et al 2009, Marivita & Iriki 2004, Maravita, Spence & 
Driver 2003). Here one recalls the famous model of Penfield's 'sensory homunculus', 
an anthropomorphic visual illustration of the human body in proportion to the areas 
of the somatosensory cortex dedicated to each body part (Penfield & Rasmussen 
1950). The hands, genitals, and lower part of the head (especially the lips) of the 
model are disproportionately (and amusingly)  larger than a real human body owing 
to the greater cortical space dedicated to their sensitivity (Ramachandran & 
Blakeslee 2005 p.25-7). This inner 'body map' is what most neuroscientists have in 
mind when they talk about a body schema - an internal map of the body that the brain 
uses to control bodily movement.  
Following suit, de Vignemont (2010) challenges Gallagher's characterisation of the 
case of Ian Waterman as one of a 'missing schema': 
It does not make more sense to claim that deafferented patients have a deficit of 
body schema than to claim that blind people have a deficit of body schema. In the 
latter case, they rely on proprioception instead of vision. In the former case, they 
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rely on vision instead of proprioception. The body schema (qua sensorimotor 
representation) is there, although based on different weighting of information. 
Whereas proprioception may normally play an important role, it has been taken 
over by vision in deafferented patients. One may reply that their actions are not 
normal because they require reflexive monitoring of their movements. This might 
have been true at the beginning when the patients had to learn how to visually 
guide their movements. Similarly, you have to pay attention at the beginning 
when you learn to drive a car. But after a while, you drive without consciously 
monitoring the visual information that you receive on the other cars, the road, etc. 
Deafferented patients are like the automatic drivers. [...] This is not to say that 
their body schema has not changed. It has, giving more weight to vision. But it is 
not “missing”. (de Vignemont 2010 p.675) 
 
It is a fair but trivial point that 'The Case of the Missing Schema' is an ever-so-
slightly inaccurate title for the second chapter of How the Body Shapes the Mind, as 
in it Gallagher actually argues, as aforementioned, that a), Waterman suffers from an 
almost total, but not totally total, loss of body schema, as he has retained 
proprioception and tactile sensation in his head as well as visual proprioception and 
is still able to freeze his bodily position at will, and b), by learning to control his 
posture and movement via visual attention, he has developed a 'virtual' body schema. 
But this concession, if it even is a concession, does not license the claim that a 
patient such as Waterman has a body schema in the sense in a blind but otherwise 
able bodied subject can be said to have one.  De Vignemont reaches this conclusion 
by misrepresenting Gallagher's position by identifying the body schema with a 
'sensorimotor representation'. Recall that this is not the neo-Merleau-Pontian concept 
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of body schema with which Gallagher operates. Though the body schema is 
constituted, in part, by. sensorimotor representations, it is not itself a representation 
but a network of bodily dispositions, and it is precisely Waterman's loss of these 
motor dispositions, which in neurotypical subjects alleviate the need for visual 
monitoring, that explains his behavioural and phenomenological atypicality. For 
Waterman his body must be, and can only be, the object of a percept or mental state. 
What matters here is that the operative intentionality of the body - its pre-reflective 
world-directedness, is vastly diminished. It is not the loss of proprioception per se 
which justifies the claim of a loss of schema, but the loss of motor dispositions that 
occurs as the direct result of the loss of proprioception; the type of information 
processing involved is a secondary concern. And the fact (assuming it is a fact) that 
Waterman has retained a neural representation(s) despite his loss of proprioception 
only serves to demonstrate that the body schema proper is not identical or reducible 
to a neural state, but is constituted by processes in the peripheral nervous system also 
as it is the connection between the two that is damaged (Gallagher 2005 p.48). 
De Vignemont also errs by conflating the (true) claim that Waterman does not need 
to continually relearn how to use visual information to control his movement with the 
(false) claim that he does not consciously and reflexively visually monitor his 
movement. He does, he just does it very well. While it is true that his movements can 
seem automatic or close to automatic from outside observation, as a matter of fact 
they are not, and unlike those of de Vignemont's seasoned driver, require a high 
degree of conscious monitoring. Even for the well established activity of walking on 
a flat surface, Waterman estimates that it requires fifty to seventy percent of his 
attention, while walking on an uneven surface requires a hundred percent (Gallagher 
2005 p.49). Waterman's need for a high degree of conscious visual attention to his 
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body is further evidenced by the fact that if he is asked to hold an egg he can do it 
apparently quite easily, but once his attention is directed elsewhere, he crushes it 
(ibid. p.44). Moreover, de Vignemont's comparison between Waterman's control of 
his body and driving a car is discredited by Waterman's own experience of driving; it 
is precisely the relative lack of conscious effort required to keep a car stable and 
moving that enables him to drive far more easily than walk  
Ian drives and he enjoys it. It seems effortless to him in comparison to 
walking. He reports that it is easier for him to drive 300 or 400 miles than to 
stop and refuel. Driving actually allows him to relax his attention to his 
bodily movements. Ian maintains his posture by 'freezing' in place. He needs 
only to keep his hands within the visual field (all the controls are manual), 
and he's assisted in a high degree of visual perception which facilitates 
automatic control in the case of driving (...). (ibid. p.58) 
Waterman's car won't change shape or fall over if he looks away, and it is 
mechanically disposed to respond appropriately to its controls. Ian thereby offloads 
much of his mobility issues onto his 'car schema', as it were. Far from providing an 
analogy by which to ascribe a body schema to deafferented subjects like Waterman 
and Christina, de Vignemont's driving example only serves to further illuminate the 
stark differences between ordinary action and their highly vision-dependent coping 
strategy. 
It is perhaps the guiding metaphor of an image of the body encoded in the brain - a 
sensory homunculus - which motivates theorists of various stripes to posit 
accompanying bodily mental imagery in their explanations of our experience and 
behaviour (e.g. Metzinger 2009; Damasio 2000, O'Shaughnessy 1980), and which 
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leads neuroscientists to assimilate the body schema to a neural representation. The 
assumption would be that as the brain processes representations of the body and/or 
various body parts, our ability to act skilfully in our surroundings must depend on a 
mental image of our body. This inference is unjustified, as it trades on an ambiguity 
between two senses of 'representation'. Unlike certain philosophers, I do not think 
that the notion of representation and its liberality of usage amounts to a call for its 
outright abandonment (cf. Hutto & Myin 2013, Hutto 2013); when deployed 
carefully it is a perfectly innocuous and very useful term. It does, however, 
necessitate some clarification as to the precise role of representation in the concept of 
the body schema I am defending here, and will appeal to at various junctures 
throughout this thesis.  
It is prima facie tempting to read both Merleau-Ponty and Gallagher as rejecting all 
forms of representational talk in relation to the body schema, so that it might be 
distinguished from a body image, but this is not strictly warranted once their claims 
are put into context. We can distinguish between what we may, following Dennett 
(1969), call 'personal' and 'sub-personal' senses of 'representation'. The personal level 
of description pertains to what Sellars (1997) calls the 'manifest image' of 
humankind, or what Husserl calls the 'life-world' [Lebenswelt], which comprise the 
humanistic domain of our everyday discourse about our mental lives. The personal 
level of description comprises both folk psychology and the personal level analysis 
par excellence, phenomenology. In the personal level sense of 'representation', to 
represent something - a thing, a state of affairs - is to be in a mental state which has 
that thing or state of affairs (or whatever) as its object (a la object intentionality). 
Explanations of behaviour at the personal level appeal to people's beliefs, desires, 
intentions, perceptions and conscious experiences. In contrast, discourse at a sub-
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personal level refers to what Sellars calls the 'scientific image' and which belongs to 
the domain of what Merleau-Ponty derisively calls 'objective thought'. Explanations 
of mental phenomena at a sub-personal level of description require a switch of 
theoretical stance from everyday discourse on experience in favour of a piecemeal 
analysis of the physical states and processes that underpin personal-level mental 
phenomena - neurobiology, computational psychology, etc. Such phenomena occur 
below the threshold of conscious awareness and deal in concepts that are largely 
alien to our everyday experience and discourse (fantasies about future societies 
adopting 'brain state language' notwithstanding (Churchland 1981)), though they may 
borrow certain concepts from personal level discourse in a more-or-less metaphorical 
way (Dennett 1971). 'Representation' in this sub-personal level sense pertains to 
information transformation occurring in particular parts of the brain (or elsewhere, 
cf. chapter IV) which causally contributes to the production of personal-level 
phenomena like consciousness and belief.  
When Merleau-Ponty and others following him (e.g. Romdenh-Romluc 2011a, 
Dreyfus 2000; 1992) express hostility to the 'intellectualist' thesis that in action, one's 
bodily movements must be the object(s) of a mental representation, it is primarily the 
personal level sense of 'representation' they have in mind. In other words, in 
following Merleau-Ponty in denying that embodied subjects must represent their 
body to themselves in order to engage in absorbed coping, I am denying that the 
attribution of a object-intentional mental state about their body is required to explain 
their behaviour and/or to describe their lived experience. As both a phenomenologist 
and a theorist writing before the discipline of psychology had entered its current 
cognitivist paradigm, Merleau-Ponty simply has no interest in the sub-personal 
version of representationalism (though one might reasonably wonder, as does 
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Dreyfus (1992), whether the inappropriateness of representational talk at the personal 
level has ramifications for a theory of cognition which posits corresponding 
representations at the sub-personal level of cognitive architecture).  Similarly, 
Gallagher's claim that the body schema is not to be identified with, or reduced to, a 
mental representation of the body, is often advanced as a phenomenologically-
motivated personal-level claim. Neither philosophers' views are strictly incompatible 
with the idea that having a functioning body schema requires the presence of certain 
kinds of sub-personal neural representations. They are, however, incompatible with 
the claims that such representations constitute a continually present body image, and 
that the body schema is identical or reducible to these neural representations 
(Gallagher 2005 p.134).  
Though the ability to deploy the appropriate motor programs required to perform a 
given action or sequence of actions will involve the activation of certain neural 
representations, this does not change the fact the acting subject need not, generally 
does not, and in many cases cannot, represent these motor commands to themselves 
in thought. At the personal level of description, their experience is harmonious with 
the project at hand and the content of their mental state far less fine-grained than that 
of their sub-personal states. Generally, both when making first-hand reports of what 
we are doing and describing the observed actions of others, we describe our 
intentions at the 'highest pragmatic level of description', making recourse to norms of 
behaviour rather than rational reconstructions thereof (Gallagher 2005 p.238, 
Ratcliffe 2007). If I am interrupted while reaching for my coffee cup and asked what 
I'm doing I might respond 'picking up my cup to drink from it', just 'picking up my 
cup' or, more likely, simply 'having a drink', but not 'I am computing the trajectory of 
my fingertips, hand and arm using visual information and prorioceptive feedback in 
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order that motor signals from my premotor cortex might initiate the following 
sequence of  finger movements and postural adjustments via electrochemical signals 
sent to my central nervous system ...' (or whatever). The implicated neural 
representations, then, though perfectly physically real, are not strictly mental 
representations - they do not feature in the agent's psychology - though they may 
form part of the physical substrate of a mental representation which does - a body 
image. For instance, it is often assumed that some form of cognitive access to a 
neural body map is required for subjects to be able to conceive of their bodies as 
their own and to possess a concept of themselves as an embodied subject (e.g. 
Metzinger 2009; Damasio 2000). Ramachandran, for example,  hypothesises that 
neuropathological conditions like  anosognosia (inability to acknowledge a disability, 
such as paralysis of a limb) and somatoparaphrenia  (delusional denial of ownership 
of a body part) are explicable in terms of damage to the cortical pathways required 
for such access (Ramachandran & Blakeslee 2005 p.253-4).  But qua 'self concept' 
(ibid., my italics), the body map here serves as the physical substrate, or part of the 
physical substrate, of the subject's body image. In our ordinary pre-reflective being-
in-the-world this conceptualised body image, though cognitively accessible upon 
reflection, is recessive to the point of absence. We can engage in absorbed coping 
without thinking about our bodies at all, because the need for such a mental state is 
alleviated by the successful close-to-automatic functioning of the body schema itself. 
So while it must be admitted that the body schema and the body image are likely to 
have some overlap at the sub-personal level of cognitive architecture, they are 
nonetheless conceptually distinct for this. 
As a system of bodily dispositions dependent upon sub-personal motor processes, the 
body schema straddles the personal/sub-personal distinction. What then, is the 
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relationship between sub-personal neural representations and the body schema? The 
answer is simple: certain neural representations are part of the physical processes 
which comprise the body schema. Here Clark's (1997) notion of an 'action-oriented 
representation' - which I have already smuggled into the chapter via the quote from 
de Vignemont - is instructive. Talk of action-oriented representations is increasingly 
common in neuroscientific treatments of the inner body map, though Clark coins the 
term in the context of  ecological robotics; robots capable of coordinated behaviours 
in the absence of pre-programmed rules or inner models of their environments (see 
e.g. Brooks 1991a; 1991b). These artificial creatures are capable of negotiating their 
way around a laboratory whilst avoiding obstacles (including people trying to distract 
them), and collecting discarded coke cans (ibid.). Action-oriented representations are 
sub-personal information-carrying states which 'simultaneously describe aspects of 
the world and prescribe possible actions, and are poised between pure control 
structures and passive representations of external reality' (Clark 1997 p.49). As 
Wheeler insightfully points out, the content of these minimal representations and 
their behavioural effects are dependent upon the context in which they are active; 
what they mean depends on what the system in which they're embedded is doing 
(Wheeler 2005 p.196). In other words, their intentionality is operative rather than 
objective. Sub-personal representations of this kind are therefore good candidates for 
the sorts of neural representations implicated in pre-reflective absorbed coping. 
Acting in the world requires modulation on both sides of the boundary of the body. 
As I shall argue in the next chapter, we respond skilfully to the ways in which the 
world presents itself to us in perceptual experience, and the morphology of the body 
provides the skill set by which we respond to it accordingly. Just as a body sans 
action-oriented neural representations cannot act upon the world, action-oriented 
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representations mean nothing, and do nothing, outside of the practical context in 
which they are embedded.. The content of action-oriented representations is therefore 
'wide'  (determined by their environment) rather than 'narrow' (determined by internal 
properties of the system) (see McCulloch 2003, Putnam 1975, Burge 1979), and 
relatively transient compared to say, a belief. As Wheeler also notes, context-
sensitive action-oriented representations are precisely the sorts of inner features one 
would expect to find in organisms who have evolved to enjoy the kind of primordial 
being-in-the-world envisioned by Heidegger (and by extension, Merleau-Ponty) 
(ibid. p.198-9).  
 
6. Plastic brains and rubber hands 
Thus far I have implicitly treated the body schema as an integrated collection of 
functions of the human organism. In this section I present an array of cases whereby 
paraphernalia external to the boundaries of the biological body may be considered to 
be incorporated into the body schema. This theme of bodily extension will be 
revisited in chapter III. 
There is ample empirical evidence to support the claim that the neural 
representations underlying the functions of the body schema exhibit a considerable 
degree of plasticity and context sensitivity, thus justifying the claim that they are 
action-oriented. Head and Holmes (1911) were taken by the way in which a blind 
man using a stick to negotiate his surroundings localised tactile sensations at the tip 
of the cane rather than in his hand, and hypothesised accordingly that his brain must 
treat the cane as part of his arm (Merleau-Ponty also notes this phenomenon 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012 pp.144-5)).  It turns out that they were correct; the brain's 
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representation(s) of the limbs is highly adaptable and continually modified by visual, 
tactile and kinaesthetic feedback. Macaque monkeys can be trained to use a rake to 
retrieve food pellets. During use of the rake, the receptive field9 of neurons in their 
somatosensory cortex - the cortical location of the  inner body map -extended beyond 
the boundary of the monkey's arm to incorporate the area occupied by the rake itself 
(Iriki, Tanaka & Iwamura 1996). Similar effects have been observed in human tool 
use also (Maravita & Iriki 2004, Maravita, Spence & Driver 2003). While using a 
grasping tool (a bit like the device used by park keepers to pick up litter) to estimate 
the size of an object, the brain treats the source of the haptic information (the signal 
from the hand) as originating from the tip of the tool rather than the actual hand 
(Takahashi, Diedrichsen & Watt 2009). Following this kind of tool use, subjects are 
temporarily prone to overestimate the distance between tactile sensations on their 
arm, suggesting that, for a short time, their brains continue to represent their arm 
length as still extended (Cardinali et al 2009).  
 
The so-called 'rubber hand illusion' provides another example of incorporation of 
extra-biological items into the neural body map. Botvinick and Cohen's (1998) 
subjects' sat at a table with their left hand hidden from view with a life-sized rubber 
hand placed in front of them in an anatomically plausible way. Two small 
paintbrushes were used to stoke both the occluded real hand and the perceived rubber 
hand simultaneously. After sitting with their eyes fixed on the fake hand for ten 
minutes, many of Botvinick and Cohen's subjects reported feeling what Tsakaris, 
Prabhu & Haggard (2006) have since dubbed 'proprioceptive drift' - a sense of 
                                                          
9 The area to which an applied stimulus - usually a bodily surface - will activate the 
firing of particular neurons. 
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ownership for the rubber hand, and claim to feel tactile sensations in it, rather than 
their hidden real hand. The effect was tested against a control group where the 
stroking of the rubber hand was asynchronous with the stoking of the real hand. The 
number of subjects who claimed to experience the illusion dropped to seven per cent, 
as opposed to forty-two percent in the  synchronous condition, indicating that 
synchronisation between tactile stimulation and visual perception of the perceived 
stimulus is important to the creation of the illusion (ibid. p.756).  
Armel and Ramachandran (2003) replicated Botvinick and Cohen's experimental 
setup and measured the galvanic skin conductance response10 of the subjects who 
experienced the illusion. Once the illusion set in, Armel and Ramachandran 'injured' 
the rubber hand by bending back one of its fingers. This elicited a strong skin 
conductance response in their subjects and they exhibited pain-anticipating 
avoidance behaviours like wincing and even snatching their real hand away from 
experimenters (ibid. pp.1502-3). It should be noted, however, that only two out of 
one-hundred and twenty subjects reported feeling any actual pain (ibid. p.1503). 
Subsequent studies reveal that the rubber hand illusion admits of degrees of strength 
and its onset proceeds through several stages before felt ownership of the rubber 
hand can displace that of the real hand (Moguillansky, O'Regan & Petitmengin 
2013). While the skin colour of the rubber hand apparently has no effect on subjects' 
susceptibility to the illusion  (Farmer, Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris 2012), the 
strength of the illusion is inversely proportional to the distance of the rubber hand 
from the real hand (Loyd 2007), and depends on the prop's being suitably hand-like 
in appearance; synchronous stroking of the hidden hand with a plank of wood will 
                                                          
10 An electrochemical response to stimuli, namely the release of sweat. Measuring 
galvanic skin conductance is a popular method of  testing the strength of emotional 
responses to stimuli.  
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not give rise to the illusion, a coarsely hand-shaped piece of wood might, and an 
anatomically accurate model hand probably will (Tsakiris et al 2010).  
Cases like these straddle the schema/image distinction. Neural adaptation to tools 
occurs in action contexts approaching absorbed coping,  which under Gallagher's 
criteria would constitute a modification to the body schema, but rely on conscious 
visual monitoring of the artificial body part, which involve aspects classifiable under 
body image. Similarly the rubber hand illusion consists in the temporary 
modification of proprioception (schema) as the product of visual attention to a fake 
limb (image). While it is highly unlikely that subjects in the grip of the rubber hand 
illusion would conceptualise their bodily selves as incorporating the fake hand, it 
seems that a certain degree of conceptual knowledge constrains the illusion, as 
anatomically implausible props won't induce an illusion of ownership. At the same 
time, the relationship between spatial proximity of the fake hand to the real hand 
suggests that proprioceptive norms constrain the illusion also. We must therefore 
concede that the schema/image distinction is heuristic rather than exhaustive, and 
acknowledge interaction between the two. I do not think that the distinction is in too 
much trouble, though. It still provides a useful conceptual tool for distinguishing 
aspects of our mental lives - object-intentional mental states about our bodies, and 
operative-intentional absorbed coping. And, as the above remarks (admittedly, 
sketchily) indicate, it can be fruitfully deployed to analyse the different stages of the 
illusion and their phenomenal and functional characteristics.  
In data-driven discussions of these neural adaptations, it is generally assumed that the 
body schema is identical or reducible to the continually-updated neural body map. 
Metzinger, for example, invokes both Iriki et al's macaque experiment and the rubber 
hand illusion to support the thesis that embodiment is entirely a matter of what's 
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going on in the brain (Metzinger 2009 pp.75-82). I think this is too hasty. For one 
thing, we should be wary of drawing any conclusions based on data from skin 
conductance alone because, as de Vignemont (2011) points out, galvanic skin 
response does not suffice to establish bodily incorporation. The same sort of response 
occurs  when we see other people in pain (Westbury & Neummann 2008) and even 
hardened viewers might sweat, wince or grimace when watching an especially 
gruesome scene from a horror film, so this kind of response probably has more to do 
with empathy than a modified body schema as such (see e.g.  G.Hein et al 2011). 
This is consistent with the fact that people with autistic spectrum disorders are less 
susceptible to the illusion (Palmer at al 2013, Casico et al 2012).11  Recall also that 
Armel & Ramachandran's recoiling subjects snatched away their real arm, thereby 
exercising a retained capacity for a body-schematic response to a perceived situation. 
Habits die harder than transitory illusions.  
As for proprioceptive drift  itself, visual processing has a tendency to dominate or 
overrule that of other senses. In the McGurk effect, for example visual perception of 
a speaker's face overrides audition, misleading people into hearing syllables different 
to those being said (McGurk & MacDonald 1976)12. Given this fact, it is perhaps not 
too surprising that this should be the case with proprioception also (Stokes & Biggs 
forthcoming). But it doesn't show that an internally-constructed body map magically 
erases the body schema proper. The rubber hand illusion is relatively short-lived and 
                                                          
11To the best of my knowledge, there are currently no data on skin conductance from 
autistic subjects subjected to the rubber hand  illusion. Going out on a limb (so to 
speak), I would venture the prediction that they would show a reduced skin 
conductance response.  
 
12 When shown a video of a face uttering the syllable ‘ba’, but with some of the ‘bas’ 
overdubbed with the syllable ‘ga’, people hear the syllable as ‘da’ (McGurk & 
MacDonald 1976). 
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is induced in artificial experimental conditions where the role of the body is 
conceived as entirely passive. Experiments with video projections of fake hands 
strongly suggest that achieving a complete sense of agency, as opposed to mere 
temporary ownership of the hand13, and to fully integrate the prop hand into the 
subject's proprioceptive field, requires active manipulation of the prop (Tsakiris, 
Schutz-Bosbach & Gallagher 2007, Tsakaris, Prabhu & Haggard 2006), because the 
sense of bodily agency requires interplay between centralised brain processes and 
afferent input from the peripheral nervous system (Tsakaris & Haggard 2005; Marcel 
2003). The rubber hand illusion therefore presents a case of partial integration, or an 
early stage of an as-yet incomplete integration, of a foreign object into the body 
schema, A more thorough integration requires a temporally extended process of 
active bodily engagement. 
 
7. Embodiment ain't in the head 
Neural plasticity allows for flexible embodiment, but it is only part of the story. 
Some philosophers have defended the view that proprioception provides a kind of 
direct knowledge of one's body that is immune to error (e.g. O'Shaughnessy 1995, 
Evans 1982). Prima facie, the rubber hand illusion and data from tool use 
experiments contradict this thesis (cf. de Vignemont 2014). Considered 
phenomenologically, however, this is not quite true. The greater degree to which an 
object integrates with the body schema via its utilisation in action, the more 
inappropriate the term 'illusion' becomes to characterise the experience. It is of 
                                                          
13 Bodily ownership is the sense of 'mineness' about the body, that this body is my 
body. The sense of bodily agency is the awareness that an action is something one is 
doing (see Gallagher 2000).  
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course true that if, say, Head and Holmes' blind man were to affirm the belief that his 
hand is located several feet away from the end of his wrist he would be saying 
something false. But viewed phenomenologically, the experience of displaced touch 
and proprioceptive drift constitutes an extension of the body through which the blind 
man gains unmediated access to features of his surroundings (e.g. that a rock is in 
front of his feet). Here the aforementioned distinction between the objective and the 
lived/phenomenal body is pertinent. Insofar as the object is utilised in an active 
motor project, it extends the lived body beyond the boundaries of the objective, 
biological body. As Merleau-Ponty remarks on this example 
The blind man's cane has ceased to be an object for him, it is no longer 
perceived for itself; rather, the cane's furthest point is transformed into a 
sensitive zone, it increases the scope and the radius of the act of touching and 
has become analogous to a gaze. (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.144) 
Similarly, amputees using prosthetic hands can hone new motor skills through use, 
sometimes performing as well on tasks (e.g. accurate grasping) as their able bodied 
counterparts (Schabowsky et al 2008) and experience the end point of a surviving 
partial limb as coinciding more with the prosthesis than their stump (McDonnell et al 
1989). 
Doing justice to incorporation requires taking the phenomenology seriously (as, for 
example, does Clark 2003). In the spirit of naturalism and physicalism, we should 
readily accept that the phenomenology of embodiment is ultimately constituted by 
physical states and processes. But while it is beyond reasonable doubt that there exist 
sub-personal neural representations of body parts and/or non body parts which are 
poised to govern action, it does not follow, in a reductionist spirit, that 'the body 
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schema is [...] as a cluster of sensorimotor representations that are action-oriented' 
(de Vignemont 2010 p.679, my italics). As I seek to articulate in more depth over the 
next two chapters, our perceptual encounters with the world involve an implicit 
understanding of, and ability to respond to, items, events and situations which are 
grasped as meaningful for us. We see objects as 'affording' possibilities for action 
(Gibson 1986), and our perceived surroundings solicit what Merleau-Ponty calls 
'motor significations' which have meaning neither for a detached Cartesian ego or a 
group of firing neurons but, as Merleau-Ponty, following Heidegger, stresses, a 
bodily subject inescapably embedded in a world of practical engagements. Intelligent 
behaviour therefore comprises a 'sensory circuit' (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.89) between 
the active body and the perceived world, of which action-oriented representations are 
merely one small but vital physical constituent. So while a body schema cannot 
function in the absence of certain sub-personal action-oriented neural 
representations, the concept of a body schema does not signify these neural 
representations, or any singular neural representation they might be said to jointly 
constitute, but the network of bodily dispositions itself, which owe not just to the 
inner workings of parts of a subject's brain but also their bodily morphology and skill 
set.  
 
8. A Note on Phantom Limbs 
Phantom limbs present a limit case for a phenomenology of embodiment. Amputees 
often experience painful, tactile or kinaesthetic sensation emanating from their absent 
body parts. There are also documented cases of aplastic phantoms, phantom limb 
experiences in those born without the corresponding body part (usually a limb) (Price 
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2006), which are likely to emerge from a combination of genetic and developmental 
factors (ibid.). It is tricky to say anything definite about phantom limbs as their 
phenomenal characteristics, physical causes, and psychological histories vary so 
much between cases (for a detailed empirical review, see Giummarra et al 2007). 
Nevertheless, I am obliged to comment on them, albeit cautiously, because they 
present a prima facie challenge to my claim that embodiment is not reducible to 
events in the brain. 
Though some patients experience their phantoms as immobile, others report being 
able to move them intentionally, and these movements can constrain the movement 
of surviving body parts in the same way as real limbs despite the absence of visual or 
proprioceptive feedback (Franz & Ramachandran 1998). In the neuroscientific and 
clinical literature, phantom limbs are often described in terms of a body image, but 
authors typically have in mind aspects of a body schema also (Gallagher 2005 ch. 
IV). Insofar as phantoms show up in patients' consciousness - as phenomenal 
curiosities, obstacles to an ordinary life, or sources of pain or discomfort, they are 
best characterised in terms of body image - an occurrent intentional object of a 
mental state. But insofar as they depend on the survival of the neural representations 
underlying proprioception and kinaesthesia, they are the product of a partial body 
schema (ibid.).  
Phantom limbs are adaptable, and the ways in which they are experienced are highly 
amenable to perceptual situations and contexts of action. Phantom movement is 
experienced in some contexts but not others. For example, one patient who was born 
without arms feels two short phantoms which gesticulate in conversation, but seem to 
slump motionlessly while walking (Ramachandran & Blakeslee 2005 p.40-2). 
Immobile phantoms (i.e. where tactile or pain sensation are felt but no movement) 
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can be revived using mirrors to invoke the visual appearance of the subject's intact 
hand taking the place of their missing hand (Ramachandran, Rogers-Ramachandran 
& Cobb 1995). This works by exploiting visual dominance and fooling the patient's 
brain into attributing the outcome of an intention to act to the perceived movement, 
and can be used to ease spasms felt in the missing hand (ibid.). The newly acquired 
felt movement is transient, however, and is lost without visual perception of the 
mirrored superimposed limb (Ramachandran & Blakeslee 2005 p.53). Conversely, 
phantom movement can be eliminated through 'learned paralysis', where the lack of 
visually perceived movement nullifies the subject's act intentions (ibid. p.46).  
Amputees who use prostheses tend not to feel phantom pains, but come to feel their 
phantom as being embodied by the prosthetic limb (Giummarra et al 2007 pp.222-3), 
and it is thought by some doctors that a phantom is essential to successful use of a 
prosthetic limb (Sacks 1985 p.71). Following adaptation, they can sometimes even 
scratch phantom itches by scratching their prosthetic limb (Giummarra et al 2008 
p.154).  
Despite their being experienced as private mental episodes, the surviving neural 
representations of absent body parts apparently depend heavily for their content on 
perception and action. This is consistent with my characterisation of the neural 
representations underlying the body schema as action-oriented. Though the 
experience of phantoms owes initially to preserved sub-personal neural 
representations of missing body parts, the content of these representations is wide 
rather than narrow; what they represent, and what shows up in the subject's 
experience on their basis, is determined by the perception of external events and the 
subject's intentional action. The adaptability of phantom limbs suggest that they 
depend in large part upon factors external to the brain, and that the subject's 
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(partially) illusory embodiment is constituted, at least in part, by their active 
perceptual engagement with their environment. Even in the absence of a real limb, 
the internal body map is malleable and depends for is content on the ways in which it 
is actively plugged into the world. 
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II. Embodying Perception: The Sensorimotor Approach to Vision 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced and defended a distinction between body 
schema and body image, and argued that the former is not reducible or identical to a 
sub-personal neural representation. In this chapter I explore the ways in which 
embodiment structures perception, with a particular focus on visual experience, by 
means of a discussion and defence of the sensorimotor approach to visual perception 
as formulated in the empirical work of Kevin O'Regan, the more theoretical-
philosophical work of Alva Noë, and their collaborative efforts.  In brief, the 
sensorimotor approach characterises visual perception as the active exploration of 
one's immediate environment via the exercise of a special kind of bodily skill.  
I begin with a discussion of the position the sensorimotor approach attacks, the so-
called 'snapshot' conception of vision, which comes in both personal and sub-
personal variations. The case against the snapshot conception is illustrated by means 
of experimental work on change blindness and inattentional blindness, and 
phenomenological analysis courtesy of Noë, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.  I then turn 
to the concept of 'sensorimotor understanding', which is of central importance to the 
sensorimotor approach. I argue that Noë's account suffers from certain contradictions 
resulting from some overly strong but ultimately non-essential claims about the role 
of action in visual experience. These shortcomings are rectified by situating Noë's 
account in relation to Husserlian phenomenology, then appealing to particular 
aspects of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy to amend Noë's account. The chapter 
concludes with a response to Andy Clark's critique of the sensorimotor approach.  
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2. Two versions of the sensorimotor approach 
Although the sensorimotor approach was brought into the philosophical and 
scientific mainstream by O'Regan and Noë's (2001) seminal Behavioural and Brain 
Sciences target article, the two former collaborators have since appropriated the 
sensorimotor approach to quite different philosophical ends. As Bishop and Martin 
(2014) instructively highlight, O'Regan takes the sensorimotor approach, 
supplemented by a higher-order thought theory of self-consciousness (a la Rosenthal 
1997), to provide the necessary conceptual tools to solve what Chalmers (1996; 
1995) famously dubbed the 'hard problem' as opposed to the 'easy problems' of 
consciousness (namely, the perplexing metaphysical conundrum of why any physical 
system should give rise to conscious experience at all) in an empirically testable and 
naturalistic way. This is how O'Regan presents his project throughout his latest book, 
Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell (O'Regan 2011) and elsewhere (O'Regan 2010), 
the consequences of which he takes to be instructive with respect to the possibility of 
machine consciousness (O'Regan 2012). Noë, on the other hand, bar a few sketchy 
asides, is less worried about the hard problem of consciousness or the possibility of 
conscious robots and repeatedly asserts that his philosophical project is essentially a 
phenomenological one (e.g. Noë 2004 p.33; 176). That is to say, he is more 
concerned with the ways in which action and embodiment structure the content of 
perceptual experience. This project, Noë readily admits, necessitates 'taking a little 
bit of consciousness for granted' (ibid. p.230, italics removed). Though I am 
generally sympathetic to O'Regan's take on the issue of the hard problem (though 
less so on machine consciousness), and will of necessity discuss a good deal of his 
empirical and theoretical work as well as the aforementioned collaborative paper, I 
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am primarily concerned with the sensorimotor approach as it functions in Noë's 
project. That it is, I am concerned with building on my previous chapter in order to 
explore the way in which embodiment shapes our perceptual experience.  
A quick note on terminology. The sensorimotor approach is often also referred to as 
the 'enactive' approach to vision. At one point, this was Noë's preferred label (i.e. in 
Noë (2004), cf. Noë (2012)). The term 'enactive' was introduced into contemporary 
philosophical and cognitive-scientific vocabulary by Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
(1991) in The Embodied Mind, which synthesises a novel blend of phenomenology 
and Buddhist thought to form the basis for a critique of what they take to be a latent 
and problematic Cartesianism inherent in cognitive science (see also Thompson 
2007). In recent years, however, the label 'enactivism' has come to be synonymous 
with the rejection of any theory of cognition which invokes representational or 
informational content (e.g. Hutto and Myin 2013, Hutto 2013). In order to avoid 
conflation with these and other views presented under the banner of enactivism, and 
for further technical (though slightly pedantic) reasons explained later in this chapter, 
I shall adhere to O'Regan and Noë's (2001) original terminology throughout.  
 
3. Against pictures in the head: the 'snapshot' conception of vision 
In his neo-classic book Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett (1991) rages 
against a position he dubs  'Cartesian materialism', which he take to have had a 
deeply unfortunate and regrettable influence on a good deal of philosophical and 
scientific theorising about the nature of the mind.  Roughly, Cartesian materialism is 
the belief in a particular centre of the brain where consciousness happens, where 
what we decide, perceive, remember, feel or imagine is presented to a centralised 
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subject housed inside an interior mental realm - the 'Cartesian theatre'. Dennett 
argues, very convincingly, that the Cartesian theatre is a myth and, as an instance of 
the homunculus fallacy, explains nothing. The sensorimotor approach to perception 
rebels against one particular instance of Cartesian materialism, namely what Noë 
helpfully dubs the 'snapshot' conception of vision (Noë 2004 p.35). According to the 
snapshot conception, visual perception is essentially pictorial in nature. Although 
Noë himself does not always distinguish clearly between them, there are in fact two 
related versions of the snapshot conception of vision. One version applies at the 
personal level of visual phenomenology, while the other applies at the sub-personal 
level of the cognitive processing which underpins that phenomenology. The personal 
level version of the snapshot conception has it that visual experience is comparable 
to a richly detailed picture, like a photograph, of the external world. On this 
conception of perceptual experience, vision presents us with rich images of the world 
the vivid detail of which is given instantaneously and simultaneously to the 
perceiver.  The sub-personal version of the snapshot conception has it that visual 
phenomenology is caused by, supervenes on, or can be identified with, states of the 
visual system which encode stable, detailed representations of the external world 
constructed out of sensory inputs. I shall consider the sub-personal version of the 
snapshot conception first.  
Aside from certain metaphors inherited from early modern philosophy,14 much of the 
motivation for the snapshot conception of perceptual cognition stems from 
considerations about the poverty of the eye. Retinal images, as images go, are pretty 
poor. As O'Regan is fond of pointing out, the lens of the human eye is vastly inferior 
to those found in even moderately priced cameras. Any photographs made with a 
                                                          
14 Namely the 'camera obscura' metaphor for perception generally attributed to 
Locke, see e.g. Bailey (1989).  
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lens with as low a resolution as the one found in the eye would be blurry almost all 
over bar the very centre, and even there the colours would be vague and muddled 
(O'Regan 2011 p.10). The photoreceptors that allow us to discriminate colours are 
found only in the centre of the eye, rendering all but the centre of our visual field 
virtually colour blind. Each eye has a vascular scotoma, a blind spot caused by blood 
vessels between the optic nerve and the retina which obstruct the images formed on 
the retina. On top of this, the brain has two different retinal images to deal with. 
These are only two-dimensional, and they are upside down (for a short but thorough 
account of the shortcomings of the human eye, see O'Regan (2011) pp.3-22). 
Furthermore, the eyes saccade on average around three times per second (Yarbus 
1967) and we blink several times a minute, which renders individual retinal 
impressions very short lived. In spite of all these optical defects, we perceive a stable 
and detailed three dimensional world incredibly well. Mainstream cognitive science 
has therefore by and large conceived of the scientific study of vision as the task of 
accounting for the mechanisms by which the brain forms internal models of the 
world out of paltry sensory stimulation. For example, Marr's landmark book Vision 
criticises Gibson's (1986) competing 'ecological' theory of vision as the 'direct 
pickup' of information from reflected light for allegedly underestimated the 
complexity of the information processing required by visual cognition (Marr 1982 
p.253), and lays the foundations for contemporary computational vision science by 
treating visual perception as a multi-stage process by which initial images are 
processed to form a three dimensional model of what is perceived (see ibid. p.260 for 
a schematic diagram of the stages of processing).   
Sensorimotor theorists like O'Regan and Noë question just how much detail need be 
encoded in these internal representations. Their answer, in contrast to their 
60 
 
predecessors in vision science, is 'not very much'. Evidence for this hypothesis comes 
by way of various experiments on the related phenomena of change blindness and 
inattentional blindness, the results of which were originally predicted by Dennett 
(Dennett 1991 pp.467-8). Change blindness occurs when subjects fail to notice 
changes in a visual stimulus despite looking straight at it. Grimes (1996) conducted a 
now famous experiment were subjects fitted with eye tracking devices were 
instructed to read a page of text displayed on a screen. Unbeknownst to the test 
subjects, text surrounding the small number of words upon which they could focus at 
any one moment was constantly changing, but they did not notice. Only the handful 
of words immediately present to the fovea can be read in one go, rendering changes 
to text in the periphery of the visual field undetectable (ibid.). O'Regan and 
colleagues (2000) used eye tracking technology to monitor subjects' blinks while 
they were presented with a series of pictures. While they blinked, changes were made 
to the picture - objects were added or removed, colours were changed, shadows 
altered, etc. Again, subjects consistently failed to detect the changes. I have 
personally seen O'Regan demonstrate this effect outside of the lab and without the 
aid of eye tracking, simply by showing a conference audience a short video, cleverly 
disguised as a photograph, of a Paris street scene. The colour of a car displayed 
prominently near the middle of the 'photograph' was gradually altered from blue to 
red, but the vast majority of the audience failed to notice this (and those who did 
notice were all familiar with O'Regan's work).15 
Similarly, inattentional blindness occurs when subjects attending to part of a visual 
scene fail to notice an otherwise striking event elsewhere in that scene. Simons and 
                                                          
15 A video of Noë replicating O'Regan's trick can be found here (at around the six 
and a half minute mark): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=af3Vq-C1ck8 (last 
accessed: 8/8/14).  
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Chabris' (1999) well known 'gorilla suit' experiment provides perhaps the classic 
example of inattentional blindness. Subjects are shown a video of a small group of 
people playing catch with two basketballs. Half of the people are wearing blue jeans 
and white t-shirts and the other half are clad entirely in black. Some test subjects are 
instructed to count the number of passes made by the black team and the others are 
instructed to count the passes made by the white team (each team has their own ball). 
During the course of play, a man wearing a gorilla suit strolls into the midst of the 
players, beats his chest, then leaves. The subjects asked to count the black team's 
passes immediately notice the gorilla. But up to sixty percent of the subjects tasked 
with counting the white teams' passes do not notice him at all (ibid.). Those tracking 
the black teams' passes are looking out for black-clad players, so the black gorilla 
suit grabs their attention. Those tracking the white teams' passes are attending to 
white-clad players at the expense of darker parts of the visual scene, so are prone to 
miss the giant ape man.16 O'Regan also cites Haines' (1991) remarkable example of 
an experienced airline pilot who, in what was thankfully only a NASA training 
simulation, landed on top of another plane parked in full view on the runway while 
attending to the visual display on his windshield (O'Regan 2011 pp.50). As O'Regan 
also notes (ibid. p.51), many ordinary traffic accidents are the direct result of drivers 
'looking but failing to see' cyclists, pedestrians and even parked cars (for a review see 
Langham et al 2002).  
Although it is of course true that our attention is often draw to fluctuations in the 
periphery of the visual field (think of the experience of suddenly noticing a spider 
running across the floor in the corner of a room), we do not see the exact cause of 
these events until we turn our head and/or eyes to inspect it; we see that something is 
                                                          
16 Simons and Chabris' original video can be found here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJG698U2Mvo (last accessed 8/8/14).  
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happening without yet seeing what that something actually is (O'Regan tends to refer 
to this as the 'grabbiness' of vision). Hence, the moral of change blindness and 
inattentional blindness, according to sensorimotor theorists (and indeed to some non 
sensorimotor theorists, such as Dennett), is that perceivers do not internally represent 
the features of a visual scene in very much detail at all (I address  objections to this 
interpretation below). The proven poverty of parafoveal vision suggests that at any 
given instant, the visual system only samples a very small amount of the available 
information in a visual scene. Perceptual constancy - the enduring stability of the 
perceived world - therefore owes not to a detailed mental model of the environment, 
but to the stable layout of the external world itself; the world looks stable to us 
simply because it is stable! For this reason, O'Regan characterises the role of the 
external world in visual cognition not as a source of stimulation from which an 
internal model is constructed which maps the world outside the head, but as a source 
of 'outside memory' readily accessible to perceivers via selective visual attention 
(O'Regan 1992). The experience of the stable and continual presence of the visual 
world owes, on the sensorimotor account, not to cognitive access to a detailed 
internal model of the world, but to perceivers' 'practical knowledge about currently 
possible behaviours and associated sensory consequences' (O'Regan & Noë 2001 
p.946), that is, in their knowing how to access information in the external world 
itself. 
It is important to note, however, that unlike ecological vision theorists inspired by 
Gibson (1986) (e.g. Chemero 2009) as well as certain others (e.g. Hutto & Myin 
2013), sensorimotor theorists are not completely opposed to visual representations in 
the more general sense in which psychologists typically use the term, that is, sub-
personal states the function of which is to detect and track certain environmental 
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features, but they are opposed to the widespread assumption that these 
representations serve as detailed three-dimensional models of the external world. 
They also deny representations in the more metaphysical sense of a mediating mental 
entity between perceiving subjects and the distal causes of their perceptions17 
What the [sensorimotor theory] denies is not the general claim that there are 
representations operative in one or various stages of visual processing but that 
the feeling of seeing all the detail at any moment is the result of a fully 
detailed, continuously present representation of all the detail. (O'Regan & 
Myin 2009 p.189) 
A line of objection to the invocation of change/inattentional blindness against the 
sub-personal version of the snapshot conception is pursued by Prinz (2006) and 
Jacob (2006), both of whom argue that change/inattentional blindness does not 
suffice to refute pictorialism. Prinz cites experiments performed by Mitroff, Simons 
and Levin (2004) who found that subjects can fail to consciously notice the 
differences in two sequentially presented arrays of objects but still perform above 
chance when forced to indicate, via answers to closed questions, which object was 
absent from the second stimulus. Hence, Prinz writes 
Another possibility [...] is that the visual system generates very rich 
representations, but doesn't compare every detail. On the [sic] view, the 
visual system registers changes in the scene, but not the fact that the change 
has taken place. The differences are all encoded, but no comparison system 
picks up on them. This interpretation is consistent with the pictorial theory of 
                                                          
17 Noë tends to flip-flop on the role of representation in vision, sometimes appearing 
to endorse anti-representationalism across the board but at other times urging for a 
more liberal notion of representation without abandoning it outright, sometimes in 
the space of the same paper. See e.g. Noë (2010).  
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vision, and Noë [and O'Regan] must argue against it to show that [their] 
interpretation is right. (Prinz 2006 p.13) 
Here Prinz begs the question against the sensorimotor view's anti-pictorialist stance 
by first assuming the existence of detailed internal representations of the two visual 
scenes, then using these to ground his story about a lack of comparison mechanism to 
detect their differences in content. In order to avoid begging the question, Prinz's 
argument has to assume that Mitroff, Simons and Levin's findings demonstrate the 
existence of such representations. But they do not. Mitroff, Simons and Levin are 
totally upfront about the fact that 'the results do not speak directly to the nature or 
completeness of the internal representations' (Mitroff, Simons and Levin 2004 
p.1279, italics in original) and that '[t]he present experiments were not designed to 
differentiate these two alternatives' (ibid.). They even conclude that 'it is important to 
note that a comparison failure explanation does not rely upon complete 
representations [...] the representations need only to be sufficiently detailed to 
support change detection' (ibid., my italics), which undermines Prinz's use of them as 
a premise for his far stronger pictorial version of their 'absence of comparison' 
account. Furthermore, Mitroff, Simons and Levin's findings do not directly 
contradict the absence of awareness and subsequent inability to recall visual detail 
reported by the subjects of Grimes', Simons and Chabris', O'Regan et al's, and 
Haines' experiments, though admittedly, the extent of their recall upon sufficient 
prompting is an open empirical question. But it is far too big a jump from the fact 
that a small amount of detail can be preserved in memory from unconscious visual 
processing to the claim that the brain encodes detailed 'photographs' of the external 
world.  
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Similarly, Jacob, who characterises vision in quasi-snapshot terms as 'recording a 
fact' (Jacob 2006 p.2, my italics), reiterating speculation of Simons and Rensinik's 
(2005), argues that the result of change/inattentional blindness experiments are not 
strictly incompatible with the existence of detailed internal mental representations 
(a) The detailed representation of the display perceived at t1 could decay or 
fade away before the comparison takes place at t2. (b) The detailed 
representation [...] could be encoded in a neural pathway unavailable for 
comparison. (c) The content of the detailed representation of the stimulus 
perceived at t1 could be encoded in a format unsuitable for comparison. (d.) 
Although the detailed representation has not decayed until the comparison 
takes place and although the representation is in the right pathway and in the 
right format, still the comparison process could fail for some other reason. 
(Jacob 2006 p.4)  
The sensorimotor theorist can agree that change/inattentional blindness is not, 
technically, strictly incompatible with rich pictorialism, but given that there 
demonstrably is plenty of detail available from a visual scene at any one time that is 
neither consciously perceived nor accessible to memory (Grimes' peripheral text, 
Simons and Chabris' gorilla man, Haines' aeroplane) they would be quite justified in 
dismissing Jacob's list of detailed representation-saving counterfactuals as ad hoc. 
Whichever way the data are spun, the visual world does not get to be inside the head. 
 
4. The visual world is not a grand illusion 
Some philosophers and cognitive scientists impressed by the results of 
change/inattentional blindness experiments draw the conclusion that in our pre-
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scientific thinking about perception, we are considerably and systematically mistaken 
about the nature of our own experience. Blakemore and colleagues (1995), following 
Dennett (1991), suggest that when we take ourselves to enjoy richly detailed visual 
experience, and thereby a richly detailed visual field, we are subject to an illusion. 
Despite how things may seem to us, it is claimed, science teaches us that 
consciousness does not in fact acquaint us with a stable visual world of richly 
coloured detail, but short-lived and vague visual fragments which are, in Blakemore's 
charming turn of phrase, continually 'washed away' by eye saccades (Blakemore et al 
p.1076). This would be disturbing and startling if it were true; the visual world would 
be a grand illusion!18 Furthermore, if change/inattentional blindness does indeed 
show that 'our intuitions about our own visual function are far from useful in 
understanding the construction of our convincing and stable visual world' 
(Blakemore et al 1995 p.1080) then it's game over for most phenomenologists.  
Fortunately, this interpretation of the data on change/inattentional blindness only 
follows if we assume the personal level version of the snapshot conception of vision. 
Though Dennett and Blakemore both reject the sub-personal version of the snapshot 
conception, they remain wedded, at least implicitly, to the personal level version, 
which they in turn attribute to ordinary folk. Even O'Regan, whose entire research 
project is levelled against the sub-personal snapshot conception of perceptual 
cognition, sometimes falls into the trap of sharing with rival vision theorists the 
assumption that the personal level version of the snapshot conception constitutes his 
explanandum as the following quotation, which comes from a chapter entitled 'The 
Illusion of Seeing Everything', illustrates: 
                                                          
18 See the essays collected in Noë (2002) for exploration of this claim. 
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We think we perceive things as highly detailed as highly detailed and perfect 
all over the visual field. How are we so sure that we really do perceive those 
details all over the scene. The answer must be because we know we can 
answer any question about these details if we ask ourselves about them. But 
to do this we needn't actually have any information stored in the brain about 
these details. All we require is to be able to immediately access the 
information in the world [...] We can then also have the impression of 
perceiving the detail all over. (O'Regan 2011 p.58, first italics in original, 
second added)  
The snapshot conception, as its name implies, conceives of visual experience in 
terms of  hypostasised conscious visual states - static images all the detail of which is 
given to the subject in one fell swoop. Naturally, people who miss the gorilla man in 
Simons and Chabris' video or the colour switch in O'Regan's Paris street scene are 
surprised when their attention is later drawn to the changes. But is this really because 
they previously took themselves to be enjoying a perception of the basketball players 
or the street akin to a photographic image? It is doubtful  that most people outside of 
a philosophy classroom would characterise their experience quite like this upon even 
minimal reflection, because experience is not like this. Nobody with working eyes is 
likely to be alarmed by the fact that peripheral vision is pretty useless for the task of 
discriminating text, or that they are prone to miss otherwise obvious events if their 
attention is directed elsewhere. How many time do we 'lose' things - keys, phones, 
glasses, etc - which suddenly 'appear' right in front of us, having been there the 
whole time? As Merleau-Ponty stresses throughout Phenomenology of Perception, 
indeterminacy is a positive feature of the visual field; it is constitutive of ordinary 
perceptual experience and not something to be reduced or explained away, as the 
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surrounding vagueness functions as the background against which the objects of 
attention can appear (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p7; pp.31-3). Indeed, without this 
indeterminacy, we cannot even make phenomenological sense of the idea of bringing 
something to visual attention, 'To pay attention is not merely to clarify some pre-
existing givens; rather, it is to realise in them a new articulation by taking them as 
figures' (ibid. p.32, italics removed). And as he notes elsewhere, it is precisely this 
phenomenon of the objects of visual attention 'emerging' from a background of 
indeterminate vagueness that impressionist painters aimed to capture by abandoning 
the photographic realism of their predecessors (Merleau-Ponty 2004). O'Regan's 
occasional rhetorical lapses aside, sensorimotor theorists share this Merleau-Pontian 
sentiment, and emphasise that, contra the snapshot conception, perceptual experience 
is fundamentally an exploratory and temporally extended affair; the perceived world 
is revealed to us not instantaneously, but over time and via a process of  perceptual 
exploration (Silverman 2013). We are constantly moving our eyes, turning our heads, 
and redirecting our attention, in order to bring things into view. Similarly, when an 
event in peripheral vision catches our attention, it prompts us to further exercise 
these abilities. Visual experience is, in this sense, a highly active phenomenon, 
comprising far more than the merely passive reception of sensory input.  
 
The visual field is not restricted by anything analogous to a picture frame. 
Phenomenologically, there are no clearly discernible borders between where a visual 
scene begins and ends. Insofar as the visual field is bounded, these boundaries are in 
continual flux. Though the amount of visible detail discriminable at any one instant 
may be minimal, our visual experience is always already informed by a sense of the 
presence and accessibility of further detail in our immediate surroundings. We do not 
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typically take ourselves to enjoy all the detail of a visual scene simultaneously, but 
we do have a implicit sense of what kind of detail is present in our surroundings and 
available for visual inspection, because as perceivers we know how to access features 
of a visual scene by tuning our heads, focussing our attention, moving our eyes, 
interacting with objects, etc. As Noë puts this point, 'The world shows up for us in 
experience only insofar as we know how to make contact with it, or, to use a 
different metaphor, only insofar as we are able to bring it into focus' (Noë 2012 p.2). 
And as Merleau-Ponty observes, the visual field comprises both the indeterminacy of 
peripheral vision and the knowledge that aspects of objects can be brought into view 
via movements of the body and of the objects themselves in relation to the 
perspective imposed by the body  
To say that I have a visual field means that I have an access and an opening to 
a system of visible beings through my position, and that they are available to 
my gaze in virtue of a kind of primordial contact and by a gift of nature, 
without any effort required on my part. (Merleau-Ponty 2012p.224) 
As I elaborate below, the 'gift of nature' to which Merleau-Ponty refers is the 
structure of experience afforded by our embodiment and the way in which the body 
is situated in its environment. For now though, it suffices to note that the worry that 
we systematically delude ourselves about the extent of our visual experience is 
dissolvable once we give up the phenomenologically inept personal level version of 
the snapshot conception of vision. As Noë puts the point: 
The sceptical reasoning relies on a bad inference from the character of a 
single visual fixation to the character of seeing itself. From the fact that, when 
I stare at a point on the wall, I can’t see colours in the periphery, it doesn’t 
follow that there are no colours in the periphery of the visual field. For my 
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visual field, rather, is made available by looking around. We look here, then 
there, and in this way we gain access to the world and our experience 
acquires that world as content. It is no part of our phenomenological 
commitments that we take ourselves to have all that detail at hand in a single 
fixation. (Noë 2004 p.57, italics in original) 
By paying closer attention to the phenomenology of visual experience we can agree 
with O'Regan (see quotation above), Dennett (1991 p.354-5), and others, that the 
brain need not represent all the available detail of a visual scene in its entirety, and 
that the fact that we experience the visual world as stable and richly detailed is owed 
to an understanding of the availability of the relevant detail upon inspection, without 
conceding that we are in any way mistaken about the nature or extent of our own 
experience, because the content of visual experience is not determined just by what 
impacts upon the retinas, or by what gets represented in the visual cortex, over any 
single arbitrarily short temporal interval. Clark captures perfectly the way in which 
the argument from change/inattentional blindness to the 'grand illusion' of the visual 
world, rests on a sleight of hand, inferring a false phenomenological story from an 
empirical one from which it does not follow 
 [T]he Grand Illusion [...] was a trick of the light. [...] The scene before us is 
indeed rich in colour, depth and detail, just as we take it to be. And we have 
access to this depth and detail as easily as we have access to facts stored in 
biological long-term memory. It is just that in the case of the visual scene, 
retrieval is via visual saccade and exploratory action. Our daily experience 
only becomes misleading in the context of a host of unwise theoretical moves 
and commitments: commitments concerning the precise role of internal 
representations in supporting visual experience, as well as our pervasive 
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neglect of the cognitive role of temporally extended processes and active 
exploration. (Clark 2002 pp.201)  
Merleau-Ponty gives us a convenient diagnostic term for the fallacy underlying the 
personal level version of the snapshot conception: the ‘experience error’. The 
experience error consists in the (mis)description of perception in terms of what we 
come to believe upon reflection about its objects at the expense of capturing the 
original phenomenon as we live through it (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.5). It is this 
fallacy that generates the snapshot conception. Once the fallacy is exposed, we are 
free to give it up. The visible world transcends any momentary gaze, and seeing is 
not at all like having a photograph projected inside the Cartesian theatre. 
 
5. The phenomenology of sensorimotor understanding 
It is not just objects in peripheral or parafoveal vision that are experienced as present 
in our ordinary experience. Though strictly speaking unseen, occluded surfaces and 
features of objects are likewise given in visual experience as present to one. For 
example, when I look at a coffee cup on a desk, it is part and parcel of my experience 
of the cup that it has a reverse side which, though occluded given my current 
perspective, is present in my immediate environment and potentially visible from an 
alternative perspective that I could occupy. Phenomenologically speaking, this is just 
a basic fact about what it is for human beings to see a three-dimensional object as a 
three-dimensional object; so as long as we are doing phenomenology rather than, 
say, metaphysics, this feature of experience may be considered irreducible. Husserl 
revisited these phenomena of perspective and presence throughout the development 
of his phenomenology. In Husserl’s terminology, occluded features of objects are 
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experienced as ‘co-present’ with their facing sides (Husserl 1999b p. 222), because 
the entire perceptual field exhibits the phenomenal feature of horizons; any visual 
presentation of an object at a particular instant anticipates additional presentations of 
that object at future instants 
 [I]n being there itself, the physical thing has for the experiencer an open, 
indefinite, indeterminately general horizon, comprising what is itself not 
strictly perceived – a horizon (this is an implicit assumption) that can be 
opened up by possible experiences. (Husserl 1988 p.23) 
We can summarise this Husserlian insight by saying that visual experience has a 
horizonal structure. Contemporary sensorimotor theorists share Husserl’s interest in 
this feature of perceptual experience. Noë’s rather confusing term for it in Action in 
Perception is ‘virtual presence’, but I shall adhere to the original Husserlian 
terminology. (Nb. To anticipate a potential confusion, it should be noted that 
‘horizons’ enjoys varied usage in the phenomenological tradition. Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty sometimes use ‘horizons’ in an extended sense to encompass not just 
co-presented features of objects, but also what we would now following Gibson 
(1986) refer to as ‘affordances’. This is unfortunate, but the ambiguity owes more to 
literary convention than a genuine ignorance of the distinction. As I shall be arguing 
that affordances and the ‘general horizons’ described in the quote from Husserl 
above are distinct, I will restrict my usage of ‘horizons’ to co-presented occluded 
surfaces and features of objects only, a restriction I shall henceforth enforce via the 
term ‘object horizons’.)  
It might be tempting to understand the horizontal structure of visual experience in 
terms of inferential reasoning. Such an account is suggested, for example, by Russell 
73 
 
(2002), who claims that we infer the shapes of objects from sense data, and Gregory 
(1980), who characterises perception as a form of hypothesis formation. The claim 
would be that we see the front of the coffee cup and infer or predict on this basis that 
it has a reverse side we cannot currently see. Talk of inferences and hypotheses may 
well be a useful metaphor for describing the neural processing implicated in 
perceptual cognition (see e.g. Helmholtz 1962, Fodor and Pylyshn 1981, cf. Hatfield 
2002), but it fails as phenomenological description because it over-intellectualises 
the experience. We do not need to engage in any reasoning in order to experience the 
co-presence of the reverse side of a coffee cup with its facing side. In fact, if we were 
to engage in such reasoning, this could only be because we already possess a sense of 
the presence of the cup's reverse side. We might, for instance, speculate about what 
the reverse side actually looks like or whether the shape of the cup might differ from 
what we would expect given its apparent shape from our current point of view, but 
these questions only get off the ground given the more basic assumption that such a 
reverse side is there to verify or falsify our expectations. The sheer presence of the 
reverse side is built into the structure of our ordinary experience, and to describe this 
in inferential terms would lapse into the experience error. Prior to scientific or 
epistemological reflection on the status of the cup's reverse side, it is simply and 
unproblematically there for us. When we affirm the presence of the reverse side of 
the cup, though we can choose to treat the utterance as a testable prediction if, say, 
we are in an epistemology seminar, this is first and foremost a report about how the 
world presents itself in our visual experience, as Merleau-Ponty stresses 
I grasp the unseen as present, and I do not affirm that the back of the lamp 
exists in the same sense in which I say the solution to a problem exists. The 
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hidden side is present in its own way. It is in my vicinity. (Merleau-Ponty 
1964b p.14) 
If the phenomenology of the visual field outstrips what is present to the eyes at any 
given instant, and it is phenomenologically inadequate to explain this aspect of 
perceptual experience in terms of inferential reasoning on the part of the perceiver, 
and there are only sparse visual representations in the brain, why, then, do we 
experience the co-presence of occluded surfaces and unattended features of objects? 
According to the sensorimotor approach, the phenomenon of co-presence owes to 
perceivers' sensitivity to the fact that the occluded surfaces are ‘available to 
perception through appropriate movement’ (Noë 2012 p.58, italics removed), and 
this requires that perceivers possess what is variably referred to as 'sensorimotor 
understanding', ‘sensorimotor knowledge’ or ‘sensorimotor skill’. Out of personal 
preference, I shall stick with the term 'sensorimotor understanding'. Sensorimotor 
understanding consists in an implicit grasp of what O'Regan and Noë call 
'sensorimotor contingencies'. Sensorimotor contingencies are the law-like regularities 
which hold between sensory contents and shifts in perspective brought about through 
bodily movement and perturbations in one’s immediate environment (O’Regan & 
Noë 2001 pp.940-3).  
Evidence for this hypothesis comes by way of early experiments on inverted vision. 
Stratton (1897) constructed a pair of glasses which flipped retinal images by a 
hundred and eighty degrees, resulting in the visual world appearing upside down. He 
tested the effects of the lenses on himself by wearing them for between four and 
twelve hours a day over a period of eight days and kept a diary of his experiences 
(ibid. p.343). When not wearing the glasses, Stratton was blindfolded (ibid.). In early 
stages of adaptation, not only was his visuomotor coordination severely impaired, his 
75 
 
entire visual field was restructured and destabilised. On the first day of wearing the 
inverted lenses, Stratton reports: 'It did not feel as though I were visually ranging 
over a set of motionless objects, but the whole field of things swept and swung 
before my eyes' (ibid. p.344). Though initially finding himself in the grip of a 
'nervous depression' (ibid. p.346) over his disjointed experience, Stratton reports a 
gradual honing of visuomotor control and a general stabilising of the visual field. 
Although the world continued to appear upside down, the experience post-adaptation 
is felt to be close to normal, especially when actively interacting with the world 
[T]he most harmonious experiences were obtained during active operations 
on the scene before me. In rapid, complicated yet practiced movements, the 
harmony of the localisation by sight and that by touch or motor perception - 
the actual identity of the positions reported in these various ways - came out 
with much greater force than when I sat down and passively observed the 
scene. (Stratton 1897 p.356)  
Similarly, Kohler (1962) designed sets of goggles which distort retinal images in 
various ways. One set of Kohler's goggles bent the light rays entering the eye in such 
a way that when the head turns to the left with the eyes turned to the right, perceived 
objects appear to contract horizontally, and when the head turns to the right with the 
eyes turned to the left, perceived objects appear to expand. One of Kohler's test 
subjects described the initial experience of wearing these goggles as being 'as if the 
world were made of rubber' (ibid. p.303). After a short period of adaptation, these 
optical disparities completely disappear and vision is reported as returning to normal. 
Kohler concludes: 'Somehow the visual system has learned a general rule: a 
contracted image must be expanded and an expanded image must be contracted, 
depending on the respective position of head and eyes' (ibid.). As Kohler makes clear 
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in his introduction to his paper, he follows tradition and endorses a version of the 
snapshot conception of vision.19But having encountered compelling empirical and 
phenomenological reasons for rejecting the snapshot conception, the sensorimotor 
approach allows for a more elegant explanation: the experience is stabilised through 
the adaptation to a new set of sensorimotor contingencies via the honing of 
sensorimotor understanding; Kohler's subjects acquired a new set of perceptual skills 
(O'Regan & Noë 2001 pp.593-4).  
This implicit grasp of sensorimotor contingencies operative in visual experience is 
held to be a practical, as opposed to propositional, form of knowledge (Noë 2004 
pp.117-22; O'Regan and Noë 2001 p.944) ; in Ryle’s idiom, it involves knowing-
how (to do something) rather than knowing-that (something is the case) (see Ryle 
2000 ch. II). Although we do not need to continually move in order to experience co-
presence, we experience co-presence because we know implicitly how to manoeuvre 
our bodies in relation to the object in such a way as to bring the occluded side or 
feature into view  
The sensory modalities, according to [the sensorimotor approach], are 
constituted by distinct patters of sensorimotor contingency. Visual perception 
can now be understood as the activity of exploring the environment in ways 
mediated by knowledge of the relevant sensorimotor contingencies. And to be 
a visual perceiver is, thus, to be capable of exercising mastery of vision-
related rules of sensorimotor contingency. (O'Regan and Noë 2001 p.943, 
italics removed) 
                                                          
19 'Vision is perhaps the most complex of the senses; nonetheless it offers the 
investigator a tantalising opportunity to learn how the brain processes sensory data 
and constructs an effective image of the outside world' (Kohler 1962 p.299). 
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Note that the emphasis on perceivers' knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies 
guards the sensorimotor theorist against a potential objection whereby the 
explanation of co-presence in terms of  dispositions to act lapses into a form of 
behaviourism. The sensorimotor theorist does not identify perceptual content with 
behavioural dispositions, but cashes it out in terms of tacit knowledge of the sensory 
consequences of movements of the body and of the object in relation to the body 
(Jacob 2006 p.2).  
Perceptual co-presence, then, is intimately bound up with our embodiment. Not only 
do we routinely bring parafoveal objects and occluded surfaces into view via the 
execution of bodily movements, it is our practical grasp of the relations between 
movements of the body and the objects of perception that constitutes our experience 
of their presence. Perhaps surprisingly, however, O'Regan and Noë have very little to 
say about the phenomenology of embodiment itself. This, I shall argue, generates 
certain troublesome but ultimately avoidable inconsistencies in their conception of 
sensorimotor understanding. These problems can be avoided by means of a more 
nuanced phenomenological analysis of the relationship between bodily agency and 
perceptual experience. Below I undertake such an analysis. For the remainder of this 
chapter I focus mainly on the work of Noë. The decision to focus henceforth 
primarily on Noë rather than O’Regan is motivated by the fact, noted in the 
introduction to this chapter, that Noë takes himself to be engaging in a form of 
phenomenological analysis. As such, he goes to greater lengths than O'Regan to 
elucidate the concept of sensorimotor understanding. Below I set out what I take to 
be Noë's precise commitments with regards to what sensorimotor understanding 
actually  is and how it is exercised. I then raise three objections to Noë's account 
before drawing further on Merleau-Ponty’s early phenomenology to sketch a more 
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thorough and phenomenologically satisfying interpretation of the notion of 
sensorimotor understanding.  
 
6. Object horizons, affordances, and practical know-how 
Noë characterises sensorimotor understanding as practical knowledge of possibilities 
for action. This leads him to explicate the horizonal structure of visual experience in 
terms of Gibsonian affordances. According to Gibson, to see an affordance is to 
directly perceive a familiar object’s practical ‘value’ or ‘meaning’ (Gibson 1986 
p.127), that is, to see it as suggesting a possible usage which can be taken up in 
action. Visual experience is laden with affordances: a chair affords sitting to a 
creature capable of sitting, lateral terrain affords walking to a creature capable of 
perambulation, the coffee cup on my desk affords grasping and drinking from, a 
buzzing mobile phone affords answering, and so forth. In Gibson’s ecological theory 
of vision, although affordances are ‘external’ properties of objects (meaning they are 
properties of actual objects, rather than of mental states), they are nevertheless 
relational properties– they are ‘animal-relative’, meaning that their perceptibility 
depends on the behavioural repertoire of the perceiver (ibid. pp.127-8). Noë’s 
extreme ecological proposal is that visual experience comprises affordances all the 
way out 
According to the sensorimotor view, there is a sense, then, in which all 
objects of sight (…) are affordances. To experience a property is, among 
other things…to experience the object as determining possibilities of and for 
movement. (Noë 2004. p.106, emphasis in original)  
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Both Noë and O’Regan tend to equivocate on the issue of whether or not these 
‘possible movements’ need be self-initiated or not, but there is ample textual 
evidence to suggest that what really differentiates the sensorimotor approach to 
vision from more traditional cognitivist theorising is an emphasis on self-initiated 
action. For example, O’Regan is quick to defend the sensorimotor approach against a 
misreading according to which seeing always requires the exercise of a bodily action, 
but nevertheless states that ‘action must potentially play a role’ in all perception 
(O’Regan 2010 p.41). Noë (2012; 2010) has recently shifted away from much of the 
terminology of their original Behavioural and Brain Sciences paper, and now 
presents his work on perceptual co-presence under the moniker of ‘actionism’, the 
rhetoric of which is clearly indicative of an emphasis on self-initiated movement. 
Elsewhere he tells us, ‘Only through self-movement can one test and so learn the 
relevant patterns of sensorimotor dependence’ required to perceive (2004 p.13, italics 
in original). And it is surely only in terms of self-initiated movement that we can 
make sense of his otherwise bewildering comparison of visual experience, in his 
latest book Varieties of Presence, to ‘a kind of dance’ (Noë 2012 p.130). In any case, 
the invocation of Gibson’s ecological theory of vision only makes sense within the 
context of active self-movement, so this reading is not only justified, but necessitated 
by the claim under consideration.  
Following Husserl and Noë, I will take it as an undeniable phenomenological fact 
that perception is irreducibly horizonal, that is, I will grant that co-presence is a basic 
phenomenal feature of visual experience. What I shall criticise, however, is Noë’s 
claim that this horizonal structure can be understood in terms of Gibsonian 
affordances and the possession of Rylean practical know-how. Below I present three 
problems incurred by Noë’s characterisation of sensorimotor understanding in terms 
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of practical knowledge for possibilities for action. I then turn to Phenomenology of 
Perception to show how two of its major themes – the previously discussed ‘body 
schema’ and the arguably lesser known concept of ‘sedimentation’ – can help plug 
the gaps in Noë’s account and form the basis of what Husserl called a ‘genetic’ 
phenomenology of sensorimotor understanding. 
 
7. Scholastic interlude: why Merleau-Ponty? 
Although Merleau-Ponty’s early phenomenology is often invoked in discussions of 
the sensorimotor approach to perception, it is seldom the subject of sustained 
engagement in the sensorimotor theory literature. Appropriation of Phenomenology 
of Perception is generally limited to the occasional citation of pieces of 
phenomenological description with the aim of portraying Merleau-Ponty as an early 
advocate of the sensorimotor approach, without due attention to the wider 
philosophical project in which those descriptions occur (e.g. Noë 2004 p.17, O'Regan 
2011 p.23). This has the doubly unfortunate consequence of portraying 
Phenomenology of Perception as a mere work of descriptive psychology and 
obscuring possibilities for philosophically interesting disagreement or mutual 
enlightenment between the sensorimotor research program and scholars of 
phenomenology. Hopefully, what follows sketches one path a more satisfying 
engagement might take by demonstrating that Merleau-Pontian phenomenology 
provides the conceptual resources to build upon and improve Noë's account of 
sensorimotor understanding and its importance to visual experience.  
 
8. Object horizons are not affordances 
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There are three big problems with Noë’s attempt to understand object horizons in 
terms of affordances for action and practical know-how. First, to perceive an 
affordance is to grasp a visual scene as suggesting possibilities for voluntary 
behaviour20, and not all bodily movement that would bring co-presented features to 
visual presentation need be voluntary. Consider again the visual experience of a 
coffee cup on a desk. The anticipation that the cup has a reverse side would be 
fulfilled irrespectively of whether or not the movements required to see it were 
willed to happen. Passive, involuntary movements would do the job just as well: I 
could be pushed into a different spatial position or fall and land with my head on the 
desk behind the cup, and the perceptual anticipation would still be fulfilled. A less 
frivolous example would be somebody incapable of voluntary self-movement, 
perhaps since birth, pushed around the desk in a wheelchair while they happened to 
be looking at the cup. Cashing out horizons in terms of an implicit grasp of 
possibilities for action therefore over-specifies the content of sensorimotor 
understanding. Perceptual sensitivity to the way in which movements of one’s body 
or movement of the object relative to one's body would affect one’s current 
perceptual experience need not require seeing an object as affording possibilities for 
active self-movement.  
With this in mind, it is important to distinguish between what we may call 'action-
dependence' and 'movement-dependence' in perceptual experience. A perceptual 
experience is action-dependent if and only if it depends for its content or character on 
the perceiver knowing how to act in certain ways, that is, if it contains some 
reference to possible self-initiated movement. Affordances are clearly action-
                                                          
20 I take this to be obvious from the sorts of examples Gibson gives of affordances in 
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, which pertain to overt intelligent 
performances rather than automatic stimulus-response reflexes.  
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dependent in this sense, for taking up an affordance requires some exercise of the 
will. An experience is merely movement-dependent if it involves being sensitive to 
sensorimotor contingencies without associating those contingencies with possibilities 
for self-initiated movement. Horizons are certainly movement-dependent, but they 
are not thereby action-dependent. Hence, there is some conceptual space between 
affordances –which presuppose volition, and object horizons, which do not, which 
gives us good grounds for refraining from equating the two. Note that this is not to 
say that object horizons are not explicable in sensorimotor terms. The sensorimotor 
theorist can continue to hold that it is necessary for experiencing horizons that one’s 
visual system be sensitive to movement of one’s body and nearby objects and/or to 
movement of objects relative to the perspective imposed by one's body. The upshot is 
simply that this does not by itself license Noë’s far stronger claim that object 
horizons are affordances. 
A second problem with equating object horizons with affordances concerns the 
psychological development of vision and agency. There are empirical grounds for 
holding that object horizons are developmentally prior to affordances. Consider Held 
and Hein’s famous ‘kitten carousel’ experiment (Held & Hein 1963). In contrast to a 
popular misconception the experiment concerned visually guided behaviour, not 
visual experience per se. For three hours daily ten pairs of neonatal kittens were 
placed in apparatus resembling a fairground carousel: a circular box with a two-
pronged rotating arm at the centre. At one end of the rotating arm, the ‘active’ kitten 
of the pair was attached to a harness with its feet in contact with the ground so that it 
could control its own locomotion. The ‘passive’ kitten was placed in a box with its 
head held in a fixed position and suspended from the other end of the rotating arm so 
that it could see the inside of the apparatus but not move around freely (although it 
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could still move its own eyes). By walking, the active kitten pulled the passive kitten 
around the carousel, so while both sets of kittens were exposed to the same patterns 
of movement and visual stimuli, only the active kittens’ movements around the 
apparatus were self-initiated. Held and Hein found that the active kittens avoided 
visual cliffs, put out their paws to brace themselves when picked up and placed on a 
different surface, and displayed avoidance behaviour when faced with looming 
objects, while the passive kittens did not, though their responses did normalise within 
forty-eight hours (ibid. p.875). Unsurprisingly, they conclude that ‘self-produced 
movement with its occurrent visual feedback is necessary for the development of 
visually guided behaviour’ (ibid).   
The passive kittens’ normal pupillary reflexes, healthy eyes, and the quickness with 
which they adapted to visually guided behaviour indicate their visual sense was not 
impaired by lack of self-movement; rather their ability to coordinate voluntary 
movement with their visual experience was temporarily hindered (ibid. p.875-6). Noë 
interprets the passive kittens’ failure of the visual cliff task as evidence for a lack of 
depth perception (Noë 2004 p. 234 §9). But given their intact visual system this 
seems implausible, and such an interpretation incurs the potentially intractable, 
perhaps even paradoxical, problem of explaining how a creature could see three-
dimensional objects in their immediate environment without experiencing depth. 
This would be tantamount to asserting that despite their fully-functioning visual 
systems, the passive kittens see the cliff in two-dimensions – an ad hoc stipulation if 
ever there was one. A more conservative explanation, suggested by Kinsbourne, is 
that the cliff looks the same to both kittens, but only for the active kittens has the 
appearance of the cliff come to be integrated with the feel of solid terrain under their 
paws (Kinsbourne 1995 pp.215-6).  
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Continuing to grant that object horizons are a basic, irreducible feature of visual 
experience, engaging in a spot of feline ‘hetrophenomenology’21 allows us to draw 
the following moral: the passive kittens perceived objects as objects, and therefore 
experienced horizons, but, unlike the active kittens, could not perceive affordances; 
visual cliffs and looming objects did not ‘negatively afford’ avoidance (see Gibson 
1986 p.137), the approaching floor did not afford paw-extension, etc. The ability to 
see affordances developed as their spatial vision and capacities for bodily action 
were allowed to integrate as they otherwise would have naturally. Hence, there is 
good reason for thinking that movement-dependent object horizons are 
phenomenologically more basic than action-dependent affordances as the former can 
apparently exist in the absence of the latter but not vice versa, and also that the 
ability to see affordances requires some additional development over and above a 
more primitive capacity to experience object horizons. Again, this is not to say that 
the passive kittens’ visual experience cannot be understood in sensorimotor terms. 
They were, after all, exposed to the same patterns of movement-dependence as the 
active kittens, only their movement was almost entirely involuntary. Movement 
dependence is still a bodily phenomenon, as it consists in perceptual sensitivity to the 
effects of (passive) bodily movements on visual content and movement of objects 
relative to an embodied perspective. The point is that mere visual sensitivity to 
movement does not equate to an ability to grasp affordances for action. 
A third problem with equating object horizons with affordances stems from a latent 
contradiction in the attribution of practical knowledge to subjects incapable of 
performing the required bodily movements for themselves. While Noë does not 
                                                          
21 The attempt to sketch a rational reconstruction of the life-world of something (a 
person, animal, machine, etc) by interpreting observations of its behaviour in terms 
of our own conceptual scheme (see Dennett (1991) pp.72-85). 
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claim that severe restrictions on a perceiver’s ability to act would result in blindness 
(which would be patently and demonstrably false), he does claim that the 
preservation of normal vision in the paralysed owes to the retention of sensorimotor 
understanding 
Paralysis is certainly not a form of blindness…Even the paralysed, whose 
range of movement is restricted, understand, implicitly and practically, the 
significance of movement for stimulation. They understand, no less than 
those who are not disabled, that movement of the eyes to the left produces 
rightward movement across the visual field, and so forth. Paralysed people 
can’t do as much as people who are not paralysed, but they can do a great 
deal; whatever the scope of their limitations, they draw on a wealth of 
sensorimotor skill that informs and enables them to perceive. (Noë 2004 p.12) 
Recall that Noë is wont to describe sensorimotor understanding as a form of non-
propositional practical knowledge, or skill (ibid. pp.117-22). On a standard 
conception of practical knowledge or skill, knowing-how to ϕ necessitates being able 
to ϕ. This conception of practical knowledge is certainly what Ryle had in mind in 
his original articulation of his knowing-how/knowing-that distinction in The Concept 
of Mind, as he argued that skills are acquired dispositions to act (Ryle 2000 p.33). 
For example, if I cannot play the guitar to a certain standard, then I do not yet 
possess the skill of guitar playing: I do not know how to play the guitar in the 
required sense. If in  time I learn to play to an adequate standard, but then an injury 
requiring physical rehabilitation renders me unable to execute the required 
movements, I lose my practical knowledge, even if I can describe quite well what it 
is I am supposed to do with the instrument to produce the desired sounds. Of course, 
there is a spectrum of cases here. I might struggle to play a certain riff if I have 
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recently trapped one of my fingers in a car door, but it would be premature to 
conclude that I have lost my musical skill. Assuming I make a full recovery, I might 
simply wake up one morning having had time to heal, and pick up the guitar and play 
the riff without difficulty and without the need for any tedious relearning process. In 
this instance, I have retained my skill - an acquired disposition to act in a particular 
way - but the circumstances required for the actualisation of this disposition, a 
necessary part of which are unbroken fingers, were prevented from coming to be. But 
there has to be a pragmatic cut-off point with this kind of reasoning. The longer a 
skill goes unexercised and the more elaborate and unlikely the circumstances 
required for the skill to be put to use become, the less plausible it is to continue to 
ascribe the skill to the person in question. If, for example, the circumstances required 
for a skill to be applied include something as extreme as the regrowth of a 
dismembered limb, the continued ascription of the skill to the unfortunate subject is 
fantastical. Though self-regenerating arms and legs might well be metaphysically or 
even physically possible, the sheer improbability of these circumstances coming to 
be, necessary as they are for the skilled performance in question, renders the 
continued ascription of the skill borderline nonsensical. Skills are, in Merleau-
Ponty’s words, ‘knowledge in the hands’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p. 145), and this is 
why we do not say of an athlete past her prime that she has retained her skill even 
though she can no longer compete, but rather that she can no longer compete 
because, alas, age has deprived her of her skill. Even if this Rylean characterisation 
of skill is not to the reader's satisfaction this need not matter because, as the 
following quotation makes clear, it is explicitly endorsed by Noë22  
                                                          
22Ryle’s knowing-how/knowing-that distinction is challenged by Stanley and 
Williamson (2001), but given Noë’s endorsement of the distinction I shall grant it for 
the sake of argument. My intuition on this matter is that Stanley and Williamson’s 
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I would have thought that if a ski instructor can’t do the jump, then she 
doesn’t know how to do it…She knows how the jump is done, but not how to 
do it. Sadly the same is true of the pianist [who has lost an arm]. He may 
retain all sorts of cognate [propositional] knowledge (…) but when he lost his 
arms, he lost his know-how. For the knowledge was, precisely, arm-
dependent. (Noë 2004. p.121) 
The problem for Noë's sensorimotor theorist should now be obvious: if the 
possession of practical knowledge is necessarily dependent upon or identical to an 
ability to act, then it is nonsensical to attribute practical knowledge of possibilities 
for action to those in whom such abilities are lacking.23  
Locked-in syndrome is instructive in this regard. The most common variation of 
locked-in-syndrome, the so-called ‘classical’ variation, involves complete paralysis 
apart from blinking and limited vertical eye movement (Bauer, Gersenbrand and 
Rumpl 1979)24. Sufferers of the syndrome can communicate using systems of blinks 
and vertical eye movements and with the help of various eye-tracking technologies 
                                                                                                                                                                    
critique, which concerns the logical form of knowledge ascription sentences, rather 
misses the point of Ryle’s original distinction, which is more phenomenological than 
logical. Ryle himself favours such an interpretation when he writes that The Concept 
of Mind ‘could be described as a sustained essay in phenomenology, if you are at 
home with that label’ (Ryle 2009 p.196). 
23 This line of criticism can applies equally to the position of Schellenberg (2007), 
who argues that spatial perception is dependent upon perceivers' capacity to act. 
 
24 Classical locked-in syndrome differs from ‘incomplete’ and ‘complete’ variations 
of the condition. With incomplete locked-in syndrome, a very small amount of 
additional motor control is preserved, while paralysis in the complete variation 
extends even to blinking and vertical eye movement (Bauer, Gersenbrand and Rumpl 
1979). Sufferers of complete locked-in syndrome are unable to communicate, so little 
is known about their experience in comparison to the other two variations, although 
the familiar phenomenon of sensory fatigue, where continual presentation of 
identical stimuli results in a decrease in the corresponding sensation, suggests their 
vision may deteriorate.  
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(Laureys et al 2005), so rather a lot is known about their experience from firsthand 
reports. People with locked-in syndrome retain full visual consciousness and their 
intellectual capacities remain untouched. Indeed the condition’s defining 
characteristic is the patient’s being ‘literally locked inside his body, aware of his 
environment but with a severely limited ability to interact with it’ (Patterson & 
Grabois 1986 p.758). Although locked in syndrome can sometimes negatively affect 
visual attention (Smith & Delargy 2005 p.406), one patient goes so far as to describe 
his vision as ‘normal, if not enhanced’ (Chisholm & Gillet 2005 p.94). As they see 
perfectly well we can say without controversy that locked-in perceivers’ experience 
has a horizonal structure. Of course, sensorimotor theorists need not, do not, and 
given their phenomenological starting point cannot, deny this. But it is wrongheaded 
for Noë's sensorimotor theorist to explain the locked-in subject’s visual experience in 
terms of practical knowledge of how ‘movement of the eyes to the left produces 
rightward movement across the visual field’ given that, on Noë’s own account, their 
inability to perform these movements renders incoherent the attribution of the 
practical knowledge required to make them. This goes a fortiori for more complex 
interactions. The locked-in patient does not know how to manoeuvre their body 
around an object in the sense of having the required skills; were they miraculously 
cured it is likely that they would need to reacquire them through rehearsal and 
physiotherapy. Practical knowledge - at least as Noë understands it - is therefore just 
the wrong sort of thing to account for object horizons. 
At this point, the following question becomes pertinent: If seeing an affordance 
requires practical know-how, what are we to say of the perception of affordances for 
the locked-in perceiver? It would be wildly counterintuitive to suggest that locked-in 
syndrome patients, who have lost almost all their practical knowledge, thereby 
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cannot see affordances. Their visual experience is not that of a human equivalent of 
Hein and Held’s passive kittens. Having been accustomed to living a life of 
practicality, and given the full preservation of their intellectual and visual capacities, 
it would be ad hoc and implausibly farfetched, not to mention rather offensive, to 
attribute to them an impoverished consciousness whereby they no longer see chairs 
as for sitting, doors as for opening and closing, coffee cups as for filling and drinking 
from, etc. We must therefore reject not only the conflation of horizons with 
affordances, but also the implied conflation of the capacity to see affordances with 
the possession of Rylean practical knowledge. What is needed is a better 
philosophical framework in which to make sense of sensorimotor understanding. 
Merleau-Ponty's early phenomenology gives us the conceptual tools to do just this. 
 
9. Motor signification, sedimentation and the body schema  
These are the facts to be accounted for: object horizons are not Gibsonian 
affordances, but through the garnering of practical knowledge, they may be 
‘upgraded’ (so to speak) to affordances. But the perceived practical value which the 
objects of vision have for the perceiver who possesses and can exercise the relevant 
know-how – affordances – persists even after this know-how has been lost. The 
sensorimotor approach is therefore hampered by Noë’s restricted conceptual toolkit. 
Fortunately, Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception gives us the additional 
tools needed to untangle the knots in which Noë’s sensorimotor theorist ties herself 
by attempting to conceive of sensorimotor understanding solely in terms of Rylean 
practical know-how and Gibsonian affordances, though understanding precisely what 
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology has to offer the sensorimotor theorist calls for 
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some preliminary exposition on the aim of phenomenology considered not as a 
subject matter for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists, but as a discipline. 
Phenomenological philosophy is personal-level analysis par excellence, but, as all 
phenomenologists know, there is considerably more to it than introspective reports 
on the content or character of one's own psychological states. Husserl’s philosophical 
project gradually evolved from what he termed ‘static’ into ‘genetic’ 
phenomenology, and Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception sits squarely in 
the latter category. Static phenomenology describes experience in terms of 
hypothetically hypostatised appearances, arguably much like the personal level 
version of the snapshot conception of vision. Genetic phenomenology goes a step 
further and escapes the shortcomings of the snapshot conception, by attempting to 
trace the origins of these appearances in lived experience. Alternatively put, we can 
say that while genetic phenomenology aims to uncover the structures of 
consciousness through which appearances are formed or, in phenomenological 
jargon, ‘constituted’, static phenomenology is (at best) limited to the description of 
its end products. Interestingly, Noë, who takes himself to be ‘investigating the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience’ (Noë 2004 p.33), echoes Husserl’s move 
from static to genetic phenomenology when he says ‘the task of phenomenology 
ought to be not so much to depict or represent or describe experience, but rather to 
catch experience in the act of making the world available’ (ibid. p.176). It is fitting, 
therefore, that the shortcomings of Noë’s account of sensorimotor understanding can 
be rectified by adopting a genetic-phenomenological approach, that is, by going 
beyond the description of the content of perceptual states in order to uncover the 
subjective operations through which such states come to be constituted in lived 
experience. Two Merleau-Pontian concepts are indispensable in this regard: the 
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already discussed body schema, and a phenomenon Merleau-Ponty calls 
'sedimentation'. 
Recall that in contrast to a percept or mental representation of one’s own body (a 
body image), the body schema is Merleau-Ponty’s term for the integrated system of 
pre-reflective motor capacities which structure lived experience. Though Merleau-
Ponty would certainly agree with Gallagher (2005) that the body schema should be 
distinguished from any mental state which has the body as its object25, the body 
schema has for Merleau-Ponty a genetic-phenomenological significance over and 
above its being a ‘system of sensory-motor processes that constantly regulate posture 
and movement that function without reflective awareness or the necessity of 
perceptual monitoring’ (ibid. pp.37-8). As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the body schema is 
not itself an appearance or an object of thought, but a ‘law of constitution’ (Merleau-
Ponty 2012 p.101), meaning that it conditions the ways in which things appear to the 
perceiver. The body schema is therefore indispensable to a genetic-
phenomenological analysis of embodied perceptual experience. Recall Gibson’s 
characterisation of affordances as ‘animal relative’. The notion of a body schema 
further illuminates this point. It is by virtue of having a body schema that objects can 
afford usage and one’s environment can take on a practical significance, because the 
way in which a subject can interact with their environment is relative to the range of 
possible actions permitted by their particular bodily morphology. A body schema is 
therefore a precondition of the formation of affordances. This is the meaning of 
Merleau-Ponty’s remark that ‘my own body is the primordial habit, the one that 
conditions all others and by which they can be understood’ (ibid. p.93).  
                                                          
25 And again: ‘A body image consists in a system of perceptions, attitudes, and 
beliefs pertaining to one’s own body. In contrast, a body schema is a system of 
sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of 
perceptual monitoring.’ (Gallagher 2005 p.24)  
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Crucially, the body schema is adaptable. By honing skills and acquiring new habits, 
it can be ‘reworked and renewed’ (ibid. p.143) (I discuss the adaptability of the body 
schema in greater depth in the next chapter). Perceivers' capacities to perceive the 
world in new ways, which are informed by their acquired skills and other changes in 
bodily morphology, endows their experience with a uniquely bodily kind of meaning 
which Merleau-Ponty calls ‘motor signification’ (ibid p. 113). Though it is rather 
tricky, particularly for an analytically trained philosopher, to define or articulate 
precisely the idea of ‘bodily meaning’, an example of the body schema’s contribution 
to lived experience should help to clarify what Merleau-Ponty has in mind. Though 
saying so perhaps runs the risk of sounding like a musical chauvinist, the perceptual 
encounters of expert musicians with their instrument of choice are significant in a 
way in which the non-players’ perception of the same instrument are not. For 
example, a skilled guitarist has at her disposal a certain ‘muscle memory’ of (inter 
alia) various chord formations, picking techniques and scale shapes, as well as a 
working knowledge of what constitutes a slim or thick neck, a solid or weight-
relieved body, heavy or light gangue strings, or an awkward or comfortable (relative 
to their preferences and playing style) layout of volume and tone pots, tremolo 
systems, and even tuning pegs, which are lacking in non-musicians who are 
nevertheless perfectly capable of performing identical finger movements. 
Consequently, guitars are perceived in more complex and meaningful ways by 
guitarists – they draw on a richer sensorimotor understanding alien to non-players. 
The non-guitarist knows (in the propositional sense of ‘knows’ – knowing-that) very 
well what guitars are for, and might even know something of how they are played 
and what the functions of their various pieces of hardware are, but a guitar does not 
afford playing (or other meaningful interactions such as tuning, lowering bridge 
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height or adjusting the truss rod) for them in the concrete sense experienced by the 
skilled player for whom the guitar represents a manifold of genuinely possible motor 
projects. Unlike non-players, the seasoned player has with respect to guitars what 
Merleau-Ponty calls the 'power to reckon with the possible' - they can orient 
themselves in relation to various dealings with guitars which for them, by virtue of 
their refined understanding of the instrument, are live possibilities (ibid. p.112) (see 
Romdenh-Romluc 2007; 2011b pp.62-192). Similar morals apply, mutatis mutandis, 
for other forms of skilful sensorimotor interactions. As a non-driver, the interior of a 
car is alien and intimidating to me in a way which invites laughter from my road-able 
friends even though I have ridden shotgun countless times, and a recent trip abroad 
served as a lesson in how, despite comprehending and obeying the instructions of 
helpful local residents, my lack of familiarity with foreign methods of public 
transport amounted to a kind of behavioural illiteracy. Doubtless we can all recall 
similar experiences where one struggles to ‘interpret’ one’s environment while others 
negotiate it effortlessly. The difference lies not between two different bodily 
morphologies, but between the manner and degree to which the same surroundings 
call for different kinds of bodily engagement. It is by virtue of the body schema and 
its adaptability that we are 'geared' into our environment (as Merleau-Ponty, 
paraphrasing Heidegger, sometimes puts it) in such a way that it makes practical 
sense to us. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body schema therefore provides insight 
into the phenomenological constitution of Gibsonian affordances, as well as helping 
to make sense of Gibson’s own construal of affordances as both properties of 
external objects and visible ‘values or meanings’ (Gibson 1986 p.127).  
With this in mind, we can turn to our second key Merleau-Pontian concept. Normal 
(i.e. typically developed and non-pathological) subjects can integrate prior mental 
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operations into their behaviour in such a way as to alleviate the need for any 
rehearsal of the reasoning behind them. Merleau-Ponty’s term for this phenomenon 
is 'sedimentation' 
These acquired worlds which give my experience its secondary sense, are 
themselves cut out of a primordial world which grounds the primary sense of 
my experience. Similarly there is a “world of thoughts”, a sedimentation of 
our mental operations, which allows us to count on our acquired concept and 
judgements, just as we count upon the things that are there and that are given 
as a whole, without our having to repeat their synthesis at each moment. 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.131)   
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of language provides a handy illustration of 
sedimentation at work in everyday experience (see ibid. pp.179-205). Learning the 
correct way to use a word, coining a phrase, or adopting a manner of talking in line 
with a newly acquired attitude (such as moderating one’s language for the sake of 
political correctness) are initially the outcome of a creative thought processes 
through which new habits are constituted. Merleau-Ponty calls this spontaneous or 
expressive use of language, ‘speaking speech’. With practice, the speaker comes to 
utilise the new linguistic device without needing to remind themselves of the 
reasoning behind their wording, sometimes having even forgotten it entirely. We can 
forget the origin of a phrase or the process through which we learned to use it while 
continuing to routinely deploy it correctly. Merleau-Ponty calls this sedimented (sic) 
linguistic usage, ‘spoken speech’. Merleau-Ponty sometimes presents spoken speech 
as a derivative, secondary and therefore inferior or ‘inauthentic’, form of linguistic 
communication (or at least he does so in Phenomenology of Perception, cf. Merleau-
Ponty 1964c), but we need not accept this, as the two are mutually grounding. 
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Though sedimented spoken speech is born of speaking speech, spontaneous speaking 
speech cannot occur ex nihlo, as a novel linguistic coinage presupposes an extant set 
of word meanings and connotations to be modified and re-appropriated, and against 
which the novel contribution of a new linguistic creation can be understood (see 
Baldwin 2007 for insightful criticism of Merleau-Ponty along these lines). Hence, 
building up the layers of meaning through which subjects engage with the world and 
each other, rests on a ‘double moment of sedimentation and spontaneity’ (Merleau-
Ponty 2012 p.132) – the formation of new modes of self-expression and 
communication within the confines of established linguistic practices.  
Returning now to the three problems with Noë’s account of sensorimotor 
understanding outlined in the previous section, and bearing in mind the discussion of 
the body schema above, my modest suggestion is that similar Merleau-Pontian 
morals apply to motor significations as to linguistic meaning. Once a perceiver has 
acquired a piece of practical knowledge – a skill – through an adaptation of their 
body schema, the perceived world gains for them a new motor signification and the 
perception of a novel affordance is made possible. However, just as we continue to 
use and understand ‘spoken speech’ without recollection of the creative ‘speaking 
speech’ through which it was constituted, we can continue to grasp the motor 
signification of a familiar object once the skilful know-how from which it originates 
has been lost through injury, illness, or in the absence of the enabling condition(s) 
required in order for it to be exercised successfully.  
With this genetic phenomenological framework in place, we are now poised to 
supplement Noë’s account of sensorimotor understanding and deal with my three 
objections. Contra Noë, object horizons are not themselves affordances for action. 
Keeping Held and Hein’s passive kittens as our example, we may say that the ability 
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to perceive affordances – to  perceive objects in one’s environment as exhibiting a 
motor signification– is the product of the development of practical know-how via 
adaptations of one’s body schema. This is why despite already being able to see 
object horizons, the passive kittens did not grasp affordances until they had honed 
the relevant bodily skills. Hence, the perceptual meaningfulness of affordances is 
constituted (in the genetic-phenomenological sense of ‘constitution’ –as coming to 
appear as such) through skilful sensorimotor interactions, of which the body schema 
is the vehicle. Now recall the locked-in syndrome patient, for whom the practical 
knowledge or skill required to take up an affordance is lost. Their meaningful 
relationship with their visual world – their system of motor significations - is not lost, 
despite their deficit, because for them affordances are already constituted – the 
bodily meaning of their familiar environment is sedimented (sic) – although the 
opportunity to form new motor significations is now largely closed to them due to 
their severely restricted possibilities for novel sensorimotor interactions through 
which new motor significations could be constituted.  
In closing this section, two additional passages from Phenomenology of Perception 
will serve to further illustrate the multi-level conception of meaningful sensorimotor 
understanding discernable in Merleau-Ponty’s work that is lacking in Noë’s. The first 
recalls Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the ‘intentional arc’ from his first book, The 
Structure of Behaviour (Merleau-Ponty 1967). The second comes from his discussion 
of (non-aplastic) phantom limbs 
[T]he life of consciousness – epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual 
life – is underpinned by an “intentional arc” that projects around us our past, 
our future, our human milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation, 
97 
 
and our moral situation, or rather, that ensures that we are situated within all 
these relationships.’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012. p.137) 
What refuses the mutilation or the deficiency in us is an I that is engaged in a 
certain physical and inter-human world, an I that continues to tend toward its 
world despite deficiencies or amputations and that to this extent does not de 
jure recognise them. The refusal of the deficiency is but the reverse side of 
our inherence in a world, the implicit negation of what runs counter to natural 
the movement that throws us into our tasks…to have a phantom limb is to 
remain open to all of the actions of which the arm alone is capable and to stay 
within the practical field one had prior to the mutilation. (ibid. pp.83-4) 
The locked-in patient’s sensorimotor understanding, though initially the product of 
practical knowledge, no longer depends for its continued existence on bodily skills as 
such, but rather inheres in their visual experience as a sedimented ‘projection’ of 
value or, to use a less extravagant phrase, an established way of seeing informed by 
past bodily engagements with the world. And just as the amputated arm survives for 
the amputee as a phantom so long as they continue to live through their familiar 
situation, with all the established affordances they have built up through the skilful 
use of their now-absent limb, the locked-in perceiver continues to ‘project around 
them their past…human milieu…and physical situation’ and thereby preserve the 
meaningful structure of their perceptual experience. There is therefore what might be 
described as an ‘historical’ dimension to the phenomenon of sensorimotor 
understanding which cannot be adequately captured by the language of 
commonsense psychology and ecological optics, to which Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology gives voice. And in so doing, it dissolves the worries incurred by 
Noë’s undercooked phenomenology. While Noë is certainly correct that ‘the task of 
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phenomenology ought to be…to catch experience in the act of making the world 
available’ (Noë 2004 p.176), this requires explicating not just how perceivers ‘bring 
the world forth’ (Noë 2012 p.14) by actively applying their sensorimotor 
understanding in experience, but also what it is to be passively embodied and situated 
in such a way as to make such understanding possible in the first place.  
This conclusion echoes Husserl's distinction between active and passive genetic-
phenomenological constitution. As Husserl's project evolved from static into genetic 
phenomenology, he became increasingly sensitive to the fact that phenomenological 
constitution encompasses both perceptual acts performed by the perceiving subject 
and a background of passive openness to the world against which such acts can 
operate, and that a thorough analysis of the activity of perceptual consciousness 
eventually leads us back to this more basic, passive level of experience 
[A]nything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a 
passivity that gives something beforehand; and, when we trace anything built 
actively, we run into constitution by passive generation. (Husserl 1988. 
p.78)26 
In light of this, I think that the unhelpful mantra of 'perception is something we do', 
rampant in the sensorimotor theory literature and the subject of much derision among 
detractors, deserves to be jettisoned, but at no real cost to the sensorimotor 
                                                          
26 Crucially, Husserl is not here espousing a form of classical empiricism whereby 
perception consists in the passive reception of impressions or sense-data (Hume 1977 
§2; Russell 1912 ch. I) (though he may well do elsewhere). This would fall foul of 
Sellars' (1997) ‘myth of the given’. Husserl’s distinction between activity and 
passivity is not between pure sensation and conceptual thought, but between a pre-
reflective openness to the world and acts of reflective consciousness. The issue of 
conceptual versus non-conceptual content, upon which I take no stance, is orthogonal 
to this less contentious point. 
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approach.27Noë in particular seems to assume that either perceptual experience must 
be conceived as wholly active – as skilful interaction with one’s environment, or else 
as wholly passive - as the construction of internal pictures of the world out of 
afferent sensory data a la the snapshot conception (Noë 2004 ch. II). But this is a 
false dichotomy. The fact that the richness of our visual experience owes to the 
possession and exercise of sensorimotor understanding does not entail that 
perception just is a form of action, and allowing for passivity in experience does not 
entail lapsing back into the snapshot conception. Nor does the admission passivity 
reduce the role of embodiment in structuring perceptual experience. If anything, 
accommodating something like the Husserlian distinction between active and passive 
constitution, as I believe Merleau-Ponty does in his phenomenology of embodiment 
(see e.g. Morris 2010), allows us to make better sense of the intimate relationship 
between bodily agency and perceptual experience, without the distractions of radical 
rhetoric (hence my reluctance, mentioned briefly at the outset, over the label of 
'enactivism'). The sensorimotor theorist who, like Noë, also aspires to be a 
phenomenologist has their work cut out for them, but it is hoped that the above 
considerations might be a step in the right direction.  
 
10. 'Sensorimotor chauvinism?' 
                                                          
27 O’Regan and Noë’s unflinchingly reiterate this claim. They declare 
‘experiences…are not states. They are ways of acting. They are things we do.’ 
(O’Regan & Noë 2001 p.960’ and later, ‘Visual consciousness is not a special kind 
of brain state, or a special quality of informational states in the brain. It is something 
we do’ (ibid. p. 970). Noë’s Action in Perception opens with it, ‘The main idea of 
this book is that perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that 
happens to us, or in us. It is something we do’ (Noë 2004 p.1) while O’Regan’s Why 
Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell, tells us that perception’s qualitative character or 
‘feel’ ‘is something we do’ (O’Regan 2011 p.68) 
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Thus far I have appealed to a congenial mixture of phenomenology and cognitive 
science to argue that the structure of perceptual experience owes to an implicit 
understanding of movement-dependent sensorimotor contingencies and action-
dependent motor significations which are constituted through bodily engagements 
with the world. In this section I defend the general underlying claim of this chapter - 
that perceptual experience is structured by our embodiment - against Andy Clark's 
accusation of 'sensorimotor chauvinism'. Clark argues that the sensorimotor approach 
risks overselling the contribution of embodiment to perceptual experience (2008 
ch.VIII; 2006; 2001; Clark & Toribio 2001). Though some of Clark's objections 
focus on certain specific and non-essential aspects of the sensorimotor approach I 
have not endorsed, he does raise a more general worry about the extent to which 
visual experience is determined by sensorimotor understanding. Responding to this 
will necessitate a shift of emphasis away from phenomenological analysis towards 
more straightforwardly empirical lines of argumentation. 
Clark draws on well-known empirical work by Milner and Goodale in support of 
their 'dual-stream' hypothesis (Milner & Goodale 1995; 1992) (see also Jacob & 
Jeannerod 2003). Milner and Goodale synthesise a wealth of behavioural and 
neurological evidence to support the hypothesis that visual information in the brain is 
divided between two distinct streams of processing. The ventral visual stream 
processes information pertaining to object location and classification, and is therefore 
often glossed as the 'vision-for-perception' stream. The dorsal visual stream 
processes visual information relevant to the guidance of action, and is often glossed 
accordingly as the 'vision-for-action' stream. In certain neurological conditions, the 
interaction between the two streams is disrupted, resulting in some unusual 
pathologies. One of Milner and Goodale's patients, referred to simply as 'DF', 
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suffered damage to the part of her brain housing the ventral stream as a result of 
carbon monoxide poisoning, leaving her with visual form agnosia. DF is unable to 
visually identify or locate objects, but she can recognise objects by touch, accurately 
grasp them on command, and even perform well on certain visuomotor tasks such as 
posting her hand or a piece of card though a letterbox-shaped hole (Milner and 
Goodale 1995 p.129). On a related note, there exist more extreme cases where 
subjects can engage in all manner of visually-guided behaviours, including walking 
around and even making a cup of tea, in the total absence of visual awareness and 
without any recollection of having done so, as occurs in instances of epileptic 
automatism brought on by frontal lobe seizures (Damasio 2000 pp.96-101). 
Conversely, people suffering from optic ataxia caused by lesions to the area of the 
cortex where the dorsal stream is located can visually identify and locate objects very 
well but struggle to use the information garnered from conscious vision to guide their 
actions. Optic ataxia patients cannot, for instance, correctly orient their hand or a 
piece of card in relation to the same letterbox-style slot, despite being able to make 
accurate verbal reports as to the shape and location of the target on the basis of their 
visual experience (Milner and Goodale 1995. p.98).  
Clark also cites an experiment conducted by Aglioti, Goodale and DeSouza (1995), 
this time on non-pathological subjects, using a three-dimensional version of the 
Ebbinghaus (or Titchener circles) illusion. The Ebbinghaus illusion occurs when 
subjects are presented with two images of small circles of the exact  same size 
surrounded by rings made up of other circles. The surrounding circles in one image 
are notably larger than those in the other. Despite the middle circles being the same 
size in each image, the one surrounded by the ring of smaller circles appears larger 
(for an optical explanation of the Ebbinghau  illusion, see Roberts, Harris and Yates 
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2005). Aglioti, Goodale and DeSouza constructed a three dimensional model of the 
illusion out of differently sized poker chips and instructed subjects to pick up the 
chip in the middle. They report that their test subjects' grasping of the centre poker 
chips was accurate despite their being subject to the visual illusion, suggesting that 
the processing involved in the performance of this visuomotor task is restricted to the 
dorsal stream and is not influenced by the apparent shape of the chip as it appears in 
their visual experience, which is presumably processed in the ventral stream. If it is 
true that conscious vision and visually-guided action are the products of two 
completely separate cognitive subsystems then it could look like bodily action and 
visual experience are far more easily divorceable than the sensorimotor theorist 
would like. Clark therefore follows Miler and Goodale in holding that visually-
guided action and visual experience are doubly dissociated; it is the ventral visual 
stream which is responsible for visual consciousness, while the dorsal visual stream 
operates unconsciously to guide action 
[W]hat is at issue is not just the evidence of substantial dissociation [between 
perception and action] but the best functional and architectural explanation of 
the evidence. And the best functional and architectural explanation, according 
to Milner and Goodale, and others, is that conscious perceptual experience 
reflects the activation of representations that have less to do with the fine 
details of world-engaging sensorimotor loops and more with the need to 
assign inputs to categories, types and relative locations so as to better sift, 
sort, select, identify, compare, recall, imagine and reason. (Clark 2008 p.192, 
italics removed) 
In passing, Noë remarks that the dual streams hypothesis is 'at best orthogonal' to his 
version of the sensorimotor approach to visual experience (Noë 2004 p.19). I think 
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that Noë  is correct but that he fails to spell out precisely why this is so, so below I 
attempt to clarify this on behalf of the sensorimotor theorist.  
First of all, the fact that sensorimotor understanding, be it of the kind implicated in 
the task of posting a letter through a letter box or in walking into a kitchen and 
making a hot drink, can be present and operative in the guidance of action in the 
absence of visual awareness does not mean that the same sensorimotor understanding 
does not profoundly shape visual consciousness when it is there, so visual form 
agnosia and epileptic automatisms, where ex hypothesi there is no visual awareness, 
prove nothing with respect to the role of sensorimotor understanding in determining 
the content of ordinary visual experience.28 The onus therefore lies with Clark's 
appeal to Aglioti, Goodale and DeSouza's three-dimensional Emmingbaus illusion 
and to the alleged functional dissociation between perception and action in optic 
ataxia. Fortunately for the sensorimotor theorist, neither of these suffices to discredit 
the claim that visual experience is dependent for its content on sensorimotor 
understanding. 
With regards to Clark's appeal to the three dimensional Emmingbaus illusion, there 
are reasons for doubting the extent to which Aglioti, Goodale and DeSouza's data 
hold up to empirical scrutiny. Franz and colleagues (V. Franz, Gegenfurtner and 
Scharnowski 2005; V. Franz 2003) undertook a similar experiment using an 
aluminium disk as the centre circle, which was placed in the middle of a drawing of 
                                                          
28 Note that this does not necessarily cut against O'Regan's solution to the hard 
problem either. For O'Regan, 'sensorimotor contingencies determine the quality of 
experience' (O'Regan 2012 p.24, italics removed), while awareness of the quality is 
explained via a 'hierarchical form of cognitive access similar to that used in "higher-
order" theories [...] of consciousness' (ibid. p.25). Though the relevant sensorimotor 
contingencies are present in cases of epileptic automatism and visual agnosia, it 
remains open for O'Regan to argue, quite plausibly, that it is the lack of the relevant 
form of cognitive access,  caused by the patients'  seizure or brain damage, which 
explains the absence of normal visual awareness.  
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the surrounding circles on a piece of cardboard. Rather than relying on observing 
video footage, they used special sensors fitted to the subjects' hand to track their 
finger movements in order to ensure that the illusion effect was not 'contaminated' by 
additional grasping movements made immediately after they had touched the disk 
(V. Franz, Genenfurtner & Scharnowski 2005 p.1361). They found that the effect of 
the illusion on grasping was not corrected for until after the disc was touched. This 
was found to be the case both when subjects could see their own hands and when the 
apparatus was sent up in such a way that they could not (ibid. p.1374). As they 
themselves point out, this directly contradicts Aglioti, Goodale and DeSouza's 
reports (ibid. p.1376-7). Hence, Milner and Goodale's assertion that 'grip size [is] 
determined by the true size of the target' and is 'uninfluenced by the illusion' (Milner 
& Goodale 1995 p.168) and Clark's subsequent conjecture that 'the processing 
underlying visual awareness may be operating quite independently of that underlying 
the visual control of action' (Clark 2008 p.185) is at best empirically questionable, at 
worst empirically false. It would therefore be unwise to hang any substantial 
philosophical point about the severability of perceptual experience and sensorimotor 
understanding on this particular empirical example.  
With regards to Clark's appeal to Milner and Goodale's take on optic ataxia, it is far 
from clear that it can do the philosophical work Clark requires of it. What Clark 
would need is a reason for thinking that optic ataxics enjoy rich visual experiences 
despite a complete lack of sensorimotor understanding. But the fist of these is only 
partially true, and the second is patently false. Optic ataxics, who have dorsal stream 
lesions, do in fact exhibit perceptual deficits, as the sensorimotor theory would 
predict, namely in peripheral vision (that is, their peripheral visual awareness is even 
worse than the rest of us!), which negatively affects their visual attention (Pisella et 
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al 2009 p.3040; 3042). In O'Regan's terminology, their vision is less 'grabby' than 
that of ordinary perceivers. And, as Rossetti, Pisella and Vighetto (2003) note in a 
detailed review of  the clinical literature on optic ataxia, not only can optic ataxics 
perform a great variety of visually-guided actions without difficulty, many of them 
tend not to suffer failures of visuomotor control in their daily lives. When they do, 
the deficits tend to be specific to particular tasks and are usually only briefly noticed 
(bid. p.176). Furthermore, optic ataxics' coordination improves considerably when 
they are allowed to take more time to complete a visuomotor task, suggesting that the 
effects of optic ataxia should be understood more conservatively, in terms of a 
breakdown in motor coordination on the basis of visual information, rather than any 
strict dissociation between the content of their visual experience and their capacities 
for visually-guided action 
Optic ataxia patients can perform all types of natural actions and are impaired 
only when a time constraint is imposed: their on-line motor updating is 
altered and their reaches toward peripheral targets are impaired when they 
have to produce immediate responses toward unknown objects... optic ataxia 
does not appear as a general deficit of action but rather as a specific deficit 
localized at a restricted level of action organization that is immediate 
visuomotor control. (ibid. p.177) 
So, with regards to optic ataxia, the facts are these: optic ataxics' perceptual 
experience is fairly normal, but not quite identical to that of non ataxics,  and their 
visuomotor coordination is notably off when temporal constraints are imposed on a 
visuomotor task. But this has absolutely no bearing on the claim that their perceptual 
experience is structured by a rich sensorimotor understanding comprising movement-
dependent object horizons (which they see) and action-dependent motor 
106 
 
significations or affordances (upon which they can act). We should therefore remain 
guarded against any attempt to radically divorce perceptual experience from bodily 
agency by appeal to the phenomenology of optic ataxia 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the neuroscientists cited above express scepticism over 
the popularist gloss of the dual stream hypothesis in terms of one information stream 
for conscious perception (the ventral stream) and another stream for unconscious 
visually-guided action (the dorsal stream), remarking that it is a something of an 
oversimplification (Rossetti, Pisella & Vighetto p.178; Pisella et al 2009 p.3042-3). 
A more thorough review of the empirical evidence against the double dissociation 
between 'vision-for-perception' and 'vision-for-action' is provided by Shenk & 
McIntosh (2010) (but cf. Milner & Goodale (2010)). To be absolutely clear, though, I 
am not dismissing the dual stream hypothesis from the armchair. That would be 
vulgar, foolish and warrant the full wrath of the neuroscience community. The 
overwhelming consensus is that some (although probably weakened) version of it is 
true and as a scientific layman I accept this readily. My point is merely that it is 
philosophically illegitimate for Clark to invoke empirically contentious details of the 
dual stream hypothesis in order to carve the sort of radical divide between perception 
and embodiment needed to undermine anything I have said in this chapter about the 
role of sensorimotor understanding in shaping ordinary perceptual experience. These 
concerns are indeed orthogonal to the sensorimotor approach to visual perception.  
 
11. Conclusion 
I began by introducing some key aspects of the sensorimotor approach to visual 
perception, supported by empirical evidence from change and inattentional blindness 
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experiments. I argued, following Noë and contra some commentators, that 
change/inattentional blindness does not prove that we are in any way mistaken about 
the extent of the richness of our perceptual experience. The emerging 
phenomenological insights concerning the visual field  served as the point of 
departure for a phenomenological analysis of the way in which embodiment shapes 
our perpetual experience, focussing on the concept of 'sensorimotor understanding' as 
it is developed in Noë's work and its relevance to what, following Husserl, I called 
the 'horizonal structure' of conscious perception. I then argued that Noë's account of 
sensorimotor understanding suffers from certain deficiencies and inconstancies 
which Merleau-Ponty’s early phenomenology equips us to rectify, albeit admittedly 
at the expense of incurring an inflated conceptual inventory which potentially carries 
its own distinct set of philosophical problems. Finally, I considered Clark's attempt to 
empirically discredit the sensorimotor approach by appeal to Milner and Goodale's 
dual stream hypothesis. These arguments were found to be both empirically suspect 
and ultimately irrelevant to the phenomenological project of the chapter. 
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III. Extended Embodiment: Sensory Substitution and the Body Schema 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I sought to demonstrate the importance of perceivers' 
embodiment to the structure of their experience by using Merleau-Ponty's early 
phenomenology to supplement O'Regan and Noë's sensorimotor approach to vision. 
An emerging theme of that chapter was that adaptations of the body schema yield 
novel motor significations and affordances. In this chapter, I further explore the 
adaptability of the body schema via a phenomenological account of perception via 
tactile-visual sensory substitution technology. The intended upshot is that by virtue 
of the body schema's inherent flexibility, it can and sometimes does incorporate 
items external to the biological body. Doing so will involve delving further into 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, as well as empirical case studies of sensory 
substitution technologies along with commentaries from contemporary analytic 
philosophers. I begin by providing some background information on tactile-visual 
sensory substitution devices. I then briefly recapitulate Merleau-Ponty's discussion of 
the body schema before outlining relevant aspects of his accounts of spatiality and 
the senses, relating these where appropriate to relevant empirical literature. Insights 
from Merleau-Pontian phenomenology are then applied to perception with tactile-
visual sensory substitution devices. Finally, the emerging account is compared and 
contrasted with those currently available in the literature on sensory substitution.  
 
2. Tactile-visual sensory substitution: some key facts 
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Sensory substitution devices (hereafter SSDs) are prosthetic technologies designed to 
enable blind people to perceive the world in ways usually reserved for the sighted 
(for a scientific overview, see Stiles & Shimojo (in press) and Bach-y-Rita & Kercel 
(2003)). The focus of this paper is tactile-visual sensory substitution (hereafter 
TVSS). As the name implies, TVSS adapts subjects' surviving sense of touch to 
achieve a modified form of perception equivalent to vision in many respects. TVSS 
devices are not the only kind of SSD, though they are the SSDs which have received 
the most attention from philosophers. There are also audio-visual SSDs which 
convert camera images into sonic signals, allowing users to experience some of the 
characteristic phenomenological features of visual perception (see, e.g. Levy-Tzedek 
et al 2012, Meijer 1992).29  An adequate phenomenological account of audio-visual 
SSDs would require a separate treatment far beyond the scope of this chapter (or 
indeed this thesis), so in what follows I restrict my discussion to TVSS only.  
Research into TVSS was spearheaded by the pioneering work of Paul Bach-y-Rita 
and colleagues in the late nineteen-sixties (Back-y-Rita et al 1969). Their prototype 
SSD was a relatively crude device which translated images from a video camera into 
patterns of activation in four hundred small Teflon tipped vibrators (known as 
‘vibrotactors’) fitted to the backrest of an old dental chair which tactually traced the 
shapes of objects presented to the camera on the user’s back. Mappings between 
camera images and vibratory-tactile stimulation could be monitored as two-
dimensional pictures using an oscilloscope. The camera, though bulky and fixed to a 
tripod, could be manipulated by hand. Six blind subjects (one early blind, five born 
blind) were trained to use this apparatus. Within a short time they could identify not 
                                                          
29 One such device is 'The vOICe' (capitalised for 'oh I see'), an updated version of 
Meijer's (1992) original design. Full details about the vOICE including user tutorials 
and a publication archive can be found at www.seeingwithsound.com (last accessed 
14/7/14). 
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only geometrical forms, but a ‘vocabulary’ of twenty-five objects including 
telephones, furniture and toy animals (ibid p.963). The speed with which they 
identified objects increased with practice and they soon mastered paradigmatically 
visual concepts including perspective, distance and even lighting (they could detect 
shadows), which were reflected in their subjective reports (ibid).  
Though this primitive SSD was hampered by a lack of portability, it was soon 
superseded by a range of more convenient devices. One now-iconic device 
comprised a smaller, head-mounted camera and a sixty-four point array of vibrators 
which could be attached to the back or abdomen via a belt. Following a short 
adjustment period (as little a few minutes), users similarly 'learn to make perceptual 
judgements using visual means of analysis, such as perspective, parallax, looming 
and zooming, and depth judgements' (Bach-y-Rita 2002 p.500). Amazingly, these 
newly acquired perceptual abilities are retained when the vibrators are transferred 
from the  back to the front of the user's torso (Bach-y-Rita 2002 p.500). Analogous 
TVSS devices have since been developed which translate camera images into raised 
dots or electrical stimulation applied to the tongue (Back-y-Rita et al 1998) or 
fingertips (Buchs, Maidenbaum & Amedi 2014, Kaczmrek, Tyler & Bach-y-Rita 
1997), yielding similar results.   
 
The more accustomed users are to the SSD and the more immersed they are in using 
it to explore their surroundings, the more recessive their awareness of the tactile-
vibratory stimulation becomes (Bach-y-Rita 1972 p.153). Moreover, users react to 
objects approaching the camera as one would react to objects approaching one’s 
body, as an experimenter discovered accidentally when adjusting the camera’s zoom 
112 
 
function while a test subject was still wearing the device. Startled, this subject raised 
his arms instinctively to protect his face and lurched backwards away from the 
‘approaching’ object despite being stimulated tactually on his back (ibid. p.98-9). As 
well as enjoying many of the advantages of normal vision, blind TVSS users are also 
susceptible to visual illusions like the waterfall illusion30 (ibid. p.79). It is therefore 
beyond doubt that TVSS constitutes a genuine form of exteroception  
Our subjects spontaneously report the external localisation of stimuli, in that 
sensory information seems to come from in front of the camera, rather than 
from the vibrotactors on their back. Thus, after sufficient experience, the use 
of the vision substitution system seems to become an extension of the sensory 
apparatus. (Bach-y-Rita et al 1969 p.964) 
Use of TVSS is a skill – a ‘perceptual skill’ as Bach-y-Rita often puts it – and as 
such requires some adjustment before it begins to feel natural. Bach-y-Rita and his 
co-workers realised early on that in order to maximise development of these 
perceptual skills, subjects must be able to manipulate the camera for themselves. The 
best results occur when subjects manipulate the camera for themselves, with some 
experimenters going so far as to  claim that active self-movement is necessary for 
successful perception (Lenay et al 2003). This was a major drawback of the original 
dental chair SSD, where the camera was larger and less mobile. For instance, though 
competent with respect to shape, subjects struggled to discriminate sizes (Bach-y-
Rita 1972 p.81). As the sensorimotor approach would predict, the greater capacity for 
self-movement granted by subsequent portable SSDs rectified this by allowing for a 
                                                          
30 Motion after effect, or the 'waterfall illusion', occurs when subjects with stationary 
eyes are shown a stationary object after being shown a moving stimulus. The 
stationary object is then perceived as moving in the opposite direction to the moving 
stimulus.  
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more thorough perceptual exploration of the environment, resulting in more 
sophisticated visually-guided behaviours. For example, after a short period of 
adjustment, users of portable SSDs can locate a white object against a black 
background then walk over to it and pick it up, correctly identify individual 
characters from a range of letters displayed on a wall (ibid p. 87), and even identify 
individual faces and facial features. Bach-y-Rita's paraphrase of one user’s 
remarkable report upon exploring a photograph of a member of his laboratory staff 
using the head-mounted camera testifies to the remarkably vision-like precision of 
TVSS perception, ‘That is Betty; she is wearing her hair down today and does not 
have her glasses on; her mouth is open, and she is moving her right hand from her 
left side to the back of her head’ (ibid. p.6).  
Research into sensory substitution, especially TVSS, has inspired much 
philosophical debate (for a review, see Kiverstein, Farina & Clark (forthcoming)). In 
particular, philosophers have been interested in how to characterise the unusual form 
of perception enjoyed by blind TVSS users. There are three main lines of 
interpretation of TVSS perception discernible in the literature: the quasi-visual 
interpretation, the tactile interpretation, and the sui generis interpretation.  
Some theorists, including Bach-y-Rita himself, are wont to claim that TVSS 
perception can be understood as a form of visual perception (Bach-y-Rita 2002; 
1972, Hurley & Noë 2003, O'Regan & Noë 2001). This is, after all, the purpose for 
which SSDs are designed 
If a subject without functioning eyes can perceive detailed information in 
space, correctly localise it subjectively, and respond to it in a manner 
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comparable to the response of a normally sighted person, I feel justified in 
applying the term “vision”. (Bach-y-Rita 1972 pp.ix-x) 
To avoid presenting an overinflated version of the visual interpretation, it must be 
noted that nobody goes so far as to claim that ordinary vision and TVSS perception 
are completely phenomenologically indistinguishable; the claim is rather that TVSS 
perception is sufficiently vision-like to be justifiably described as visual. Hence my 
use of the term 'quasi-visual'. One obvious difference between ordinary vision and 
TVSS perception is the absence of colour qualities (at least in the case of users blind 
since birth, see Ortiz et al (2011)). TVSS perception also typically lacks the affective 
content that accompanies much visual experience. For instance, pornographic images 
do not induce sexual arousal, and the perception of loved ones’ faces is 
disappointingly devoid of any affective dimension, though this does not prevent 
users from taking pleasure in learning to recognise previously unfamiliar objects 
(Bach-y-Rita 2002 p.509-10).  
Despite being a defender of the quasi-visual interpretation, Bach-y-Rita (2002) raises 
the worry that these facts might count against the possibility of SSDs giving rise to 
genuinely visual experience. Similarly, Lenay et al (2003) suggest that the lack of 
emotional value found in TVSS users' experience counts against their experience 
being genuinely visual. This, I think, is too hasty a conclusion. With respect to 
colour, blind TVSS users can discriminate coloured surfaces on the basis of light 
reflectance (Bach-y-Rita 2002 p.502), which is arguably what sighted subjects' 
functioning eyes allow them to do. Furthermore, we do not deny vision to the colour-
blind, nor would we deny vision to a person or creature whose vision was so poor 
that they could not discriminate colours, or to someone whose vision is entirely 
monochrome like the painter described by Sacks (1995) who lost his colour vision 
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due to cerebral achromatopsia. With respect to the absence of emotional content, 
O’Regan and Noë instructively point out that blind TVSS users' sexual and 
emotional development occurs in the absence of vision, so it is perhaps to be 
expected that these experiences will remain non-visual for them (O'Regan and Noë 
2001 p.958). And in any case, there exist pathological subjects (such as psychopaths) 
who lack these emotional attachments altogether: we don’t infer from this that they 
can’t see!  
Not everyone is impressed by the quasi-visual interpretation. Others have argued that 
blind TVSS users' perception remains tactile, as the users lack functioning eyes and 
the source of the perception is tactile stimulation (Prinz 2006, Block 2003, Keeley 
2002, Ross 2001). As adaptation to TVSS exploits neural plasticity, further technical 
disagreement between the two parties arises as to whether the implicated brain 
processes traffic in visual or tactile information (Hurley & Noë 2003, Block 2003). 
Against the dichotomy of TVSS-as-visual versus TVSS-as-tactile, others have 
claimed that TVSS perception is so radically different from both vision and touch 
that it constitutes an emergent and entirely sui generis form of perception. Deroy & 
Auvray forthcoming, Auvray & Myin 2009). A related thesis from empirical 
psychology, which does not immediately contradict any of these, is that TVSS 
perception consists in an 'artificially acquired' or 'synthetic' form of synaesthesia 
(Ward and Wright 2012, Proulx & Stoerig 2006). Farina (2013) endorses a 
combination of the sui generis interpretation and the synaesthesia thesis. 
In what follows I undertake a genetic-phenomenological analysis of adaptation to, 
and perception with, TVSS devices, using further insights from Merleau-Ponty. On a 
scholastic note, given the influence of Merleau-Ponty's early phenomenology on 
much contemporary work on embodied cognition, it is perhaps surprising that to date 
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no such account has been explicitly formulated. I argue that Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology compels us to endorse a hybrid account comprising variations of 
both the quasi-visual interpretation and the synaesthesia thesis and to reject the 
tactile and sui generis interpretations, and more generally, that evidence from TVSS 
further supports my claim in chapter I that the limits of embodiment do not always, 
and certainly do not by necessity, coincide with the boundaries of the human 
organism.  
 
3. Adaptation to TVSS via extension of the body schema 
Discussions of adaptation to TVSS tend to focus on the plasticity of the implicated 
neural processing (Block 2003, Hurley & Noë 2001, Bach-y-Rita 1972) and/or the 
sort of perceptual knowledge gained through the use of an SSD (Prinz 2006, Ross 
2001) rather than its phenomenology. Sensorimotor theorists characterise adaptation 
to an SSD in terms of the acquisition of sensorimotor understanding, and attribute the 
emerging vision-like perceptual abilities to blind subject's implicit mastery over 
paradigmatically visual sensorimotor contingencies (O'Regan & Noë 2001 pp.957-8). 
Again, I am sympathetic to this account, but think that insufficient attention has been 
paid to the precise ways in which the user's embodiment shapes the adaptation 
process and the emerging experience. In this section, I argue that blind subjects' 
adaptation to TVSS consists not just in the reorganisation of information processing 
in their brain and sensitivity to novel sensorimotor contingencies, but in the 
integration of the SSD with, and subsequent extension of, the body schema.  
Recall that the body schema is not to be confused with a mental representation of the 
body - a body image. The body schema is an integrated system of motor dispositions 
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that structures perception and action (Gallagher 2005) and in Merleau-Ponty's words, 
is a ‘law of constitution’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.101) in the Husserlian genetic-
phenomenological sense of 'constitution'  - as coming to appear as such, meaning that 
it constrains and conditions the ways in which things appear to the perceiver. This 
pertains both to experience of one's own body and the surrounding world. Indeed, for 
Merleau-Ponty, the two are inseparable; they are ‘two sides of a single act’ (ibid. p. 
211) which only artificially come apart in 'objective' thought. By this he means that 
although we can, if we wish, describe in isolation the experience of our own bodies 
and the experience of the surrounding world, the resulting description would be a 
piece of abstract philosophical theorising, and not a description of lived experience 
as it typically unfolds.  
This claim motivates Merleau-Ponty to distinguish between ‘external' and ‘bodily’ 
conceptions of space. External space is space conceived as an unbounded expanse of  
determinately fixed positions. Bodily space, on the other hand, is a pre-reflective 
spatial awareness that, for normal subjects at least, is phenomenologically prior to 
assigning determinate spatial values to objects through an egocentric frame of 
reference. For example, in order to judge that something is ‘about four feet in front of 
me’, I must first have a sense of myself as orientated towards the object through the 
perspective imposed by my body, without which ‘in front of’ (and ‘me’ for that 
matter) would lack the sense it has in that context. External space and bodily space 
are therefore complementary notions, as reflective judgements about the former are 
grounded in a pre-reflective awareness of the latter. Hence Merleau-Ponty’s remark 
that ‘Homogeneous [external] space can only express the sense of oriented [bodily] 
space because it received this sense from oriented space’ (ibid. p.104) and his rough-
and-ready rebuttal of Kant’s transcendental account of space: though in a sense Kant 
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was correct in holding that an a priori intuition of space is a condition of the 
possibility of spatial judgements31, the space Kant has in mind is the universal, 
objective space of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics, rather than the bodily 
spatiality of unreflective experience 
Insofar as I have a body and insofar as I act in the world through it, space and 
time are not for me a mere summation of juxtaposed points, and no more are 
they, for that matter, an infinity of relations synthesised by my consciousness 
in which my body would be implicated. (ibid. p.140-1) 
As illustrated by the case of Ian Waterman in chapter I, the fact that there is no need 
to ‘synthesise’ through any deliberative mental act of judgement the individual 
spatial points at which one's body parts are located into a unified perception of the 
body owes to the body schema. In the previous chapter we saw, following Merleau-
Ponty, that through the honing of skills and acquisition of new habits, the body 
schema can be ‘reworked and renewed’ (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.143) yielding new 
affordances and motor significations. The body schema is flexible; it is by honing 
motor habits that we can engage fluidly in skilful behaviour, and the possession of a 
body schema is a precondition of forming and perfecting such motor habits. Recall 
also that for Merleau-Ponty, the body schema has an existential significance over and 
above its relevance to the psychology of perception and action. In fact, it is a key 
concept in his embodied take on the now-familiar Heideggerian notion of being-in-
                                                          
31 ‘At the basis of their [geometrical objects'] intuition lies a pure intuition (of space 
and time), which is a priori. This is possible because the latter intuition is nothing but 
the mere form of sensibility, which precedes the actual appearance of the objects, 
since in fact it makes them possible. Yet this faculty of intuiting a priori concerns 
not the matter of the appearance (that is, the sensation in it, for this constitutes what 
is empirical), but its form, viz,. space and time.’ (Kant 1977 pp.25-6) 
 
119 
 
the-world. Merleau-Ponty takes up the Heideggerian notion of being-in-the-world 
and gives it an embodied twist: the body is the ‘vehicle of being-in-the-world' 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012 p. 84), because it is through the body schema that we have a 
practical grasp on our surroundings prior to deliberation or reflection. On Merleau-
Ponty’s account, even instinctual postural adjustments like the hand movements 
implicated in grasping, or avoidance behaviour induced by pain, are more than blind 
stimulus-response reflexes because they have a 'sense’; they are the appropriate 
bodily adjustments given the implicitly understood  normative demands of one’s 
situation, 'Reflex, insofar as it opens itself to the sense of a situation, and perception, 
insofar as it is an intention of our total being, are modalities of a pre-objective 
perspective that we call “being in the world"' (ibid. 2012 p.81, italics in original). 
Hence, to inhabit the practical sphere that Heidegger emphasises as primary for 
Dasein, one must be anchored into the world through a body schema.  
Recall also Bach-y-Rita’s remark that SSDs are 'extensions of the user’s sensory 
apparatus'. With this in mind, Merleau-Ponty's account of the body schema allows us 
to make phenomenological sense of blind subjects' adaptation to TVSS SSDs: TVSS 
extends the body schema beyond the boundaries of the biological body and functions 
as part of the system of embodied capacities perceivers bring to bear on their 
environment through perceptual exploration. As Bach-y-Rita observes, it is essential 
to successful use of an SSD that ‘camera movement must be under the control of one 
of the subject’s motor systems (hand, head movement, or any other)’ (Bach-y-Rita 
2002 p.497) in order to compensate for the absence of the exploratory eye 
movements, and indeed other bodily movements such as head turnings, upon which 
ordinary vision is heavily dependent (Bach-y-Rita 1972 p.99, cf. Yarbus 1967). 
Recall also that, as with awareness of one's body generally, awareness of the tactile 
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stimulation is highly recessive. By developing the required motor habits, the SSD 
ceases to be given as an external object for the user, and becomes what Heidegger 
(1962) calls ‘transparent equipment’, or what Rowlands (2010) has more recently 
dubbed a ‘vehicle of disclosure’: it becomes for them something through which they 
perceive the world, rather than a mere object which that they perceive as out there in 
the world.  
As with Head and Holmes' example of the blind man’s cane noted in chapter I, the 
SSD becomes integrated into the user’s bodily space, and so long as they are 
immersed in the exploration of their environment the vibrators on their body, like the 
handle of the cane, are not objects of perception, but part of the pre-reflective system 
of motor capacities though which perceivers are aware of the surrounding world. 
However, unlike the blind man's cane, which extends his field of tactile sensitivity, 
perception with an SSD allows the user to experience objects with which their 
sensory apparatus is not in direct physical contact. The objects of TVSS perception, - 
faces, walls, pictures, etc - are no more experienced at the source of the vibratory 
simulation than the objects of ordinary vision are experienced as on the retina, but at 
their actual external locations. It is in this crucial sense that blind TVSS users' 
newfound sensory fields have more in common with vision than they do with touch 
because, as Martin (1993) notes, while one's field of tactile sensitivity coincides with 
the boundaries of one's body (phenomenal space), the visual field appears as distal 
and unbounded (external space). Hence, adaptation to TVSS allows blind subjects 
gain the sort of perspective on external space that is usually provided by vision. This 
notion of perspective harkens back to Merleau-Ponty's description of the visual field: 
To say that I have a visual field means that I have an access and an opening to 
a system of visible beings through my position, and that they are available to 
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my gaze in virtue of a kind of primordial contact and by a gift of nature, 
without any effort required on my part. (Merleau-Ponty 2012p.224) 
Adaptation to TVSS doesn’t just enable blind users to identify an inventory of items 
learned by rote, but to grasp motor significations and thereby respond intelligently 
and appropriately to their situation via the exercise of sensorimotor understanding. It 
is by acquiring a quasi-visual field that blind TVSS users can orient themselves in 
relation to distal objects and anticipate bodily engagements with them. The user who 
lurched backwards had neither the time to make a judgement about the looming 
object, nor a prior history of ‘zooming’ stimuli from which to develop a conditioned 
reflex32, but having assumed the perspective of the camera, the sudden stimulation 
was instantaneously understood. This practical form of understanding is an 
achievement not of a reflecting subject, but of the pre-reflective operative 
intentionality of the body schema.  
 
4. Aside: A quick note on Kiverstein and Farina on SSDs and extended 
consciousness  
At this juncture, it is worth noting how my Merleau-Pontian account of adaptation to 
TVSS (which at this point in the chapter is, admittedly, far from complete) differs 
from a prima facie similar one due to Kiverstein and Farina (forthcoming). They 
argue that SSDs form part of an extended (i.e. not entirely neural) physical basis for 
their uses' conscious experience. With this much I agree. Indeed, a defence of the 
'extended mind thesis' is the subject of my next chapter, and a defence of what I shall 
                                                          
32 In the terminology of Phenomenology of Perception, these alternatives would be 
labelled respectively as 'intellectualist' and 'empiricist'.  
 
122 
 
call the 'extended conscious mind' thesis is the theme of chapter V. I am also in 
agreement with their claim that this extension of the physical states and processes 
which realise the SSD user's perceptual experience is made possible by an adaptation 
of their body schema. However, in contrast to the Merleau-Pontian picture I have 
presented, Kiverstein and Farina follow neuroscientists in characterising the body 
schema as ' an action-oriented [neural] representation of the body that gives the agent 
knowledge of what he can do with his body' (Kiverstein and Farina 2012 p.21). 
Hence, despite their aim of defending externalism about consciousness, Kiverstain 
and Farina apparently have an internalistic take on the body itself. If adaptation to 
TVSS consists merely in the forming of a novel kind of internal representation, then 
it is unclear why anything outside of the SSD user's brain should count as part of the 
physical substrate of their experience33. If the body is merely a causal pathway 
through which the requisite internal representations come to be formed, then 
Kiverstein and Farina need to show why the SSD itself should amount to more than 
an extra component in the causal chain or fall foul of what Adams and Aizawa 
(2001; 2007) call the 'coupling-constitution fallacy' (I discuss this fallacy in more 
depth over the next two chapters). By construing the process of adaptation to TVSS 
as an adaptation of the sensorimotor mechanisms which comprise the body schema 
proper, and not reducing these to internal representations thereof, the Merleau-
Pontian account is actually far better suited to the cause of externalism about 
consciousness.  
 
5. The unity of the senses, synaesthesia, and bodily synthesis, 
                                                          
33 Nb. Again, I am not denying that the forming of novel action-oriented 
representations is involved in adaptation to TVSS, only that this tells the whole story.  
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Thus far in following Merleau-Ponty I have claimed that TVSS perception is made 
possible by the incorporation of the SSD into  the body schema, and that users 
thereby gain a perspective on objects in external space via the acquisition of new 
sensorimotor understanding. In this section, I turn to part two of Phenomenology of 
Perception to shed further light on the experience of TVSS perception. 
In the 'Sensing' chapter of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty argues the 
intentionality of the senses is not reducible to that of isolated sensory systems. This is 
because sensory experience is governed by an underlying operative intentionality, 
whereas attending to the contribution of individual sensory modalities involves a 
form of object intentionality. The justification for this claim stems from the simple 
phenomenological observation that perceptual experience does not typically present 
us with pre-distinguished visual qualities, tactile qualities, etc, but unified inter-
sensory wholes whose relation to a particular sensory modality is often ambiguous. 
The question of how to distinguish sensory modalities is the subject of longstanding 
debate in the philosophy of mind (for a logical geography see Sorabji (1971), Grice 
(1962), Leon (1988), Ross (2001), Keeley (2002), and Macpherson (2010))34, and 
although it is not Merleau-Ponty's aim to discredit this enterprise, he is critical of 
                                                          
34 Leon (1988) argues that the senses are distinguishable by their unique, intrinsic 
phenomenal characters or 'qualia'. The classic formulation of this view is generally 
attributed to Grice (1962), though it is actually one of several criteria Grice discusses 
in his treatment of the senses, albeit the one on which he places the most emphasis. 
Against the qualia view, Ross (2001) argues that the senses are to be distinguished by 
reference to the particular properties of objects they detect. This 'proper objects' view 
has its origins in Aristotle's De Anima, as Sorabji (1971) makes clear. Keeley's 
(2002) account of the senses, which demarcates sensory systems in terms of their 
proper biological functions, can be read as an empirically-informed naturalistic 
version of the proper objects view. Macpherson (2010) questions the extent to which 
these approaches are mutually exclusive, and develops a 'multidimensional space' 
account whereby different approaches to individuating sensory modalities each 
contribute to a wider project of delimiting possible (e.g. animal, robotic, alien) 
senses. 
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traditional philosophy and psychology's attempts to 'pulverise' (Merleau-Ponty 2012 
p.236) experience into sense-specific qualities or representational contents. This is 
because performing the mental experiment of segregating the senses requires the 
adoption of a somewhat abstract and psychologically unnatural 'analytic attitude' 
(ibid p.247) towards ordinary experience in response to a given question which 
presupposes their distinctiveness, whereas ordinary experience is inherently 
multisensory. Merleau-Ponty therefore sides with a growing number of analytic 
philosophers who express scepticism over the extent to which sensory experiences 
are always or even ever modality specific (see e.g. the essays collected in Stokes, 
Matthen & Biggs forthcoming). Philosophers therefore risk committing the 
'experience error' of producing a distorted description of perception in terms of what 
we come to believe subsequently about its objects through commonsense reflection 
or scientific investigation, at the expense of accurately describing the phenomena 
under investigation (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.5). By means of illustration, consider the 
way by which Husserl arrives at his notion of 'pure sensation'. Husserl writes that 
sensory experience consists in the 'apprehension' of sensations through which the 
'schemata' of objects are constituted. In other words, perception presupposes sensory 
inputs which are organised into unified appearances of objects, 'Perceptual 
apprehension presupposes sensations-contents, which play their necessary role for 
the constitution of the schemata and, so, for the constitution of the appearances of 
real things themselves' (Husserl 1989 p.61). However, in contradistinction to the 
broadly Kantian picture implied by this claim, Husserl does seem to take it that these 
raw sensations can feature directly in the content of perceptual experience, as 
illustrated in his discussion of the 'presupposed sensation-contents' in the auditory 
perception of a tone 
125 
 
Finally, the spatial apprehension could be suspended, and then it becomes a 
mere “sense-datum” instead of a spatially sounding tone […] It is to be 
understood that such a tonal datum could be constituted without there being 
carried out any spatial apprehension at all, an apprehension which, in our 
example, was only abstractly put aside or, to correct this misleading 
expression, was suspended but is still, in the changed mode, a lived 
experience, the lived experience, to be precise, which pre-gives the spatial 
tone. We should mention, however, that this is not a necessary pre-givenness. 
A tone would be thinkable which dispensed with every spatial apprehension. 
Here, with the pure datum of sensation, we encounter a pregivennes which 
yet precedes the constitution of the object as object.” (ibid. p.24-5) 
Here Husserl flip-flops between two claims. One the one hand, he introduces the 
notion of pure  sensation as the product of a scrutinising attentive attitude to one's 
current sensory experience. Husserl does, after all, start by saying that the spatiality 
of the perception could be subtracted away from the experience. By the end of the 
passage, though, he appears to slip into a second claim to the effect that by 
hypothetically abstracting away the spatial organisation of the perception, we 
uncover a pure sensory datum which was previously present, albeit unnoticed, in the 
experience, by inferring that the phenomenologist's inspection of her sensory 
experience directs her towards a 'pre-given' 'pure datum of sensation' that preceded 
her perception of the object.  In other words, Husserl here endorses what might be 
called a pre-reflective sense datum theory of sensation.35 Husserl's account of pure 
sensation therefore presents the phenomenologist with a dilemma. Either the notion 
                                                          
35 This position, phenomenalist in spirit, coheres with the recurring notion of 'hyletic 
data' in Husserl's account of the lived body in Ideas II (Gallagher 1986b, cf. Q. Smith 
1977). 
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of a pure sensation is an abstraction from our ordinary perceptual encounters with the 
world, in which case it is an inappropriate posit for a phenomenological description 
of ordinary sensory experience, or object perception is consequent upon unnoticed 
pure sensations akin to atomistic sense data. Merleau-Ponty takes the first option by, 
unlike Husserl by the end of this passage, remaining true to the 'appearances of real 
things themselves' 
Far from being coextensive with perception, the sensible quality is the  
peculiar product of the attitude of curiosity or observation...[T]he quality  
does not figure in the natural exchange between my vision and the world. It is 
the response to a certain question posed by my gaze and the result of a 
second-order or critical act of vision that attempts to know itself in its 
particularity; it is the result of an “attention to the purely visual” that I 
employ when I am worried about being tricked or when I wish to commence 
a scientific study of vision. (Merleau-Ponty 2012. p 235) 
Against the  abstract notions of 'purely visual' and 'purely tactile' contents, Merleau-
Ponty stresses the extent to which sensory modalities are integrated, yielding a 
holistic and multisensory perceptual field or, as he puts it, the way in which they 
'communicate between themselves' (ibid. p.238). An especially relevant example, 
which appears twice in Phenomenology of Perception, is the 'communication' 
between touch and vision in the perception of a furry carpet. Merleau-Ponty remarks, 
'this red would literally not be the same if it were not the “wooly [sic] red” of the 
carpet’ (ibid. p.5), and later, ‘the blue of a rug would not be the same blue if it were 
not a wooly [sic] blue’ (ibid. p.326). That he invokes the same example using 
different colours is not insignificant, for Merleau-Ponty's point is not that perceivers 
can associate the carpet's colour with the way they expect it to feel, but that 
127 
 
irrespective of its particular colour or what they happen to know about the purpose of 
carpets, they literally see its texture; it is seen as touchable.  
For Merleau-Ponty, this sort of inter-sensory communication is phenomenologically 
ubiquitous. Consider, for example, how walls look solid, or how gravel paths look 
rough (see O'Callaghan (forthcoming) for additional examples). The horizonal 
structure of these perceptions include non-visual co-present contents. Similarly, 
certain colours are experienced as 'warm' or 'cool', and evidence strongly suggests 
that these sorts of correlations between colours and affective-sensory states hold 
across cultures (Gao et al 2007, Ou et al 2004). In instances like these, we are only 
tempted to factor the experience into uniquely visual and tactile contents when we 
cease to describe experience qua experience, and commit the experience error. 
Phenomenologically, what is sensed is not a pure visual given, but a multisensory 
whole which is simultaneously visible and touchable, and embedded in an implicitly 
understood context of potential bodily interactions which Merleau-Ponty calls a 
'motor physiognomy' (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p. 217). Although we can selectively 
attend to the 'distinct but indiscernible' contributions (ibid. p.239) of individual 
sensory systems to the overarching perceptual experience, this cannot destroy 
perception's multisensory structure by reducing experience to an isolated sense-
specific quale or sense-datum36.  
                                                          
36 Note that it makes no difference to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological claim 
whether the metaphysics of these hypothetically isolated sensory contents are 
conceived in terms of sense-data-like mental intermediaries, a la the qualia view, or 
the properties of objects they represent, a la the proper objects view. Tye (2002), for 
example, argues rather convincingly that the former are reducible to the latter. All 
that matters here is that these do not show up as pre-distinguished in ordinary 
perceptual experience. 
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Of course, appearances can be deceiving; it could transpire that the 'solid' wall is 
actually a hologram, that the 'rough' gravel is made of carefully painted pieces of 
smooth polystyrene, and so on. But this is an epistemological side issue that does not 
undermine this phenomenological claim. And the senses can conflict, as happens 
with the McGurk effect noted in chapter I, but while conflict between senses may 
cause confusion, it is only against an assumed background of general harmony that 
this conflict can appear surprising or troublesome, and the fact that this harmony can 
be disturbed does not mean that it does not usually hold. In any case, 
epistemologically undesirable communication between sensory modalities is still 
communication between sensory modalities. This emphasis on the multisensory 
nature of the perceptual field allows us to make sense of Merleau-Ponty's otherwise 
obscure claims about the phenomenon of synaesthesia, which in turn has 
ramifications for a phenomenology of TVSS perception.  
In the psychological literature, synaesthesia is generally regarded as a perceptual 
abnormality (though not a disability) where a phenomenal feature typically 
associated with one sensory modality is experienced idiosyncratically in another 
modality. Until relatively recently, reports of synaesthesia were largely written off as 
fabrications, loose metaphorical talk or effects of hallucinogenic drug abuse (LCD 
and mescaline can induce similar experiences). However, scientific consensus has 
now shifted towards universal acceptance of the phenomenon as genuine, caused by 
cross-wiring between cortical regions (Ramachandran & Hubbard 2001a). It is likely 
to have a genetic basis (Ward & Simmer 2005), is estimated to occur in around four 
to five per cent of the population (Simmer et al 2006), and despite the once 
widespread belief that it is ‘overwhelmingly a female condition’ (Baron-Cohen 1996 
p.1), ongoing research suggests it effects persons of both sexes equally (Simmer et 
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al, ibid). The most studied form of synaesthesia is grapheme-colour synaesthesia, 
where subjects see letters or numerals as coloured (Ramachandran & Hubbard ibid, 
Galton 1881). Other forms of synaesthesia include auditory-visual synaesthesia, 
where sounds automatically induce reliable visual experiences (Goller, Otten & 
Ward 2008), taste-touch synaesthesia, where contact with certain textures 
automatically induces particular tastes (Ramachandran & Hubbard 2003), and tactile-
visual synaesthesia, where tactile stimulations automatically induce reliable visual 
experiences (Simmer & Ludwig 2012). For present purposes, though, we need only 
to distinguish broadly and heuristically between what we may call intra-modal and 
inter-modal forms of synaesthesia. Grapheme-colour synaesthesia is intra-modal, 
because colours and graphemes are both paradigmatically visual contents. More 
relevant to the current discussion is inter-modal synaesthesia, where the sensory 
contents typically associated with one modality are experienced via a different 
modality, as occurs in audio-visual, taste-touch and, most importantly in the present 
context, tactile-visual, synaesthesia. It is this kind of inter-sensory communication 
between vision and touch that Merleau-Ponty has in mind with his example of the 
furry carpet.  
For Merleau-Ponty, inter-modal synaesthesia is not radically different from ordinary 
perception, but a modified form of experience where certain features of ordinary 
perception are disproportionately amplified or recalibrated. What is abnormal about 
the cases of inter-modal synaesthesia documented in the psychological literature is 
therefore not the fact that they are synaesthetic, but their particular idiosyncrasies and 
the strength with which they are experienced. That is to say, there is no synaesthesia 
ex nihilo, because the senses already interact to yield unified, multisensory 
perceptual experience  
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Synaesthetic perception is the rule and, if we do not notice it, it is because 
scientific knowledge displaces experience and we have unlearned seeing, 
hearing and sensing in general in order to deduce what we ought to see, hear, 
or sense from our bodily organisation and from the world conceived by the 
physicist. (Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.238) 
At various points in Phenomenology of Perception and elsewhere (e.g. Merleau-
Ponty 1964d) Merleau-Ponty appeals to empirical studies of infants to support claims 
about lived experience prior to its distortion in 'objective' theorising. It is fitting, 
therefore, that his claim that perception is originally synaesthetic is supported by 
recent work in developmental psychology. Earlier psychologists, notably Piaget 
(1952), believed that infants' sensory systems initially function independently, and 
are subsequently integrated through learning. Against this view, there is neurological 
evidence to suggest that infants' perception actually involves a substantial amount of 
cross-modal activation between sensory systems. Though neural connections 
between sensory areas of the brain are 'pruned' in normal development, some are 
retained into adulthood (Spector & Maurer 2009, Maurer & Mondloch 2005, Maurer 
& Muarer 1988).  The presence of inter-modal synaesthesia in infants is thought to 
play an important role in their perceptual and linguistic development (Maurer, 
Pathman & Mondloch 2006, Baron-Cohen 1996, Köhler 1947), as well as the 
cultural development of language and its evolutionary origins (Ramachandran & 
Hubbard 2001b, Day 1996). Despite their differences in aims and methodology, the 
moral of these empirical findings is distinctly Merleau-Pontian: perception is 
inherently multisensory and ambiguous with respect to specific modalities, even in 
normal adults, but we typically fail to appreciate this in our analyses because of a 
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tendency to substitute an idealised rational reconstruction for an accurate description 
of the phenomena. 
It is Merleau-Ponty's contention that the integration of sensory modalities is also 
accomplished by the body schema, through which they are unified into a singular act 
of an embodied subject. He explains this using an analogy with double vision. 
Pushing one's eyeball causes a retinal disparity resulting in a double image. Upon 
release of the eye, the two images merge. The merging of images is not achieved 
through a mental act of judgement; it simply unfolds 'before our eyes' (as it were). In 
this sense, the merging of images is a mechanical operation of the eyes and wider 
visual system. However, considered phenomenologically, the merging of images is 
more than mechanical because it has an existential significance for the subject: the 
double image is experienced as an obstacle to ordinary perception to be transcended. 
The merging of images is lived through as a progression from a confused perceptual 
state which violates a certain norm of appearance, towards a corrected or completed 
perception.37 The double image poses a problem for the perceiver, but this problem is 
resolved pre-personally (as Merleau-Ponty would put it)  by a body structured in 
such a way as to comport itself towards the completion of perception 
And herein lies the distinction between perceptual synthesis and intellectual 
synthesis. When I pass from double vision to normal vision, I am not merely 
conscious of seeing the same object with my two eyes, I am also conscious of 
progressing towards the object itself and finally of having its carnal presence. 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012 p.242, italics removed) 
                                                          
37 Husserl too makes this observation, and it is likely that here Merleau-Ponty is 
channelling his remark that double images ‘mean things only in contradiction to all 
normal motivations’ (Husserl 1989 p.66, italics removed).  
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On Merleau-Ponty's account, the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for sensory 
modalities, which are unified through neither 'transcendental' judgement (a  la his 
'intellectualist') nor 'empirical' association (a la his 'empiricist'), but through a ‘bodily 
synthesis’ (ibid. p.154) whereby the 'distinct yet indiscernible' senses are 
intentionally directed towards one and the same environment  
The vision of sounds or the hearing of colours comes about in the same way 
as the unity of the gaze through the two eyes, insofar as my body is not a sum 
of  juxtaposed organs, but a synergetic system of which all of the 
functions are taken up and tied together in the general movement of being in 
the world, and insofar as it is the congealed figure of existence. (ibid. p.243) 
This notion of the sensing body as a 'synergetic system' sheds further light on 
perception via TVSS. Sensory experience is 'synergetic' in the literal sense of being 
more than the sum of its parts. It is not reducible to the qualities or representational 
contents of its composite subsystems, because the objects of perception are not 
isolated sensory givens but multi-sensible objects to which the senses, organised into 
a unified bodily system, are uniformly intentionally directed. It follows that TVSS 
perception is synaesthetic, but only insofar as all perception is, in a limited and 
qualified sense, synaesthetic, because sensing is a singular act of a bodily system 
comprising multiple integrated sensory subsystems and not a motley of juxtaposed 
acts of seeing, touching, etc. Hence, like the experiential differences between 
diagnosed synaesthetes and normal perceivers, the experiential differences between 
the sighted and blind TVSS users consist in the organisation of their perceptual field, 
'The blind person's world and the world of the normal person differ not merely in the 
quantity of matter available to them, but moreover in the structure of the whole' 
(ibid. p.233, italics in original). A Merleau-Pontian phenomenological account of 
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TVSS therefore agrees with Farina (2013), Ward and Wright (2012), and Proulx and 
Stoerig (2006) that TVSS perception is synaesthetic, but denies that this synaesthesia 
is 'acquired' or 'artificial'. A degree of inter-modal synaesthesia is inherent in 
perceptual experience, and is therefore not 'acquired' in the sense in which 
knowledge or a medical condition is 'acquired', and is not 'artificial' or 'synthetic', but 
rather quite natural. Adaptation to TVSS does not consist in the acquisition of inter-
modal synaesthesia, rather, the prior presence of low-level inter-modal synaesthesia 
in the sensory field, due to unpruned (sic) neural connections and the bodily system 
in which they are embedded, makes adaptation to TVSS possible. This seems 
particularly plausible given the presence of unlearned tactile-visual synaesthesia in 
blind subjects who do not use TVSS devices (Steven & Blakemore 2004). TVSS 
merely exploits the extant but more limited multisensory perceptual field enjoyed by 
blind subjects by endowing it with a quasi-visual perspective. 
Once it is acknowledged that in ordinary experience objects are seen as touchable, 
we can understand the role played by blind TVSS users' surviving sense of touch 
without contradicting their firsthand reports by assimilating their experience to a 
form of extended tactile sensitivity. Recall that users experience the objects of TVSS 
perception as externally located, relative to an embodied perspective, and that their 
awareness of the vibratory stimulation form the SSD is highly recessive. To have an 
object in one's visual field is, at least in part, to recognise its touchability (sic) from a 
distance. There is therefore a tactual component to their experience, but it is the same 
tactual component present in ordinary vision. Once integrated, the SSD functions as 
part of the bodily synthesis by which sensory stimulations are unified into a holistic 
perceptual field, and what is restored to the blind through TVSS is not a set of 
uniquely visual qualities or concepts, but the capacity to grasp the motor 
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significations that externally located objects - surfaces, faces, familiar items, etc - 
have for an embodied, situated subject, that is, a subject with a perspective.  
 
6. The Merleau-Pontian account vs. the alternatives 
To recapitulate, I have argued that TVSS perception should be understood in terms 
of an extended singular bodily act of sensing made possible by the integration of the 
SSD with the user's body schema, and that the perceiver thereby acquires a quasi-
visual perspective allowing them to sense the touchability of objects in external 
space. The Merleau-Pontian account therefore endorses elements of both the quasi-
visual interpretation and the synaesthesia thesis. The truth of the quasi-visual 
interpretation consists in the fact that the enhanced sensory field enjoyed by blind 
TVSS users has more in common with a visual field than an area of tactile 
sensitivity, because its objects are given as located in external space relative to the 
user's own bodily space, which now incorporates the SSD. The truth of the 
synaesthesia thesis is that TVSS perception is indeed synaesthetic, but this is not to 
be explained as the acquisition of synaesthesia ex nihilo caused by interaction with 
the SSD, but by endowing the subject's inter-modally synaesthetic sensory field with 
a quasi-visual perspective.  In this final section, I situate the Merleau-Pontian 
account in relation to extant interpretations of TVSS perception. I begin by arguing 
that the tactile and sui generis interpretations should be rejected. I then highlight 
some ways in which the Merleau-Pontian account avoids certain problems incurred 
by versions of the quasi-visual interpretation as articulated in the existing literature 
on sensory substitution.  
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From a phenomenological point of view, the tactile interpretation is a non-starter. 
The fact that it is starkly at odds with how skilled TVSS users typically describe their 
experience is reason enough to treat it with a degree of scepticism, but several 
philosophers have insisted nevertheless that TVSS perception is indeed tactile. In 
order to contradict blind TVSS users' first hand reports, defenders of the tactile 
interpretation tend to resort to a sub-personal level of explanation which bypasses 
phenomenological description entirely in favour of attending to perception's 
underlying physical causes. For instance, Keeley's (2002) insistence that TVSS 
perception is tactile follows from his view that sensory modalities are to be 
individuated by reference to proper functions of dedicated sensory systems as 
determined by natural selection, while Block (2003) appeals to neuroscientific data 
on the processing of spatial information in the somatosensory cortex to support the 
claim that the information processed by the brain while using an SSDs remains 
tactile. But not only does this presuppose a dichotomy of purely visual versus purely 
tactile contents we have grounds to treat with suspicion, it is a latent instance of the 
experience error, and therefore inadequate for the task of understanding perceptual 
experience.  
Another tactic for establishing the tactile interpretation, which is less deferential to 
facts extrinsic to phenomenology, is the appeal to a two-step reasoning process 
allegedly employed by blind TVSS users. Ross (2001) makes such a move. He 
distinguishes between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ perception. Not to be confused with the 
traditional philosophical antitheses of direct (or 'naive') and indirect realism about the 
objects of perception, in Ross' terminology ‘direct’ perception is non-inferential and 
‘indirect’ inferential. However, he adds the following qualification, ‘indirect 
perception can be non-inferential, if by ‘non-inferential’ we mean that there is no 
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reflective inference; that the couch looks soft can become non-inferential in this 
sense’ (ibid p.501, my italics), and interprets TVSS perception as one such case of 
the need for reflective inference being alleviated by ‘strength of association’ while 
continuing to count as indirect (ibid.). This empiricist sentiment is echoed by Prinz: 
‘My best guess is that prosthetic vision devices simple [sic] allow subjects to make 
automatic inferences about where objects are located in space as a result of tactile 
information’ (Prinz 2006 p.5). The claim is therefore that TVSS perception involves 
unconscious inferences to visible properties based on information gained through 
touch. The alleged role of unconscious inferences in perception, due originally to 
Helmholtz (e.g.1962), is the subject of some controversy (Hatfield 2002 cf. Fodor & 
Pylyshyn 1981). From a phenomenological point of view, however, the claim that 
TVSS perception involves inferences based on tactile input is straightforwardly false. 
By construing the required inferences as unconscious, Ross and Prinz tacitly 
acknowledge that the experience cannot be adequately described in inferential terms. 
Although it is true that TVSS users make inferences in the learning stages, often 
taking several seconds or longer to work out what they’re perceiving (Bach-y-Rita 
1972 p.6), the claim that developed TVSS perception consists in rapid inferences is 
only plausible given the assumption that adaptation to TVSS consists solely in 
learning and honing such inferences. This over-intellectualises the process, which, as 
we have seen, is more about honing motor skills and grasping motor significations 
than exercising judgements. To perceive with an SSD is to exercise a practical skill, 
and practical skills are not gained simply by sharpening one’s reasoning, but through 
bodily habituation; I might be able to recognise the shapes of E, A and D chords on a 
guitar, but I won’t be able to properly play a twelve-bar rhythm track until my 
fingers are disposed to shift seamlessly between them. Furthermore, this gloss of 
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TVSS perception in terms of a fictitious two-step reasoning process misses the vital 
phenomenological point that the perceiving subject is not a disembodied reflecting 
ego, but an embodied subject at home in the world. Trivially, TVSS perception 
involves tactile stimulation, but this does not make it a form of tactile perception. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology also compels us to reject the sui generis 
interpretation of perception with a tactile-visual SSD. Within the Merleau-Pontian 
framework outlined above, the claim that TVSS perception constitutes an entirely sui 
generis form of perception seems unnecessarily radical. While all sides can agree 
with the relatively innocuous claim that SSDs  'can become integrated to such a 
degree that one can speak of a novel form of perceptual/sensorimotor interaction' 
(Auvray & Myin 2009 p. 1053), we should stop short of the far stronger claim that 
through TVSS 'perception can not only transcend its sensory origins, but it can move 
beyond the confines of the traditional senses' (ibid. p.1054). This only seems 
compelling if 'traditional' sensing is conceived in terms of isolated visual acts, tactile 
acts, etc, rather than as singular act of a synergetic bodily system. If we follow 
Merleau-Ponty in holding that even ordinary sensory experience cannot be 
adequately described in these terms, then the fact that TVSS perception cannot be 
adequately captured in these terms either does not license the inference that it 
constitutes an entirely novel form of perception distinct from the natural senses. And 
while it is beyond doubt that ordinary perception and TVSS perception differ 
experientially, inferring from this that 'these emerging capacities brought by SSDs do 
not and cannot figure on the same list as the natural or existing senses' (Deroy & 
Auvray forthcoming p.17) is one step too far. There is enough overlap between the 
two forms of perception to render the sui generis interpretation unnecessary; their 
difference is one of structure, not of kind. Furthermore, the sui generis interpretation 
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risks rendering TVSS perception mysterious in a deeply undesirable way. As Lenay 
et al (2003) stress, we should not neglect the important fact that SSDs increase the 
extent to which the blind and the sighted partake in a common experience of a shared 
world. By emphasising the bodily being-in-the-world common to both, the more 
conservative Merleau-Pontian account allows us to recognise their shared intentional 
structure thereby avoiding the potential epistemological and ethical quandaries 
incurred by rendering blind TVSS users' experience radically alien, whilst continuing 
to acknowledge their genuine phenomenal differences.  
Finally, we can see how the Merleau-Pontian account improves on previous attempts 
to defend the quasi-visual interpretation of TVSS perception. On a negative note, it is 
instructive with respect to how not to argue for the quasi-visual interpretation. Any 
neuroscientific argument, such as Hurley and Noë's (2003) which appeals solely to 
neural plasticity38, is off the table for the same reason that Block's argument for the 
tactile interpretation is - facts about the implicated neural activity and the correct 
characterisation of the information processing therein, while scientifically interesting 
and valuable, cannot serve as a reliable guide to a phenomenological analysis on pain 
of committing the experience error. Such approaches presuppose, rather than 
provide, an adequate phenomenological description from which their characterisation 
of the neural processing, as visual or tactile, derives.  
Another possible line of argument, with which Bach-y-Rita (2002), Hurley and Noë 
(2003) and Noë and O'Regan (2001) all flirt, is also clearly ruled out by the Merleau-
                                                          
38 Hurley and Noë distinguish between cortical dominance and cortical deference, 
and argue that TVSS perception is a form of the  latter. 'In cases of cortical 
dominance, cortical activation from a new peripheral input source gives rise to 
experience with a qualitative character normally or previously associated with 
cortical activity in that area...In cases of cortical deference, in contrast, cortical 
activity in a given area appears to take its qualitative expression from the character of 
the nonstandard or new input source. (Hurley & Noë 2003 p.133) 
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Pontian account: appeal to uniquely visual qualities or objects. It is no coincidence 
that arguments offered in favour of both the tactile and quasi-visual interpretations of 
TVSS perception tend to derive from a (sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit) 
logically prior account of sensory modality individuation. Proponents of the qualia 
view of sensory modality individuation (to which Bach-y-Rita (2002) leans), should 
they wish to argue for the visual interpretation, would need to identify a unique 
mind-dependent sensory quality present in ordinary vision, absent from the other 
senses, that is restored by TVSS. Proponents of the proper objects view of modality 
individuation are saddled with the analogous task of singling out a particular 
property or class of properties of objects to which vision alone gives access that 
TVSS devices allow the user to experience. By following Merleau-Ponty in rejecting 
as phenomenologically wrongheaded the idea of introspectively isolatable sensory 
qualia and the dichotomy between purely visual and purely tactile contents, the 
defender of the quasi-visual interpretation is disburdened both from identifying such 
a quale and from answering the question of which if any properties are exclusively 
visual. On a positive note, the Merleau-Pontian framework does allow us to make 
sense of the precise way in which TVSS perception is quasi-visual without the 
problematic appeal to sense-specific qualities or contents, by emphasising the 
uniquely visual perspective with which users are endowed by virtue of an extension 
of the body schema. It is this phenomenological feature of TVSS perception that 
justifies the characterisation of the experience as quasi-visual rather than tactile or 
sui generis.  
 
7. Conclusion 
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I began by describing some classic examples of tactile-visual SSDs and detailing the 
ways in which these allow blind subjects to perceive the world in ways 
approximating to ordinary vision. I then appealed to further insights from Merleau-
Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception to develop a novel and plausible account of 
TVSS perception which avoids some serious problems incurred by the available 
alternatives, to explore one way in which the body schema can adapt to incorporate 
objects beyond the boundaries of the organism. On the account of TVSS I have 
developed, the SSD  functions as an external part of the same 'bodily synthesis' by 
which stimulations of sensory subsystems are integrated into a unified and 
multisensory perceptual field. Adaptation to TVSS consists in the integration of the 
SSD with the subject's flexible body schema via the honing of sensorimotor 
understanding. The acquisition of a quasi-visual perspective, and the consequent 
ability to engage in visually-guided behaviours, is understood in terms of a 
modification of bodily space which enables the subject to orient themselves in 
relation to objects in external space. It is by virtue of its inherent flexibility that the 
body schema does not by necessity coincide with the boundaries of the human 
organism. I also argued, contra certain detractors, that the emergent experience, 
though dependent on tactile stimulation and qualitatively different from the vision of 
the sighted, can nevertheless still be understood as a limited form of vision. 
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IV. Beyond the Body: Extending the Mind 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I presented the case for a form of 'extended' embodiment via 
sensory substitution. This chapter branches even further outwards to explore the 
significance of items located beyond the boundaries of the body entirely to defend 
the clam that many instances of cognition - reasoning, action-planning, remembering 
- do not take place solely inside the brains of intelligent agents, but are constituted by 
physical process which loop brain, body and world. In other words: the mind is not 
(always) in the head.  
The belief that the mind is located inside the head is so longstanding and widely held 
that for many working in philosophy and the cognitive sciences it is practically 
axiomatic. Indeed, the central question for philosophy of mind in the analytic 
tradition, the vast majority of which is predicated on some version of physicalism, is 
that of how, exactly, mental states can be caused by, supervene on, or be identified 
with, states of the brain.39 Even Descartes, the historical poster child for substance 
dualism, did not doubt that immaterial mental substance is housed inside the skull, 
interacting with the organism via the pineal gland of the brainstem (Descartes 1985 
pp.99-108). Over the last two decades, however, this default assumption has been the 
target of an ever-expanding wealth of literature advocating and defending a position 
variably known as 'active externalism' (Clark and Chalmers 1998), 'the hypothesis of 
extended cognition' (Clark 2008), 'vehicle externalism' (Hurley 2010) or more 
                                                          
39 See, for example, the way in which the debates over the different brains of 
physicalism, functionalism, dualism, eliminativism, etc, are framed in Kim (2006) 
and the papers collected in Rosenthal (1991).  
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generally and in the idiom I shall adhere to, the extended mind thesis. According to 
the extended mind thesis, thinking is not always something we do entirely in our 
heads. Quite often, thinking quite literally takes place in the 'external' world. To be 
more precise, extended mind theorists claim that a good deal of cognitive processes - 
the physical processes which constitute mental phenomena like reasoning and the 
intelligent guidance of action - comprise not just states of the brain and central 
nervous system, but also parts of the environment in which the organism that houses 
the brain is embedded.  The extended mind thesis is attracting a growing number of 
adherents (e.g. Rowlands 2012, Clark 2008; 2003; 1997, Wheeler 2007, Menary 
2007a, Wilson 2004, Clark and Chalmers 1998, and the essays collected in Menary 
2010a, cf. Rupert 2009, Adams and Aizawa 2007; 2001), and its converts have 
explored the possibility of its application to areas as diverse as social cognition 
(Krueger 2012, Krueger & Overgaard 2012), the psychology of memory (Sutton et al 
2010), personal identity (Olsen 2011, Rudder-Baker 2009), social ontology 
(Gallagher 2012, Gallagher & Crisafi 2009), musical performance (Krueger 2014, 
Cochrane 2008) and the study of language (Spurrett and Cowley 2010, Cowley 
2007).  
This chapter explores and defends the extended mind thesis in detail. Doing so 
necessitates veering away somewhat from the largely phenomenology-driven 
considerations of previous chapters and adopting a more straightforwardly 
philosophy of cognitive science-based approach. However, in an attempt to warm the 
reader to the suggestion that their mind might not always stay inside their head, I 
begin by briefly revisiting some phenomenological insights concerning the nature of 
our mental lives found in Heidegger's early phenomenology. I then proceed to 
recount the arguments in favour of the extended mind thesis, focussing mainly on the 
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locus classicus of the debate, Clark and Chalmers' seminal Analysis article, 'The 
Extended Mind'. I then discuss several examples, both empirical and theoretical, of 
the extended mind thesis at work, and diffuse some commonsense objections. The 
bulk of the chapter tackles the most prominent criticisms of the extended mind thesis. 
 
2. What it is like to have an extended mind 
For many philosophers, cognitive scientists, and laypeople alike, the very idea that 
the mind might be partially located outside of the brain is so intuitively unpalatable 
as to be borderline intellectually offensive. Before entering into the specific 
arguments for and against the extended mind thesis, some preliminary 
phenomenological analysis might help to soften these prejudices somewhat.   
How obvious is it, from the perspective of ordinary experience, that thinking -
reasoning, planning actions, solving problems, etc - takes place inside our heads? 
Husserl for one, thought that this was not obvious at all 
[T]hinking is not actually located in the head, the way the impressions of 
tension are, etc. That we very often speak as if it were so is no proof that we 
actually apprehend it that way in intuition. (Husserl 1989 p.161)  
Historically, speaking, it cannot always have been considered obvious. If it had, 
Aristotle would probably not have been able to entertain the hypothesis that the 
function of the brain was to cool blood, while the heart was centre of sensation and 
action.40 Of course, it is certainly true that we often silently soliloquise when, for 
instance, trying to work out how best to verbalise a complex matter, or when mulling 
over a set of instructions. In these private cases it seems correct to observe, as 
                                                          
40 See Gross (1995) for a detailed analysis of Aristotle's views on the heart and brain 
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Dainton does in his discussion of the spatiality of experience, that 'If I focus on my 
own conscious thinking, it apparently occurs somewhere within my head - between 
my ears, behind my eyes' (Dainton 2005 p.60).  But not all thought is like this. For 
one thing, not all thinking is conscious, or deliberate. Moreover, a great deal of our 
ordinary day-to-day activities involve the application of practical reasoning, bodily 
skills, and interactions with our environment that while rarely the product of 
deliberative, conscious thought processes, are nevertheless intelligent, goal-directed 
behaviours with a distinctive experiential character.  
Heidegger argued that it is our pre-reflective relationship with an already familiar 
environment, and not an attitude of detached intellectual scrutiny, that constitutes the 
default mode of being (or, if you prefer, state of mind41) for Dasein, his term for the 
sort of existence belonging essentially to humans.  Prior to reflecting on the world 
around us, we typically find ourselves comfortably immersed in a network of 
familiar practices involving various tools and other assorted paraphernalia which we 
do not experience as foreign objects. In Heidegger's terminology, these tools are 
experienced as 'ready to hand', as opposed to 'present at hand' (Heidegger 1962 
p.103).42 For example, though it is trivial that my computer is a physical object 
located outside of my body and that in using it I perceive it, when immersed in the 
activity of researching current affairs on the internet or rectifying the shortcomings 
of my latest thesis chapter, I am not aware of it as a foreign object, or as something I 
am deliberately visually inspecting. Rather, my experience is directed at the activity 
in which I am engaged, and my consciousness is occupied primarily by the particular 
                                                          
41 Heidegger would probably disapprove of this terminology, having gone to great 
lengths to avoid words like 'mind' for fear of Cartesian implications, but it is, I think, 
a sufficiently innocuous rendering of Heidegger's basic idea into commonsense 
language. 
 
42 For a thorough discussion of Heidegger on tool use, see B. Preston (1998). 
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project at hand. This harmonious engagement with the computer as the vehicle of my 
current activity is only disrupted when something goes awry, for example if my 
internet connection dies or (as is apparently commonplace with Toshiba latops!) it 
spontaneously shuts itself down, or if I am adjusting to the use of a new piece of 
software or hardware. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, when driving a car or 
playing a musical instrument.  Navigating roads or improvising using a pentatonic 
scale are thoughtful activities in which decisions are made and actions performed on 
their basis with a view to achieving a particular end, which are made possible by an 
experiential unity with my surroundings in which the boundaries between the 
thinking subject and the world in which they are situated are obscured. Heidegger 
dubbed these familiar objects as they appear to us in ordinary experience 'equipment', 
as illustrated in his well-known discussion of hammering 
Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure 
(hammering with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of 
this kind is not grasped [i.e. understood] thematically as an occurring Thing, 
nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using [...] In 
dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates 
itself to the "in-order-to" which is constitutive for the equipment we are 
employing at the time; the less we just stare at the Hammer-thing, and the 
more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial to our relationship to 
it become, and the more unveiledly [sic] is it encountered as that which it is - 
as equipment...The kind of being which equipment possesses - [...] - we call 
readiness to hand. (Heidegger 1962 p.98, italics in original)  
In our familiar dealings with the useful objects on which we rely to accomplish 
various practical goals, we do not experience ourselves as isolated from our 
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environment, but deeply immersed in it, hence the strong opposition to the traditional 
dichotomy of subject and object than runs throughout Being and Time.  
It is not just phenomenologists who are impressed by the way in which a great deal 
of our ordinary behaviour depends on our oneness with surrounding objects. The 
psychologist David Kirsh, whose research is motivated by scepticism regarding 
classical psychological models of action-planning whereby subjects must represent 
an abstract model of a task and the outcome of actions executed in order to complete 
it (e.g. Glover 2004), stresses the extent to which our mental lives and our capacities 
to exercise our intelligence are inextricably bound up with the environmental props 
we rely upon to get by in the world (I discuss some of Kirsh's empirical work and its 
relation to the extended mind theses below).  
We live most of our life in constructed environments. Layers of artefacts 
saturate almost every place we go, and there are pre-existing practices for 
doing things. These artefacts and practices have been designed, or have 
coevolved, to make us smarter, to make it easier for us to solve our problems 
and perform our habitual tasks. (Kirsh 2009 p.270) 
Everywhere we go and in almost everything we do, we are surrounded by 
meaningful public items which play an important role in the governance of our 
behaviour, from road signs which aid us in remembering where to walk or drive, to 
items displayed in a supermarket in such a way as to affect our purchasing decisions, 
to mobile phones and tablets which store valuable information and run an ever-
expanding array of labour-saving applications. On my understanding, the extended 
mind thesis, in essence, represents an attempt to situate these sorts of Heideggerian 
phenomenological insights within the context of contemporary cognitive science in a 
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way that is both empirically viable and compatible with the terminology of analytic 
philosophy of mind43. Of course, merely appealing to a carefully selected chunk of 
Heidegger's phenomenology does not cut the mustard as an argument for the 
extension of cognition into the world, but it does give the extended mind thesis some 
intuitive appeal by relating it back to our ordinary experience prior to its dissection in 
the lab or the philosophy classroom.  
 
3. The parity principle 
The extended mind thesis adheres to the same broad commitments to physicalism 
and functionalism common to the vast majority of contemporary philosophy of mind 
and cognitive science, but differs from mainstream cognitivism insofar as it rejects 
the widely held additional assumption that Wilson (2004) dubs 'smallism', namely 
the assumption that the realisation of mental phenomena, achieved by dint of the 
functional organisation of its composite physical processes, occurs only inside 
brains. Strictly speaking, this assumption of smallism is extrinsic to both physicalism 
and functionalism per se. As such, extended mind theorists take this assumption to be 
unjustified, overly dogmatic, and open to revision. 
Central to understanding the extended mind thesis is the notion of coupling. An agent 
is said to be 'coupled' with an external object when reciprocal causal interaction 
between the agent and an object drives along some activity undertaken towards some 
particular cognitive end. Take one paradigmatic example (due originally, insofar as I 
can ascertain, to Wilson (1994)), to which I shall return at numerous points 
                                                          
43 Clark often cites Heidegger as an influence, though refrains from discussing his 
phenomenology in any detail (e.g. Clark 2003; 1997). For a more through treatment 
of Heidegger's relevance to, and influence upon, contemporary cognitive science, see 
Wheeler (2007) and the essays collected in Kiversten and Wheeler (2012).  
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throughout the chapter, of a mathematician using a pen and paper to help solve an 
equation. The use of representational media outside of the body - diagrams, written 
word and symbols, rough sketches, etc - quickens the process of solving equations 
(Villegas, Castro & Gutierrez 2009). The cognitive end in this case is producing a 
solution to a given mathematical problem. The mathematician's act of writing 
causally impacts upon the paper by creating meaningful and useful marks on the 
page. These marks, in turn, causally impact upon the agent via visual perception. The 
activity of solving the equation on paper therefore comprises a two-way loop 
between an embodied, perceiving agent, and an external source of information. This 
loop exists so long as the mathematician is actively engaged in using pen and paper 
to perform the various computational operations required to reach their solution. The 
mathematician and their trusty stationary therefore comprise a particular kind of 
system, a coupled system. There is nothing remarkable or controversial about the 
idea that they instantiate a system - just about any set of coordinated components can 
be treated as a unified system (see, e.g. Mainzer 1997, Van Gelder 1998). What is 
arguably more controversial is Clark and Chalmers' stance that coupled systems like 
these are cognitive systems 
In these cases, the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way 
interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its 
own right. All the components in the system play an active causal role, and they 
jointly govern behaviour in the same sort of way that [internal] cognition usually 
does. If we remove the external component the system's behavioural competence 
will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain. Our thesis is that this 
sort of coupled process counts equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not 
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it is wholly in the head. (Clark & Chalmers 1998 pp.8-9, first italics in original, 
second added) 
This inclusion of extra-neural items into the cognitive domain is motivated by 
appeals to parity of reasoning between the inclusion of processes internal to an 
organism (i.e. in the brain) as part of its cognitive architecture, and items external to 
the organism which perform a coarsely isomorphic function. In other words, where 
an object is in relation to a person has no immediate bearing on whether it forms part 
of their mind. What matters is the role played by that object in underpinning their 
thoughts and behaviour. If an object external to the body plays the right kind of 
functional role, there is no non-dogmatic reason for discounting it as part of a 
cognitive state or process. This is the 'parity principle', due originally to Clark and 
Chalmers (though in their original article, they do not use this exact term), which 
Clark states thus   
Parity Principle. If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as 
a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for 
that time) part of the cognitive process. (Clark 2008 p.77) 
It must be stressed that the extended mind theorist does not claim the functional 
isomorphism between an external process and its nearest internal counterpart must be 
especially fine-grained. As Clark explains, 
[F]ar from requiring any deep similarity between inner and outer processes, 
the parity claim was specifically meant to undermine any tendency to think 
that the shape of the (present-day, human) inner process sets some bar on 
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what ought to count as part of a genuinely cognitive process,  (Clark 2012 
p.285, italics in original) 
In what follows, I elaborate on a range of cases in which the parity principle instructs 
us to regard items outside of the brain and body, when suitably coupled to an 
intelligent agent, as part of their cognitive architecture, that is, as part of the physical 
basis of their mind. The conclusions which emerge from these considerations of 
parity are then defended at length against objections raised by more conservatively 
minded philosophers who wish to keep the mind firmly inside the head. 
One pedantic note about terminology: the rhetoric of minds 'extending into' their 
surroundings is a little unfortunate. As one defender of extended cognition remarks, 
the image of a neural process literally travelling outside of somebody's head into an 
object suggests a metaphysics that is 'positively medieval' (Menary 2010b p.609). 
This isn't really what extended mind theorists mean when they say cognition is 
'extended'. What they actually mean is that in instances of cognitive coupling, the 
processing involved is distributed across a surface area wider than that of select parts 
of the brain. If it were up to me, I would stick to more literally accurate talk of 
'distributed cognition' but, alas, it isn't up to me. For better or worse the 'extended' 
label has stuck, while 'distributed cognition' has come to have a slightly different 
meaning in a lot of cognitive science, where it is generally used to refer to the 
distribution of labour in coordinated group behaviour (see, e.g. Maglio, Kandogan & 
Haber 2003, Hollan, Hutchins & Kirsh 2000).  
 
4. From epistemic action to extended cognition 
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The ability to skilfully manipulate our immediate environment is of central 
importance to a great deal of our practical reasoning. As Kirsh notes 
[P]roblem solving is an interactive process in which subjects perceive, 
change, and create the cues, constraints, affordances, and larger-scale 
structures in the environment, such as diagrams, forms, scaffolds, and artefact 
ecologies that they work with as they make their way toward a solution. 
(Kirsh 2009 p.290)  
According to the extended mind thesis, the use of such artefacts to simplify and 
quicken our  problem-solving prowess extends the physical basis of users' minds by 
distributing the requisite cognitive processing across reciprocal loops between brain, 
body and world.  
Clark and Chalmers appeal to the cognition involved in the retro videogame Tetris to 
illustrate this claim. In Tetris, puzzle blocks of various shapes (called ‘zoids’) fall 
from the top of a two dimensional grid. Points are scored by rotating and aligning the 
shapes to form complete rows which then disappear from the screen, freeing up 
space in the grid. Failure to make whole rows out of the blocks will result in the 
zoids piling higher and higher until the grid is full, at which point the player is, in the 
language of gaming, 'dead'. The cognitive task is therefore to identify the best shape 
of fit and available slots for the zoids. In a fascinating empirical study, Kirsh and 
Maglio (1994) found that players of all levels of ability tend not to move zoids in 
accordance with prior decisions concerning where they are to placed, but instead 
physically rotate them on the screen to assign prospective locations in real time. 
Skilled players frequently make moves that are superfluous from the point of view of 
traditional ‘planning-control’ models according to which puzzle solving is a matter 
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of internally representing a task space and computing potential solutions and then 
performing the corresponding action as a result. In actuality, players begin to 
manipulate zoids even before they come into full view on the screen (ibid. p.524). 
This suggests they do not proceed via a linear 'think-decide-act' strategy, but  rather 
‘offload the structure [of the problem] onto the world’, thus ‘pre-empting the need 
for certain representations or…the need for making certain inferences’ (bid. p. 545). 
Human subjects, even those with minimal gaming experience, easily outperform the 
control experiment –a sophisticated computer simulation of Tetris playing utilising 
an efficient linear, rule-following strategy (ibid. pp.518-26). This is because they do 
not face the temporal constraints imposed by the requirement of planning moves 
prior to execution. Neither do they face the additional computational effort incurred 
by generating a complete internal representation of the task space. Tetris players 
really do, to adapt Brooks’s slogan-come-cliché, use the world as its own model 
(Brooks 1991a; 1991b).  
The manipulation of the zoids to identify the best shape of fit is an example of what 
Kirsh and Maglio dub epistemic actions: ‘physical actions that make mental 
computation easier, faster, or more reliable…that an agent performs to change his or 
her own computational state’ (Kirsh & Maglio 1994 pp.513-4). Other examples of 
epistemic actions include moving chess pieces to discover the best available move 
(ibid p.545), and shuffling scrabble tiles to identify possible letter combinations 
(Kirsh 1995) (a fortiori in its mobile app equivalent, Words With Friends, where the 
entire tile try can be shuffled at the tap of a button). In these instances, part of the 
world is skilfully manipulated in order to visually identify the solution to a given 
problem, thereby alleviating the subjects' internal mental workload. 
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The psychological moral of epistemic actions is that 'It is both cognitively easier and 
computationally simpler to use the external representation than an internal 
representation' (Kirsh 2009 p. 279). The evolutionary moral is that 'In general, 
evolved creatures will neither store nor process information in costly ways when they 
can use the structure of the environment and their operations upon it as a convenient 
stand-in for the information-processing operations concerned' (Clark 1997 p.46). The 
philosophical moral, according to Clark and Chalmers, is that some of the cognitive 
processing needed to solve the puzzle literally takes place on the screen rather than 
exclusively in the players’ brains, because the act of physically rotating shapes on a 
two-dimensional grid at the click of a button is coarsely functionally isomorphic to 
mentally rotating images ‘in the mind’s eye’ to complete the same task (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998 pp.10-12; see also Clark 1997 pp.64-5; 203-4 and Clark 2008 pp.70-
5). The flow of information and causal profiles of the two cases might not be entirely 
identical, but there is no reason to think that this should have any bearing on their 
status as part of a cognitive system; there are often myriad available internal 
procedures for completing the same cognitive task - think of the numerous 
associative techniques we can employ to aid memory recall, or the different formulae 
we could employ to solve the same mathematical problem. The only major 
differences between the way people actually play the game and the unrealistic 
alternative scenario of players mentally rotating imaginary shapes prior to hitting 
'enter' are that (a) in the former case, the activity is distributed across the embodied 
agent and the computer rather than housed in their brain, and (b) access to the desired 
destination for the zoid is perceptual rather than introspective or imaginative (or 
whatever). (a) can only constitute the basis of an objection if it is assumed that the 
boundaries of brain and body constitute the bounds of the mind, but such an 
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assumption begs the question against the extended mind theorist. (b) is more of a fact 
about the associated phenomenology of different methods of Tetris playing than 
anything else, and it would be both overly strong and seemingly ad hoc to claim that 
two instances of cognitive processing must be accompanied by identical 
phenomenology in order to count as instances of the same type.  
 
Another good example of cognitive extension via epistemic action, and one that is 
more common for most of us at least, is the role played by word processing in the 
writing process. When writing (say) a philosophy paper, we do not proceed by first 
privately formulating the arguments, clarifying the key ideas, and articulating these 
into readable English in our heads, and then typing them out by rote resulting in a 
finished article. Perhaps there are a tiny minority of technophobic savants for whom 
this would be a natural enough way to get the job done, but for the vast majority of 
people this would be practically impossible. Ideas are clarified as we go along, by 
reading, modifying and re-reading the wording and structure of the text, cutting, 
pasting and deleting sections as appropriate, crosschecking the text with other 
documents, etc. The use of external media is essential to the process of producing the 
article, not just in the trivial sense that without it there would be no way to record 
one's finished ideas, but because the writing is literally part of the thought process. 
The intellectual labour does not precede the writing process; the writing process is a 
significant and indispensible component of the intellectual work itself.  
Though it is possible in principle to compose an academic article internally and 
subsequently record it on the page, typically we do not do this. We do not do this 
because it is inefficient and cumbersome, and because we simply do not need to, 
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because there exist malleable external structures which relieve our brains of a large 
amount of the cognitive workload.  As Menary puts the point 
The media function as enabling hardware, but the vehicles themselves enable 
processes that cannot be completed in the head alone. The physical act of typing 
necessarily involves external physical manipulations. My ability to compose a 
paper is severely curtailed by the absence of those external manipulations [...] 
Stable and enduring external written sentences allow for manipulations, 
transformations, reorderings, comparisons and deletions of text that are not 
available to neural processes. (Menary 2007b p.629).  
 
It is at best abstract and artificial, at worst a complete fiction, to think of the act of 
writing as enjoying a wholly autonomous existence from thinking. Word processing 
software makes available various actions essential to the process of writing - cutting, 
copying and pasting, highlighting, not to mention the ready visual display of text - 
that are not available to brains alone. The ability to formulate the content of a 
philosophy paper is so inextricably bound up with the usage of external media that 
the idea of focussing purely on what occurs in the writer's brain, vital and interesting 
though this is, seems to leave out something essential to an account of this particular 
species of intelligent activity. A cognitive scientist who did so would only be 
studying one isolated part of a broader explanandum. Furthermore, the example of 
essay writing satisfies the parity principle. Consider an internalist scenario where our 
would-be author attempts to privately compose the text in her head, commits it to 
memory, then goes about typing it up word for word. When formulating her 
argument and checking her wording, she would need to represent to herself 
whichever sentence(s) she was presently mulling over. The state of her brain which 
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encodes this representation would subsequently play a causal role in bringing about 
the act of typing up the final version of the sentence(s). How she does this exactly 
could vary. She might visualise the sentence to herself or privately rehearse it in a 
sort of internal dialogue, 'behind her eyes and between their ears', as Dainton puts it. 
How exactly she does it doesn't strictly matter; the important point is that this method 
of formulating a piece of text would involve representing the content of the article to 
herself in its various stages of completion. In the more common case of formulating 
the text using the computer display, something analogous and from the perspective of 
functional decomposition, coarsely isomorphic, happens. The only difference is that 
the work in progress is displayed for the author not in the form of a private quasi-
visual or quasi-auditory (or whatever) image, but on the screen in front of them. 
Again, through epistemic action, much of the cognitive workload is distributed 
across brain, body and world. 
 
5. Extended beliefs: the curious case of Otto and Inga 
Thus far I have focussed on mental process, but what of mental states? By far the 
most discussed of Clark and Chalmers' original examples of extended cognition is 
their 'Otto's notebook' thought experiment. The thought experiment is designed to 
show that external objects coupled to an intelligent agent can form part of the 
physical realisation base for one or more of their dispositional beliefs. Clark and 
Chalmers invite us to imagine Otto, a man who suffers from a mild form of 
Alzheimer's disease and as such has trouble remembering certain pieces of 
information, namely addresses. To redress this deficiency, Otto uses a notebook to 
store addresses, which he keeps with him as much as possible. One day Otto desires 
to visit the Museum of Modern Art in his native New York, and in order to get there, 
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looks up the address in his notebook, which informs him that the museum is located 
on 53rd Street. Otto's counterpart in the thought experiment, Inga, also desires to 
visit the Museum of Modern Art. Inga is fortunate enough to have a healthy brain, 
which enables her to recall the location of the museum before setting out. Inga 
clearly has the belief that the museum is located on 53rd Street, and this belief is 
operative in guiding her behaviour, even though prior to her act of recollection this 
belief was neither conscious nor occurrent (Clark and Chalmers 1998 p.12). 
According to the extended mind thesis, Otto's notebook plays a functional role 
sufficiently similar to the neural encoding in Inga's brain which enables her to recall 
the location of the museum to count as an external component of his memory system, 
and it is equally correct to ascribe the dispositional belief 'The Museum of Modern 
Art is on 53rd Street' to both of them. Like Inga's biological memory, Otto's extended 
memory is reliable (the information therein is usually true), readily available (he 
keeps the notebook with him as much as possible), the information therein is 
endorsed automatically upon retrieval, and it guides his behaviour in much the same 
way, allowing us to reliably predict his behaviour via the attribution of a belief about 
the location of the museum. And while it is true that Otto's notebook is susceptible to 
damage, loss, or outside interference, these are also true, albeit to a lesser degree, of 
Inga's biological memory. Inga's memory can be similarly damaged or lost through 
injury or intoxication, and is open to manipulation from suggestion or physical 
interference at the hands of crafty neuroscientists (ibid. p.15). The only substantial 
difference is that Otto's access to the information about the museum is perceptual 
rather than introspective, but again, this difference is more phenomenological than 
anything else.  
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To many people the suggestion that Otto's notebook comprises part of his memory 
will sound crazy. Driven by this intuition, some philosophers have appealed to 
features of our commonsense folk psychological concept of belief to block the 
attribution of the belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53rd Street to Otto. As 
Chalmers points out, he and Clark are not especially interested in the finer details of 
whether or not their thought experiment is fully compatible with our ordinary folk 
concept of belief, remarking that the issue is merely terminological (Chalmers 2008 
p.xiii). What matters, Chalmers says, is the extended mind thesis' potential for 
explaining the behaviour of coupled agents 
The deeper point is that extended states can function in explanation in very 
much the same way that beliefs function, and they should be regarded as 
sharing a deep and important explanatory kind with beliefs. This explanatory 
unification is the real underlying point of the extended mind thesis. (ibid. 
p.xiv)  
Not being much of an epistemologist, I am sympathetic to this view. But it is hard 
not to read Chalmers' comments  as something of a cop out. After all, Clark and 
Chalmers did choose to explicitly defend the claim that there can be extended beliefs. 
I shall therefore take it upon myself to defend the notion of extended beliefs against 
two prominent folk psychology-driven objections to extended beliefs, one due to 
Preston (2010) and another to Weiskopf (2008).  
The immediately obvious alternative to Clark and Chalmers' characterisation of 
Otto's dealings with his notebook would be to say that Otto in fact has no belief 
about the location of the museum prior to consulting his notebook, and merely 
acquires it upon inspection, only to later forget it again. Preston peruses this more 
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conservative interpretation, citing Otto's apparent lack of first-person authority over 
the contents of his notebook prior to consulting it 
[U]pon being asked, Otto is the authority on whether what's written in his 
notebook is indeed what he believes. But he isn't authoritative about the 
contents of his notebook before he has consulted it. He can't avow what-he-
believed-before-consulting -his-notebook at times prior to his consulting it, 
which is what matters to the claim that that he already believed it. So even 
though he isn't surprised to find it out, Otto does have to wait and see how 
things are in the "external world" (i.e. his notebook) before finding out what 
he believes. However, in ordinary cases of belief [...], there's simply no such 
thing as "finding out what one believes." (The phrase can only mean making 
up one's mind.) (Preston 2010 p.360, italics in original)  
Preston is right to point out that Otto's lack of surprise upon accessing the contents of 
his notebook is insufficient grounds for attributing an extant belief to him; I am often 
unsurprised by events I read about in the news, this doesn't mean I already knew 
about them. However, there are different senses in which one can be' unsurprised' by 
a piece of information. If, as Preston presents the case, Otto is unsurprised by the 
contents of his notebook simply because he is habituated to following its instructions 
and is aware of no information to the contrary, then he may just be in the same 
situation as my cynical news reader. But, as I interpret Clark and Chalmers, the 
mental life of Otto differs slightly from this. One important feature of the 
phenomenology of recollection is that the thing recalled is apprehended by the 
subject with a feeling of recognition or familiarity. Husserl called this feature of 
memory 're-presentation' - in recollection the thing recollected is given as a re-
presentation of something previously presented in experience (see, e.g. Husserl 
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1991). When we recall things effortlessly, mere absence of doubt suffices for 
automatic  endorsement of the belief in question. If somebody asks me which house 
number I live at, ceteris paribus, I shall reply 'number twenty-six' without hesitation. 
I will not need to consciously follow any procedure for retrieving the information 
that I live at number twenty-six. If I am presented with the trickier task of 
remembering, say, the name of a person I once met very briefly, I may find myself 
mentally 'searching' for their name until I reach an 'a-ha!' moment. My frustration is 
brought to an end by the realisation, 'that's the guy!', and I now apprehend the 
person's name as recollected. On my understanding of Clark and Chalmers, Otto's 
memory recall is more like the second case. Otto, being impaired, often needs to 
make some extra effort to follow a particular procedure for recalling the address of 
the museum, namely looking it up in his notebook, to 'jog' his memory. Now Preston 
could retort that if this is the case, and Otto does indeed experience the information 
in the notebook as recollected, then he already had that belief anyway, and the 
notebook acts merely a prompt. But as ex hypothesi there is no neural representation 
corresponding to the museum's location for the notebook to prompt, if Otto does 
indeed have an extant belief about the whereabouts of the museum, this can only be 
because the relevant information is encoded in his notebook. If we conceive of the 
role of the notebook in Otto's mental life along these lines, then his belief is on a par 
with an internal belief that requires a bit of mental effort to access. And there is 
nothing remarkable about these kinds of beliefs. 
It is worth noting that even if it is accurate to say that Otto 'finds out what he 
believes' about the location of the museum, this does not establish that he didn't 
already have that belief. Beliefs for which people do need to be presented with 
evidence in order to 'find out' that they have them are commonplace, as illustrated by 
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the prevalence of implicit biases. Saul (forthcoming) synthesises a compelling body 
of empirical data showing that many in the philosophy profession are disposed 
negatively towards women, which can have a severe impact on their consideration 
for academic posts, their treatment at conferences, and so on. Many of the men and 
women guilty of being so biased will avow, quite sincerely, that they do not harbour 
any ugly beliefs about the value or ability of female philosophers and their dealings 
with other women, partners or family members for instance, may well be different. 
But there seems to be no other way of making sense of the prevalence of negative 
bias against women than to conclude that on some largely unconscious level, many 
people hold sexist beliefs. Though it was a huge over-exaggeration of Ryle's to claim 
that people come to know what they believe in the same way they in which they 
know the beliefs of others - through observation, he was at least correct about this 
class of beliefs, where people really do need to be presented with the evidence of 
their own actions in order to appreciate the tacit motivations behind them (see Ryle 
1949 pp.160-73, cf. Davidson 1984). So again, given the prevalence of these internal 
beliefs, only an internalistic double standard could motivate the denial of Otto's 
belief on the grounds that he needs to consult 'external evidence' to know what he 
believes.  
Preston also worries that Otto's inability to affirm his belief about the museum's 
location prior to consulting his notebook prevents the extended mind theorist from 
ascribing that belief to him. It is also true that his belief about the museum's location 
is only operative in guiding his behaviour during or shortly after he has consulted the 
notebook. But this doesn't pose a problem for the extended mind theorist either, 
because many dispositional beliefs are like this. There are plenty of internal beliefs to 
which we can only ascent upon conscious recollection, and which play no role in 
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guiding behaviour at all prior to or shortly after conscious recall. We all have beliefs 
about pieces of trivia that have virtually no application to anything we do that require 
substantial conscious 'searching' to recall. I have plenty of beliefs about, for instance, 
events depicted in films I saw a long time ago and didn't particularly enjoy and lyrics 
to songs that were played on the radio when I was a child. These play absolutely no 
role in guiding any of my behaviour bar some very specific and incredibly rare 
and/or improbable scenarios, and require considerable 'jogging' to come to 
consciousness (I might, for example, have to sing the melody of the offending song 
to myself). Furthermore, I cannot avow what I believe about these things prior to 
conscious recollection, because of the relative difficulty involved in retrieving them. 
But it is obvious and undeniable that these count among my beliefs. By parity of 
reasoning, then, the fact that Otto can only avow his belief about the museum upon 
conscious recall, and that prior to recall there is no observable behaviour to be 
explained by the attribution of that belief, poses no problems for the extended mind 
theorist; such beliefs are commonplace.  
A second worry about the status of extended beliefs concerns their integration with 
extant internal beliefs. Weiskopf (2008) worries that unlike ordinary cases of belief, 
modification to the contents of Otto's notebook are not automatically integrated with 
other relevant beliefs. If for example, I am told that the philosophy department has 
been moved to another part of the York campus, it is likely that I will cease to 
believe that it is located in the Sally Baldwin building, if I read that a neighbour has 
died I will probably cease to believe they will put their bins out for collection on 
Wednesday night, and so on. Weiskopf claims in that in 'ordinary quotidian cases' 
this process of belief revision is both automatic and unconscious (ibid. p.268; 269). 
The contents of Otto's notebook, however, are not automatically integrated with his 
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extant beliefs. If he is told that the Museum of Modern Art has been demolished, his 
notebook is not automatically amended accordingly. Similarly, if one page of his 
notebook contains the museum's address, while a later entry on another page informs 
him that it has burned down, the latter  piece of information will not override the 
former. Weiskopf takes this to mean that his extended beliefs cannot really be beliefs 
at all 
Beliefs are, as I will say, normally informationally integrated with, and 
updated in concert with, other beliefs [...] But most externally located mental 
states do not share this feature. So [...] they cannot be beliefs’’ (ibid. p.268). 
 
For reasons highlighted by Kyselo and Walter (2011), this conclusion simply does 
not follow. Even if it is the case the belief integration is normally rapid and 
unconscious, this is not an essential feature of beliefs per se (ibid. p.254). There are 
many instances where we fail to connect two pieces of remembered information 
either rapidly or prior to conscious consideration. Kyselo and Walter's example is 
visiting the Museum of Modern Art's cafe. You believe that the museum is on 53rd 
street, and that the cafe does a good latte. While walking to the museum, you 
suddenly remember reading recently that it has been torn down. Only at that point do 
you infer that the museum is not the place to go for a decent latte. You were 
previously privy to two pieces of contradictory information: that the museum had 
been torn down and that the museum cafe served good coffee. These facts were 
encoded somewhere in your brain and you would have been able to access and affirm 
either if need be, but it took some time and perhaps some prompting for your belief 
set to be updated appropriately (ibid. p.251). I frequently have this experience after 
walking to the bank on a Saturday afternoon to find it closed, despite believing that it 
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is Saturday, that banks close early on Saturdays, and that the bank is the place to go 
to make a deposit. These are all things I believe, but their integration is far from 
rapid. Moreover, it is precisely the fact that I didn't bother to consciously think about 
whether or not I should walk to the bank that prevented them from being integrated 
in time to save myself a wasted journey. There is nothing remarkable about any of 
this either. So, the fact that more time is needed in order for Otto's extended beliefs 
to integrate with  extant internal beliefs, or each other, and that he has to make a 
conscious effort to update his notebook in the light of new information, poses no 
problem at all for the extended mind theorist.  
Weiskopf also claims that the possibility of inconsistencies between Otto's internal 
and external beliefs somehow poses a problem for the extended mind theorist, as it 
renders Otto irrational, which means that the attribution of his extended belief yields 
no useful behavioural predictions  
If we suppose these external states [the notebook entries] to constitute Otto’s 
standing beliefs, then we must say that he both believes that the museum is on 
53rd and that it has been demolished. Minds that are extended in Otto’s sort 
of way seem especially prone to falling into this sort of inconsistency and 
irrationality. The source of such error is the absence of the normal 
consistency-maintaining doxastic mechanisms located in the functional 
architecture of believers. (Weiskopf 2008 p. 270) 
Again, I fail to see the problem here. Many if not most (if not all) ordinary people 
believe all sorts of contradictory things; they believe that spiders are dangerous 
despite also believing that spiders cannot harm them, they believe that it is morally 
wrong to steal but that it is perfectly acceptable to illegally download music, they 
believe that God is benevolent, that violence is bad, but also that God is wrathful and 
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vengeful. These are beliefs they will sincerely affirm when prompted and which 
serve to guide their behaviour in different ways at different times. Some contextual 
knowledge may be required to predict what they will say and do, but they are 
believers nonetheless. And recall that Otto suffers from mild Alzheimer's disease; to 
expect his behaviour to be as rational as Inga's is to demand far too much. Occasional 
lapses in rationality and subsequent difficulties in predicting his actions are to be 
expected, but these have no bearing on the status of his extended beliefs as beliefs.  
The shortcomings of these folk-psychological objections share a common diagnosis. 
Though they attack the notion of extended beliefs from different angles, both Preston 
and Weiskopf's arguments adopt the same strategy of identifying a feature lacked by 
Otto's extended belief, then proceeding in an attempt to use the absence of this 
feature to undermine its status as a belief,  all the while failing to acknowledge that 
internal beliefs which also lack this feature are positively ubiquitous. Both rest on an 
over-intellectualised caricature  of ordinary human behaviour to smuggle in an 
internalistic chauvinism through the back door.  
 
6. Defending the extended mind thesis 
Above I provided rebuttals to some objections aimed specifically at Clark and 
Chalmers' notion of extended beliefs. For the remainder of this chapter I take up the 
challenge of defending the extended mind thesis against the most influential 
arguments levelled against it more generally. By far the most prominent critics of the 
extended mind thesis are Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa (e.g. Adams and Aizawa 
2007; 2001), so the bulk of the section will focus on their work, although I shall also 
discuss related objections due to Robert Rupert (2009), who argues for a more 
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conservative 'embedded' cognition, and Mark Sprevak (2009), who takes issue with 
Clark and Chalmers' appeal to the parity principle and their particularly liberal brand 
of functionalism.  
 
7. Notebooks don't think! 
Though it should hardly need stating, it is worth stressing that neither Clark nor any 
other defender of extended cognition has ever claimed that the external objects 
utilised in instances of cognitive coupling -notebooks, mobile phones, computers, 
etc- are themselves cognitive subjects. The very suggestion that, say, Otto's notebook 
itself remembers lists of dates and addresses, or that my computer screen engages in 
reasoning about the puzzle game I am playing is so utterly absurd and 
embarrassingly outlandish that one would expect even the most ardent critic of 
extended cognition to do their opponents the courtesy of refraining from attributing it 
to them. Nevertheless, Adams and Aizawa, in a particularly antagonistic opening 
passage, write 
Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4? 
Clark's answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician.  
That about sums up what is wrong with Clark's extended mind hypothesis. 
(Adams & Aizawa 2010 p.67) 
This is a straw man argument if ever there was one. The extended mind thesis does 
not have it, falsely, that the mathematician's pencil somehow thinks when it is used 
as part of a problem-solving process. Rather, it is the mathematician who thinks; it 
just so happens that the pencil and paper she uses to help her do so forms part of the 
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physical apparatus (which includes her brain, or parts of it at least) that makes her 
thinking possible. Clark himself responds to this by applying the underlying logic of 
Adams and Aizawa's remark to the brain itself. Paraphrasing (and parodying) Adams 
and Aizawa's pencil and paper example, he writes 
Question: Why did the V4 neuron think that there was a spiral pattern in the 
stimulus? 
Answer: because it was coupled to the monkey. (Clark 2008 p.86) 
As Clark explains, the intuitive awkwardness of the answer owes to the absurdity of 
the assumption underlying the question, namely 'the idea that a V4 neuron (or even a 
group of V4 neurons or even a whole parietal lobe) might itself be some kind of self-
contained locus of thinking' (Clark 2010b p.83, italics  in original). Individual 
neurons do not think, but they do function as part of a larger system which does. The 
particular neuron or group of neurons implicated in the monkey's perception of the 
spiral image is merely one important part of a broader physical system underlying the 
cognition  involved in the monkey's dealings with the stimulus; it is not itself a 
bearer of whatever mental state monkeys find themselves in when they look at 
spirals. Once this simple fact is acknowledged, Adams and Aizawa's flippant joke 
about the mathematicians pencil is stripped of its rhetorical force. 
 
8. Adams and Aizawa's tripartite critique: a tripartite critique 
It is easy to accept that pencils and neurons do not think.44 But all unhelpful rhetoric 
to the contrary aside, a sceptic about extended cognition might still have a hard time 
jettisoning the intuition that there is clearly some important difference (or 
                                                          
44 With apologies to panpsychists (e.g., Strawson 2006). 
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differences) between the neurons firing in the monkey's head (or indeed anyone's 
head) and the mathematician's pencil, regardless of whether or not it is coupled to an 
intelligent agent. Obviously, this is true; these are two very different things. The 
brain is a vastly complex organ, the pencil is a very basic tool. What matters is 
whether their many differences have negative ramifications for the extended mind 
thesis. In their much-cited 2001 Philosophical Psychology paper, its various follow 
ups, and their 2007 book-length treatment, Adams and Aizawa develop three related 
arguments that seek to do justice to this intuition. Below I outline and respond to 
each of these in turn. I shall call these the science argument, the coupling-
constitution argument, and the content argument. I shall argue that the science 
argument is straightforwardly empirically false, that the success of the coupling-
constitution argument depends directly upon the success of the content argument, 
and that the content argument fails, taking the coupling-constitution argument with it.  
 
9. The science argument 
Adams and Aizawa make numerous attempts to empirically discredit the extended 
mind thesis. They are happy to accept that extended cognition is possible in principle 
and that future scientific advances have the power to make it a reality; that the mind 
is in the head is not touted as a logical or conceptual truth. They are also happy to 
accept that tool use and action play an important role in shaping our mental lives and 
that these are of interest to the study of intelligent behaviour. They also agree with 
extended mind theorists that 'the skull does not constitute a theoretically significant 
boundary for cognitive science' (Adams & Aizawa 2001 p.46), because merely 
pointing to the fact that the brain is located in the head tells us nothing about the 
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nature of cognition. Rather, they claim that the arguments given by Clark and 
Chalmers in support of the extended mind thesis fail to overturn what they take to be 
an almost unanimous scientific consensus - the belief in the 'contingent empirical 
fact' that the mind is firmly inside the head 
Our view is simply that as a matter of contingent empirical fact, when one 
looks at [cognitve processes], such processes happen to occur almost 
exclusively with the brain. Insofar as we are intracranialists, we are what 
might be called "contingent intracranialists", rather than "necessary 
Intracranialists". (ibid. p.53)  
Adams and Aizawa characterise their case for 'contingent intracranialism' as a 
defence of scientific orthodoxy against its radical opponents in the embodied, 
enactive and extended research programs in philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science (Adams & Aizawa 2007 p.9). At times, though, they are wont to invoke 
cognitive-scientific orthodoxy as itself constituting evidence against the extended 
mind thesis, in order to place the burden of proof squarely on the extended mind 
theorist (e.g. Adams & Aizawa 2010 p.74). As an argument, this will not do. Adams 
and Aizawa cannot appeal to orthodoxy in order to defend that orthodoxy on pain of 
circularity. One cannot respond to a series of arguments in favour of a philosophical 
position merely by stating that the burden of proof lies with its proponents; they will 
simply agree and redirect the respondent to whatever proofs they believe they have 
already provided. And in any case, nothing about the extended mind thesis 
contradicts any neurological findings, behavioural studies, or the experimental 
methodologies used therein. What is at issue is the philosophical gloss we should put 
on the findings of practicing cognitive scientists, whether, for example, Kirsh and 
Maglio's Tetris study should be construed in terms of contingent intracranialism or 
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extended cognition. Pragmatically speaking, scientists are quite justified in not caring 
too much about these finer philosophical details and getting on with the business of 
designing and conducting experiments in order to accumulate valuable data. Insofar 
as our choice of interpretative scheme for this data is a philosophical and not an 
empirical matter, received opinion amongst empirical researchers in the cognitive 
sciences is largely irrelevant. That said, it might be a little too rough and ready to 
sweep the science argument under the carpet on this basis. Fortunately for the 
extended mind thesis, though, Adams and Aizawa's science argument itself fails on 
empirical grounds. 
Appeal to orthodoxy, granting that contingent intracranialism does in fact accurately 
represent this orthodoxy, fails as an argument because it is precisely this orthodoxy 
that Adams and Aizawa have taken it upon themselves to defend. But there is also a 
more nuanced variant of their science argument that potentially has more bite. 
Adams and Aizawa claim that unlike their more conservative contingent 
intracranialism, the seemingly more radical extended mind thesis yields no 
interesting or testable laws. For example, Adams and Aizawa cite psychophysical 
laws such as Weber's first law45and chunking effects46 in memory recall tasks as 
examples of the sorts of lawful regularities we should expect from investigation into 
the nature of mental processes. It is true that Otto's use of his notebook is unlikely to 
conform to the chunking effects typically exhibited in human working memory. A 
single page of a notebook can easily contain more than the so-called 'magical number 
                                                          
45 Weber's first law states that the just-noticeable differences between stimuli are 
proportional to the value of the stimuli, see Fancher and Rutherford (2012) pp.167-
71.  
 
46 The ways in which bits of information are grouped into meaningful 'chunks' in 
working memory, aiding and constraining recall, see Miller (1956).   
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seven' pieces of information often touted as the upper limit of human working 
memory.47But this by itself provides no objection. It could only do so if Miller's law 
(or something suitably like it) were conceptually necessary for something to count as 
working memory which, of course, it isn't. If a person or creature were discovered 
whose working memory capacity far exceeded that of typical humans, we would not 
conclude on that basis alone that they weren't really remembering! So the fact that 
the behaviour of coupled systems might not be governed by the same psychological 
or psychophysical laws as their decoupled counterparts constitutes no objection to 
their existence or status as genuinely cognitive phenomena. However, Adams and 
Aizawa go a step further, expressing scepticism regarding the existence of any 
empirically interesting laws governing coupled systems, 
[I]n contrast to intracranial processes, transcranial processes are not likely to 
give rise to interesting scientific regularities. There are no laws governing 
humans and their tool use over and above the laws of intracranial human 
cognition and the laws of physical tools...What are the chances of there being 
interesting regularities that cover humans interacting with all these sorts of 
tools? Slim to none, we speculate. (Adams and Aizawa 2001 p.61) 
As it is the business of science to uncover law-like regularities, the extended mind 
thesis will fall at the first hurdle of scientific credibility if this is true. But is it really 
the case that 'there are no laws governing humans and their tool use over and above 
the laws of intracranial human cognition and the laws of physical tools?'. The answer 
is an overwhelming 'no'. Clark's own counterexample comes from the field of 
human-computer interaction (HCI). HCI studies the emergent behaviour of humans 
                                                          
47 According to George Miller's famous study, the number of informational chunks 
stored concurrently in human memory is limited to seven, plus or minus two (Miller 
1956, cf. Baddeley 1992).  
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and computers construed as unified systems. These studies uncover plentiful causal 
laws over and above those found in psychology textbooks or the basic physical laws 
governing the machines themselves, and often also make recourse to modelling 
techniques prevalent in cognitive psychology (e.g. information storage, 
transformation and retrieval in memory (Clark 2008, p.96)). Classic HCI examples 
include Hutchins’ much-discussed account of the levels of information processing 
crisscrossing between agents and their environment in the navigation of a naval ship 
(Hutchins 1996). With regards to tool use generally, there in fact are so many 
examples of empirical research which uncovers lawful regularities governing human-
tool interaction that listing individual examples would not do justice to the extent of 
the field's success (for a detailed review, see Baber (2003)). On an even grander 
scale, the application of complex systems theory to group behaviour teaches us that 
all sorts of mathematical regularities and power laws emerge from behaviour of 
systems comprised of human agents and their surrounding environment (see Mainzer 
2007, pp.311-66). Contra Adams and Aizawa, these laws are not reducible to those 
governing the internal neural resources of individual agents and their casual 
interactions with external props; they really are sui generis laws that provide reliable, 
testable predictions of the behaviour of emergent phenomena; the science argument 
is empirically false. 
Of course, Adams and Aizawa could concede the existence of these and similar laws 
whilst continuing to object to extended cognition on the grounds that these laws are 
too specific to the particular task at hand and as such are unlikely to generalise to all 
instances of cognitive extension. This should not trouble the extended mind theorist 
either. It would be facetious to dismiss the findings of a psychological study dealing 
with one particular kind of performance task on the grounds that the regularities 
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discovered in the subjects' behaviour cannot be generalised to model their 
performance on a completely different sort of task. Given the vast and wildly 
heterogeneous range of tools utilised by human beings, this same should be expected 
to apply a fortiori in cases of cognitive extension via tool use. And in any case, there 
are commonalities to all successful instances of tool use to supplement our thought 
processes, such as increased speed and efficiency with regards to problem-solving.  
The final strand of Adams and Aizawa's science argument attacks what they take to 
be an underlying commitment of Clark and Chalmers to a widely discredited 
philosophy of psychology: behaviourism. The methodological behaviourism 
espoused by pre-cognitivist psychologists like Watson (1913) and Skinner (1957) 
and echoed in philosophical circles by logical behaviourists, most notably Ryle 
(1949), fell out of fashion in the wake of a devastating critique due to Chomsky 
(1959) and the rise of contemporary cognitive psychology and computational 
neuroscience. Adams and Aizawa allege that Clark and Chalmers are implicitly 
committed to behaviourism, because they appeal to Otto's disposition to behave in 
certain ways, namely to walk to the Museum of Modern Art on 53rd Street, to 
support their claim that his notebook serves as an external memory source 
In fact, we find that radical [extended  mind] theorists tend to rely on a 
behavioural -not to say behaviourist- conception of the cognitive...Cognitive 
scientists have generally rejected such behavioural conceptions of cognition, 
since they allow that gigantic look-up tables might count as cognitive models. 
(Adams & Aizawa 2001 p.47) 
This attempt to tar extended mind theorists with the brush of behaviourism is 
unconvincing. Clark and Chalmers do not claim that Otto's notebook constitutes 
175 
 
external memory storage just because his observable behaviour mirrors that of Inga, 
but because the content of the notebook plays the same sort of causal explanatory 
role as the internal mental representation a good post-Chomskian cognitivist would 
posit in the explanation of Inga's behaviour: 
It is the way the information [in Otto's notebook] is poised to guide reasoning 
(such as conscious inferences that nonetheless result in no overt actions) that 
counts. This is not behaviourism but functionalism. It is systemic role that 
matters, not brute similarities in public behaviour (though the two are of course 
related). Perhaps Adams and Aizawa believe that functionalism just is a species 
of behaviourism. If so, we plead guilty to the charge but find it less than 
damning.(Clark 2010a p.52, italics  in original) 
In fact, as Clark and Chalmers see things, extended cognition follows from a very 
general commitment to functionalism, which is an integral part of the scientific 
orthodoxy Adams and Aizawa are so keen to defend. I address an objection to the 
extended mind thesis based on Clark and Chalmers' reliance on functionalism due to 
Sprevak (2009) below, but for now it suffices to note that Adams and Aizawa's 
charge of behaviourism is inaccurate. So much for the science argument. 
 
10. The coupling-constitution argument 
Adams and Aizawa's attempts to empirically discredit the extended mind thesis fail. 
Their other two arguments are of a more philosophical nature. I shall call the first of 
these the 'coupling-constitution argument'.  The intended upshot of this section is that 
the coupling-constitution argument holds no weight when taken on its own, as it 
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presupposes the success of another argument, discussed in the following section, to 
even get off the ground.  
The coupling-constitution argument attacks what Adams and Aizawa take to be 
fallacious reasoning on the part of the extended mind theorist. As they see things, 
when Clark and Chalmers appeal to complex couplings between agents and their 
environments to illustrate the case for extended cognition, they commit a 'coupling-
constitution fallacy'. This is 
[A] tacit move from the observation that process X is in some way causally 
connected (coupled) to a cognitive process Y to the conclusion that X is part of 
the cognitive process Y. The pattern of reasoning here involves moving from the 
observation that process X is in some way causally connected (coupled) to a 
process Y of type ϕ to the conclusion that X is part of a process of type ϕ. 
(Adams & Aizawa 2009 p.81)  
Exposing this alleged fallacy supposedly shows that the extended mind thesis 
confuses causal interactions between cognitive processes and their environment with 
extensions of those processes into that environment, and/or casual interactions 
between cognitive systems and external objects with a broadening of those systems 
themselves. Adams and Aizawa illustrate the coupling-constitution argument with 
examples of familiar domestic contraptions causally influencing their surroundings. 
Components of air conditioning units and CD players interact with surrounding air 
molecules, but we do not thereby infer that the affected air molecules are part of the 
process of sound production or air conditioning, or that air molecules are themselves 
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part of a sound system or air conditioning unit48 (ibid. p.84). As an aside, I'm not 
entirely convinced that these examples show what Adams and Aizawa would like 
them to. Although not the sort of details one could reasonably expect to find listed 
among the item's components in the manufacturer's handbook, prima facie, it is no 
great stretch of the imagination to make sense of the idea of the surrounding air 
molecules, while not a proper part of the air-conditioning or sound-producing 
devices, being an essential part of the process of sound-production or air-
conditioning. After all, if the machines were placed in a vacuum their individual 
components could continue to function just fine but accomplish nothing, so the 
suggestion that the processes of sound production or air conditioning require more 
than just the presence of a fully-functional air conditioning unit or home stereo is 
hardly elaborate; the extended mind theorist might even use the analogy to their own 
advantage if so inclined. What Adams and Aizawa need is a positive account of what 
'constitution' actually amounts to. But as Ross and Ladyman (2010) point out, not 
only do Adams and Aizawa make no effort to provide such an account, there is no 
corresponding causal/constitutive distinction in contemporary physics for them to 
lean on49.  
Philosophical niceties about domestic appliances aside, there is at least one example 
in the literature of a sympathiser of Clark and Chalmers actually deploying this kind 
of reasoning. Noë, in a brief discussion of the extend mind thesis in the closing 
chapter of Action in Perception, characterises the extend mind thesis as the claim that 
'the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes’ (Noë 
                                                          
48 I am well aware of the fact there is technically no such thing as an 'air molecule', 
but for present purposes this doesn't matter.  
 
49 Having almost no knowledge of contemporary physics, I defer to Ross and 
Ladyman's authority on this point. 
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2004 p.221, my italics ). To this particular passage, Adams and Aizawa's contingent 
intracranialist would be quite justified in replying that 'a process P may actively 
interact with its environment, but this does not mean that P extends into its 
environment' (Adams and Aizawa 2001 p.56), thereby resisting the claim of 
cognitive extension. There may well be other instances of the fallacy in the extended 
mind literature. But even granting that instances of the coupling-constitution fallacy 
are present in some discussions of extended cognition, these are more likely due to 
sloppy wording on the part of the author than any deep-seated trouble with the case 
for the extended mind thesis itself. Clark and Chalmers' actual arguments in favour 
of the extended mind thesis rest on no such reasoning from causal interaction to 
constitution. Recall that the reason Clark and Chalmers offer for construing items 
such as Otto's notebook and the Tetris players' computer screens as part of an 
extended cognitive process is not the effect they have on their internal cognitive 
resources, but their role in the functional economy of the user. It just so happens that 
in these cases this is more widely distributed.  
The crux of the issue comes down to this: what exactly is meant in this context by 
'non-cognitive'? Or put positively: by virtue of what does something qualify as 
'cognitive'? Adams and Aizawa have much to say on this issue, and I discuss their 
positive account below. However, the key point to note at this juncture is that any 
such account of the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction must serve as a vital premise 
in any variation of the coupling-constitution argument. Without such an account, any 
theoretical division of a physical process into cognitive and non-cognitive 
components will be arbitrary, with only unstated and undefended intuitions to guide 
it. The coupling-constitution argument presupposes a principle of demarcation for the 
cognitive and, taken on its own, is powerless against the extended mind thesis. 
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Adams and Aizawa's coupling-constitution argument therefore stands or falls with 
the success of their third and trickiest argument, the content argument, which I 
address in the next section of this chapter. 
Before tackling Adams and Aizawa's content argument, my defence of the extended 
mind thesis is obliged to take into consideration  a more sophisticated variant of the 
coupling-constitution argument due to Robert Rupert (2009). Rupert argues that the 
extended mind thesis should be rejected in favour of the more conservative 
hypothesis of embedded cognition. The hypothesis of embedded cognition shares 
with the extended mind thesis the innocuous claim that our mental lives are highly 
dependent upon complex  interactions with various environmental props, but stops 
short of the claim that these external props are partially constitutive of cognition 
itself. Opting for  more of a philosophy of science-based approach than Adams and 
Aizawa, Rupert invokes Occam's razor and argues that the extended cognitive 
systems and processes posited by extended mind theorists should be eliminated from 
the operative ontology of practicing cognitive scientist in favour of an exclusive 
focus on the persisting core of internal cognitive resources housed inside the 
organism, hence his characterisation of his view as 'organism-centred cognition' 
(ibid. p.47). The cornerstone of Rupert's approach is what he calls his 'systems-based 
criterion' for determining whether or not something is to count as part of cognition, 
which he states as follows 
[A] state or process is cognitive if and only if it is a state of, or process 
occurring in, mechanisms that are elements of the integrated set members of 
which contribute causally and distinctively to the production of cognitive 
phenomena. (ibid. p.35) 
180 
 
Its fatal flaw is its reliance on the phrase 'cognitive phenomena'. This phrase occurs 
throughout Rupert's critique of the extended mind thesis, but is never precisely 
defined bar some rough and ready allusions to the explananda of cognitive science. 
Taken by itself, this is not particularly problematic. However, if the systems-based 
criterion is intended as a principle of demarcation of the cognitive from the non-
cognitive, and it is repeatedly and explicitly presented as such, then it is flatly 
circular. Of course, it can't be false that a cognitive system is a system that is 
responsible for the production of cognitive phenomena, but this is basically a 
tautology. Far from providing a principle of demarcation that might help work 
against the extended mind thesis, Rupert's systems-based criterion presupposes one. 
Hence my characterisation of Rupert's position as a variant of the coupling-
constitution argument; Rupert wants to drive a wedge between cognition proper and 
media external to the organism by showing that it is a mistake to construe them as 
unified systems, but without being able to ground this in a clear-cut cognitive/non-
cognitive distinction. Just like Adams and Aizawa's own coupling-constitution 
argument, Rupert's systems-based view requires but does not provide an account of 
what makes the cognitive 'cognitive' without which any division of coupled systems 
into cognitive and non-cognitive components will be arbitrary. In the next section I 
turn to Adams and Aizawa's attempts to do this and argue that they are unsuccessful.  
 
11. The content argument and the 'mark of the cognitive' 
The coupling-constitution argument is only serviceable if Adams and Aizawa can 
provide a principle of demarcation for the cognitive from the non-cognitive which, 
unlike Rupert's, does not suffer from circularity. They offer a candidate for such a 
181 
 
principle by means of what I shall call their 'content argument'. In this section I argue 
that Adams and Aizawa's content argument also fails, taking the coupling-
constitution argument down with it. 
Adams and Aizawa claim that as it is the business of the cognitive sciences to 
investigate cognitive phenomena, they (or philosophers acting on their behalf) owe 
us an account of precisely what it is for something to be 'cognitive' (Adams & 
Aizawa 2007 p.31). They call such a criterion the mark of the cognitive. They are 
keen to stress the search for a satisfactory mark of the cognitive should not descend 
into a mere terminological quibble, and offer instead what they take to be an 
empirical hypothesis about the nature of cognition based on the available evidence 
(ibid. p.49).  Adam and Aizawa's candidate criterion is what they call 'intrinsic' or 
'non-derived', as opposed to 'derived', content. Their distinction between derived and 
non-derived content is reminiscent of Searle's distinction between intrinsic and 
derived intentionality. Searle originally invoked the distinction within the context of 
machine intelligence (Searle 1980) before extending its application to debates 
surrounding the scientific understanding of consciousness (Searle 1992) and social 
ontology (Searle 1995). Searle famously argued (against the likes of Fodor (1980)) 
that the formal properties of a system - the syntactic structure of any program it 
physically implements - cannot suffice to make that system genuinely intelligent, 
because formal properties alone cannot guarantee any internal comprehension of the 
meanings of the symbols upon which the program operates. What Searle takes the 
system to require, is a prior understanding of the semantics of the program, and it is 
this 'original' or 'intrinsic' grasp of meaning that mere machines lack. As it is an 
undeniable phenomenological fact that humans do understand meaning and, on 
Searle's own understanding of contemporary neuroscience, an empirical fact that the 
182 
 
capacity to do so is somehow an accomplishment of the brain, Searle concludes that 
intrinsic intentionality is an as-yet unexplained biological property of humans', and 
possibly certain other animals', brains. It is this basic, biological endowment of 
human brains with intrinsic intentionality that supposedly explains the prevalence of 
socially constituted meaning; we are intentional agents who can grasp meanings, and 
as such can confer meaningfulness onto signs, flags, symbols, and the like in a 
secondary, derivative fashion (Searle 1983). Though they express scepticism with 
regards to his philosophically skewed reading of neuroscience (Adams and Aizawa 
2007 pp.35-6), Adams and Aizawa are essentially in agreement with Searle over the 
distinction between intrinsic, and therefore genuinely mental, content, and its 
derivate counterpart in the public sphere  
Part of what we think distinguishes cognitive processes from non-cognitive 
processes is that cognitive processes involve representations. More 
specifically, cognitive processes involve non-derived, rather than derived, 
representations [...] Traffic lights, gas gauges, and flags are paradigm cases of 
items bearing derived content. Thoughts, experiences, and perceptions are 
paradigm cases of items bearing non-derived content. Roughly speaking the 
idea is that derived content arises from the way in which items are handled or 
treated by intentional agents. For the most part, things with derived content 
are assigned that content by intentional agents who already have thoughts 
with meaning. Underived content arises from conditions that do not require 
the independent or prior existence of other content, representations, or 
intentional agents. (ibid. p.32) 
This bearing of non-derived representational content, as Adams and Aizawa see 
things, is a definitive feature of cognitive  states and processes found only in brains, 
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which serves to demarcate the cognitive from the non-cognitive. If this is true, then 
items such as Otto's notebook, the mathematician's stationary, and the words and 
images displayed on the Tetris player's computer monitor, which contain only 
derived content, are ruled out as constitutive parts of their users' cognitive resources. 
The coupling-constitution argument, supported by a foundational premise to the 
effect that the cognitive is to be distinguished from the non cognitive on the basis of 
its exhibiting non-derived content, could be repackaged and redeployed, this time 
successfully, against the extended mind thesis. This is the content argument.  
One possible way of responding to the content argument would be to offer an 
alternative mark of the cognitive that allows for extended cognition. Rowlands takes 
such an approach.  Rowlands offers an alternative and extended cognition-friendly 
mark of the cognitive as information processing the proper function of which is to 
produce a representational state belonging to a subject (Rowlands 2010a pp.107-34). 
Though Rowlands' approach is interesting and I find myself in agreement with much 
of it, I do not think that this is a particularly fruitful avenue to pursue in combating 
the content argument. An Adams and Aizawa-style contingent intracranialist would 
be well within their rights to dismiss such a counter on the grounds that merely 
putting forward an alternative mark of the cognitive does not suffice to disprove or 
discredit their own, and is therefore a refusal to engage with their position rather than 
a direct counter to it. Furthermore, devising an account of the mark of the cognitive 
for the very purpose of saving the extended mind thesis runs the risk of begging the 
question against the contingent intracranialist.  
Another tactic would be to deny outright any such distinction between non-derived 
and derived content. Dennett makes this move against Searle (Dennett 1996 pp.50-
6), while Hutto and Myin follow suit against Adams and Aizawa (Hutto and Myin 
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2013 pp.135-53). Cards on the table: I am far more sympathetic to the positions of 
Dennett and Hutto and Myin than Adams and Aizawa's. That is, I am sceptical as to 
whether there really is a clear distinction between derived and non-derived content, 
let alone one of any relevance to cognitive science. And I find Adams and Aizawa's 
attempts to elaborate on their notion of non-derived content utterly perplexing. For 
instance, I am not at all convinced that 'we cannot make the firing of a particular set 
of neurons mean what it does, simply by agreement that it does (Adams & Aizawa 
2010 p.72). This is precisely what happens when a new public symbol is coined, say, 
in the designing of a corporate logo. The marketers are in effect deciding what the 
neural state tokened by the perception of their logo shall henceforth represent. If their 
marketing campaign is successful, over time the logo will become synonymous with 
their brand and instilled in popular consciousness, and this will be what the neural 
states underpinning people's perceptions or mental images of the logo will now be 
about. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the teaching of any new words. So the 
very suggestion that 'the cognitive states in normal cognitive agents do not derive 
their meanings from conventions or social practices'  (Adams & Aizawa 2001. p.48) 
seems to me to be patently false. Quite why we should need to (somehow) bracket 
out all the publically-derived content of people's mental states in order to explain 
their behaviour scientifically is completely beyond me, and I struggle in vain to 
discern what, if anything, the leftover 'underived' (sic) content of such states could 
even amount to. That said, I do not wish to delve into the issue of content fixation. A 
thorough treatment of this topic would take me too far afield and, in all honesty, I 
simply cannot understand what is going on in a lot of the relevant literature. I shall 
therefore follow a more conciliatory strategy in my reply to the content argument. I 
shall argue that even if a conceptual distinction between derived and non-derived 
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content is granted, it simply cannot do the work required of it by the contingent 
intracranialist.  
There are at least three reasons why Adams and Aizawa's appeal to the derived/non-
derived content distinction, even if there is such a distinction to be drawn,  is doomed 
to fail. First of all, it is far from clear that cognitive scientists - real ones, not 
philosophers thereof - really do require anything like a mark of the cognitive. The 
history of science is littered with success stories that proceeded in either total 
ignorance or outright defiance of the supposedly a priori first principles dictated by 
philosophers. Biology, including its sub-discipline of artificial life (see, e.g. Gardner 
1970), seems to get by just fine without getting bogged down in the philosophical 
complexities of formulating an adequate definition of 'life'. And the early modern 
conception of 'matter' and the atomism that comes with it- still influential in many 
philosophers' commonsense musings on physical systems - is embarrassed by 
contemporary physics (see e.g. the essays collected in Ross, Ladyman and Kincaid 
2013). If these are to be the 'mature sciences' from which a 'would-be science' like 
cognitive science should take its lead (Adams & Aizawa 2001 p.53; 49), then the 
demand for a principled mark of the cognitive seems like an overly strong 
requirement bordering on pure philosophical fantasy.  
Secondly, as Menary (2010b) points out, Adams and Aizawa themselves abstain 
from providing a positive account of how allegedly intrinsically content-bearing 
states get their content. They do, however, cite extant accounts from the naturalised 
semantics literature, including those of Dretske (1981), Millikan (1984) and Fodor 
(1990). Presumably, then, we are supposed to infer their theory of content from 
these. But these accounts of content are a heterogeneous and often competing bunch. 
Millikan's biosemantics, for example, is deeply rooted in Darwinism, while Fodor 
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advocates a strongly anti-Darwinian stance on the issue of representational content 
(Fodor 2008). Given the absence of a singular positive account of intrinsic content 
fixation, Adams and Aizawa's notion of intrinsic content is not so much a candidate 
mark of the cognitive as a purely theoretical stand-in for some as-yet unformulated 
mark of the cognitive to come by way of a fully developed and unanimously agreed 
upon naturalised semantics. But there is no such account, so quite what the extended 
mind theorist is supposed to respond to here is a complete mystery.  
Thirdly and most importantly, even if we accept for the sake of argument that such a 
thing as the mark of the cognitive is required by cognitive science, and that the 
derived/non-derived content distinction can be adequately fleshed out, and that 
cognitive processes necessarily involve representations with non-derived content, 
this is still insufficient to equip Adams and Aizawa's contingent intracranialist with 
the right tools to deny cognitive extension, because Adams and Aizawa find 
themselves obliged to concede that not every state of a cognitive processes need 
exhibit intrinsic content anyway (!). In their original paper, they acknowledge the 
limitation of their own view by noting that 
Having argued that, in general there must be non-derived content in cognitive 
processes, it must be admitted that it is unclear to what extent every cognitive 
state of each cognitive process must involve non-derived content. (Adams 
and Aizawa 2001 p.50) 
In their book-length treatment, they elaborate on this as follows 
As far as we know, cognitive processes might involve representations that 
include a small fixed set of non-representational functional elements, such as 
punctuation marks and parentheses. Such items might count as part of a 
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language of thought based on the manner in which they interact with items 
having non-derived content. If this happens, then cognitive states will to some 
extent be less than maximally dependent on non-derived content. Not every 
part of every cognitive state will be content bearing. (Adams and Aizawa 
2007 p.55-6 my italics )  
If even Adams and Aizawa are happy to admit that it would be too strong an 
empirical hypothesis to insist that every part of a process must bear non-derived 
content in order to qualify as a cognitive process, and that genuinely cognitive 
systems are highly likely to contain parts which do not bear such content, then an 
appeal to the presence or absence of non-derived content cannot be the deciding 
factor in whether or not it is correct to call a part of a process cognitive. When Clark 
(2010a) calls Adams and Aizawa on this, their direct response amounts to little more 
than a reiteration of the same fatal concession 
We don't think we have good reason to hypothesise that every component of 
every state of a cognitive process must bear non-derived content [...] Our 
view is that at least some components of cognitive states require some non-
derived content, where the states of a notepad for arithmetical computations, 
Otto's notebook, video games, and most mundane tools do not. (ibid. p.50, my 
italics) 
This harkens back to the fundamental misunderstanding of Adams and Aizawa's 
sarcastic joke about the mathematicians' pencil. The external item is not the bearer of 
a cognitive state - it plays a nontrivial role in the overall functional economy of a 
wider system which has that state. Otto and his notebook, Tetris players, 
mathematicians equipped with pencil and paper etc, are all systems which, ex 
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hypothesi, contain neural states bearing non-derived content, as well as processes or 
parts of process which do not. If the fact that these latter processes do not bear non-
derived content does not automatically deem them non-cognitive after all, then Clark 
and Chalmers' arguments for the extended mind thesis remain untouched. As Clark 
himself puts it, at this point 'there is really no case (concerning intrinsic content) left 
to answer' (Clark 2010a p.49). The derived/non-derived content distinction, by 
Adams and Aizawa's own admission, fails to ground a clear-cut cognitive/non-
cognitive distinction. The content argument therefore rests on an indefensible double 
standard in favour of the internal over the external. As such, it fails, taking the 
coupling-constitution argument with it. 
 
12. The mark of the cognitive mk. II 
Adams and Garrison (2013) offer an alternative candidate for a mark of the cognitive 
that shrinks away from the issue of content. They appeal to the role of reasoning in 
cognitive processing to outline what they take to be a necessary, but not sufficient, 
criterion, by which cognitive systems are to be distinguished from non-cognitive 
ones. In this section I flag up a number of concerns with their position and conclude 
that even if these are put aside, their mark of the cognitive sequel poses no real threat 
to the extended mind thesis either.    
According to Adams and Garrison a system (an animal, a machine, or whatever) 
qualifies as genuinely cognitive if and only if its behaviour - by which they mean, 
somewhat confusingly, not just bodily movement, but the causing of that movement 
(ibid. p.341) - can be explained by reference to the system's reason(s) for behaving 
that way. There is a variety of senses in which we explain things in terms of reasons. 
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We might, for example, invoke gravity as the 'reason' for a precariously balanced 
object falling from a shelf, or a design flaw as the 'reason' for a glitch in computer 
software. Similarly, as Adams and Garrison remark, we might invoke facts about 
natural selection as the 'reasons' for the presence of a particular trait in a species. This 
use of the term 'reason' means something more akin to 'cause' or 'contributing 
historical factor', than 'reason' as it occurs in the sorts of explanations Adams and 
Garrison have in mind: 'cognitive explanations', that is, explanations of intelligent 
behaviour. They therefore distinguish their intended sense of 'reasons' from other 
common uses of the term 
[O]n our view of reasons that are involved in cognitive systems with 
cognitive processes, the reasons required must be the system's own reasons, 
and the explanation in terms of reasons must not only be at the evolutionary 
level of the species or programmer (or whatever). Call these system centred 
reasons. The explanations in terms of the reasons are teleological. Cognitive 
systems do one thing A in order to achieve another thing B. In the types of 
explanations we are featuring, the goal of doing B and the strategy for 
accomplishing B by doing A are represented within the system. (bid. p.347, 
italics  in original) 
Note that nothing in their definition of system centred reasons states that the system 
in question must be conscious of a  goal state or their strategy for achieving it, or that 
these inner representations need even be accessible to consciousness. Adams and 
Garrison are quite happy that cognitive systems need not have conscious access to 
their own system centred reasons (ibid. footnote 24), and the strategy for achieving a 
particular goal might be encoded in an unconscious motor signal. Hence, what they 
have in mind with their notion of a system centred reason is not so much a rationale 
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that retrospectively justifies an action (in the manner of Davidson (1963)), but rather 
a sub-personal representation of the intended outcome of an action that causes that 
action. Genuine behaviour, in their stipulated sense, is behaviour that can be 
explained as the effect of an internally represented goal state 
[W]hether the motions of a system (or creature) have cognitive causes cannot 
be determined by observing the motions alone. For there to be genuine 
intentional behaviour explicable in cognitive terms depends upon the causes 
of the motions (movements). Only motions with cognitive explanations are 
truly cases of intelligent behaviour. (Adams and Garrison  p.342) 
I do not wish to quibble over their slightly unusual use of the word 'behaviour' or get 
bogged down in tangential concerns in the philosophy of action concerning whether 
or not reasons are causes (see the essays collected in D'oro and Sandis (2013)); 
Adams and Garrison may stipulate terms howsoever they wish. So for the remainder 
of this section, to avoid the appearance of begging the question, I shall reserve the 
term 'behaviour' for bodily movement causally explicable in terms of reasons. 
Adams and Garrison invoke two examples from ethology and one from robotics. 
They claim that it is by virtue of a cat's representing a particular goal-state (e.g. the 
acquisition of food) and an accompanying strategy for achieving it (i.e. a particular 
sequence of bodily movements) that the stalking of its prey constitutes the work of a 
genuinely cognitive system, while the co-ordinated activity of a termite mound does 
not (Adams and Garrison take the termite example from Turner (forthcoming)). The 
cat has, represented somewhere within it, both a desire for food (the goal state) that is 
the cause of the bodily movement that brings about the satisfaction of the desire, and 
the motor program(s) needed to initiate these bodily movements. The 'behaviour' of 
191 
 
the termite mound, on the other hand, contains no such representations and can be 
explained in its entirety (i.e. using biochemistry) without the need for positing any 
such representations; the cat engages in reasoning, the termite mound, considered as 
a 'superindividual', as Turner calls it, does not.  
Adams and Garrison also appeal to Rodney Brooks's robotic 'creature', Herbert, to 
support their mark of the cognitive. As noted very briefly in chapter I, Herbert is able 
to perform the task of collecting empty drinks cans dispersed around the floors of the 
MIT robotics laboratory whilst avoiding obstacles in the absence of any pre-
programmed knowledge of how to recognise drinks cans or instructions on where to 
find them50. Herbert is a classic and oft-cited example of basic embodied intelligence 
in action, as it (he?) utilises neither a classical symbolic computational architecture 
nor, as Brooks is at pains to emphasise, a neural network (Brooks 1991a.). Unlike 
robots spawned by traditional 'top-down' Artificial Intelligence (Nilsson and 
colleagues' Shakey, for example51), Herbert's can-collecting emerges from the 
dynamic interactions between Herbert's active movement as conditioned by its bodily 
morphology (it is mobile and fitted with a grasping device) and its local environment 
(Brooks 1991a; 1991b). With no central processing unit with global control of its 
movement, Herbert's activity is entirely modulated by feedback signals distributed 
throughout its body. As Brooks explains 
The point of Herbert is two-fold. 1. It demonstrates complex, apparently goal 
directed and intentional, behaviour in a system which has no long term 
internal state and no internal communication. 2. It is very easy for an observer 
                                                          
50A video demonstration of Herbert can be found here 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YtNKuwiVYm0 (last accessed 22/8/14).  
 
51 A video demonstration of Shakey can be found here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RhrLHkVuerc (last accessed 22/8/14).  
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of a system to attribute more complex internal structure than really exists. 
Herbert appeared to be doing things like path planning and map building, 
even though it was not. (Brooks 1991a p.19) 
In a move echoing Descartes' principled denial of intelligence to machines in his 
Discourse on the Method on the grounds that they lack reason (Descartes 1998), 
Adams and Garrison write  
Suppose that a human lab assistant in the A.I. lab picks up a soda can and 
returns it to a trashcan. In some sense of behaviour, Herbert and the lab 
assistant have done the "same thing". The overt movements are the same. 
However, on the notion of behaviour that involves causing, these may not be 
the same behaviour. The lab assistant retrieves the can for a reason. Perhaps 
the reason is to remove clutter in the lab. Herbert's movements, however, are 
not performed for Herbert's reasons. Herbert has no [system centred] reasons. 
(ibid. p.342) 
Supposedly, then, it is Herbert's apparent lack of system-centred reasons that renders 
it a non-cognitive system, and it is for this reason that Adams and Garrison rebuke as 
'behaviourist' Brooke's characterisation of Herbert's activity as 'intelligence without 
reason' (ibid. footnote 14). Indeed, for them, 'intelligence without reason' is an 
oxymoron, and Herbert's 'behaviour' is not genuine behaviour, as they have defined 
it, at all.  
There are notable lacunae in Adams and Garrison's own reasoning regarding these 
three examples. Insofar as Adams and Garrison deem Herbert's activity unintelligent 
and non-cognitive on the grounds that Herbert lacks reason as they have defined it - 
as having a representation of a goal state and a strategy for achieving it which causes 
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its bodily movement - they simply assume their candidate for a mark of the cognitive 
without arguing for it. The same goes for their treatment of the stalking cat and 
Turner's 'superindividual' termite mound. Adams and Garrison alternate between 
appealing to the role of reasoning in the cat's behaviour to justify the claim that the 
cat, but not the termite mound, comprises a cognitive system,  and appealing to the 
cat's behaviour to support their hypothesis that cognition necessitates the presence of 
system centred reasons. These arguments are not only circular but secure a sleight of 
hand by appealing to popular and prima facie plausible intuitions - that cats have 
minds, that termite mounds don't, and that robots don't really know what coke cans 
are - then cashing these out in terms of a conception of 'reasoning' that is repeatedly 
stated but never explicitly defended.  
As Adams and Garrison see things, the positing of system centred reasons is 
necessitated by the type of explanation proper to the understanding of intelligent 
behaviour, but no justification is given for this beyond the banal fact that the 
explanations of cognitive science explain cognitive phenomena and other types of 
explanation do not. They simply assume that it is the necessity of their system-
centred reasons that grounds this difference:  'We maintain that if the full and 
accurate explanation of a system's behaviour must include the system's own reasons, 
then one is explaining the behaviour of a cognitive system and those reasons will be 
system centred reasons.' (ibid. p.347-8). What is required to make this work is a 
demonstration of the alleged fact that all cognitive processing necessarily requires 
representations of reasons, but no such demonstration is forthcoming.  
In the absence of such a demonstration, let us be charitable and take it that the claim 
enjoys some prima facie acceptability. After all, the suggestion that cognitive 
systems are systems capable of behaving for their own reasons hardly sounds 
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implausible. The above reservations about Adams and Garrison's circular 
argumentative strategy notwithstanding, however, it is far from clear that this second 
mark of the cognitive actually can carve the sorts of distinctions they would like. 
While the issues of animal minds, collective mentality and machine intelligence are 
the subjects of ongoing controversy (see, e.g. the essays collected in Lurz (2009), 
Chant, Hindriks and Preyer (forthcoming) and Preston and Bishop (2002) 
respectively), I can agree with Adams and Garrison that cats have minds and termite 
mounds don't both for the sake of argument and because this is fairly 
uncontroversial. I will remain agnostic as to whether a robot like Herbert can 
justifiably be deemed 'intelligent', but I strongly disagree that Herbert lacks  system 
centred reasoning as Adam and Garrison have defined this. This is highly 
problematic for their proposed mark of the cognitive if it is supposed to rule out 
Herbert while allowing for humans and cats.  
To see why their example of Herbert fails, consider how Adams and Garrison might 
respond to the following potential line of objection. It could be argued that there is 
nothing immediately objectionable about the idea of the lab assistant picking up the 
can without having any particular reason to do so; she might be acting purely on 
impulse (perhaps she has obsessive compulsive disorder) or blind habit (her strict 
upbringing has conditioned her to be neat and tidy). When asked why she picked up 
the can, she might honestly reply, 'I have no idea'. Given the fact that her act of can-
collecting involved the co-ordination of bodily movement in response to perceptual 
stimulation, it would be highly counterintuitive to regard it as the work of a non-
cognitive system. This would constitute a case of genuine cognition which does not 
involve system centred reasoning, thereby disproving the claim that the presence of 
system centred reasoning is necessary for cognition (though it may still be 
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sufficient). Now, Adams and Garrison can respond that although the lab assistant 
might lack conscious access to her reason for picking up the can, this does not mean 
that she lacks a reason for doing so - in their sense of 'reason' - as not only can a 
system-centred reason be absent from the system's current conscious awareness, it 
can be inaccessible to consciousness completely. There is therefore nothing 
problematic in saying that the lab assistant could pick up a can either entirely 
absentmindedly (as it were) or while consciously thinking about something else, 
while continuing to ascribe to her a sub-personal representational state which causes 
and guides her can-collecting behaviour. The problem for Adams and Garrison is that 
if this is all having a system-centred reason amounts to, then Herbert does satisfy 
their mark of the cognitive. And if Herbert satisfies their allegedly necessary 
condition, then whatever morals are supposed to follow from Herbet's non-cognitive 
status for the extended mind thesis are mooted. 
It is generally unwise to defer to a robotocist in philosophical matters, but it is even 
less advisable to overrule them when it comes to the empirical details of their own 
designs. Despite employing the rhetoric of 'intelligence without reason', and 
'intelligence without representation' to describe Herbert (the titles of his 1991 
papers), in his more sober moments Brooks stresses that Herbert is actually not an 
entirely non-representational device  
My earlier paper [Brooks 1991a] is often criticized for advocating absolutely 
no representation of the world within a behaviour-based robot. This criticism 
is invalid. I make it clear in the paper that I reject traditional Artificial 
Intelligence representation schemes (...). I also made it clear that I reject 
explicit representations of goals within the machine. There can, however, be 
representations which are partial models of the world -  in fact I mentioned 
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that individual layers extract only those aspects of the world which they find 
relevant - projections of a representation into a simple subspace" [...]. The 
form these representations take, within the context of the computational 
model we are using, will depend on the particular task those representations 
are to be used for. (Brooks 1991b p.20, my italics) 
What Herbert lacks is not the capacity to represent its surroundings (a la Turner's 
termite mound), but a complete internal model of its environment encoded in a 
central unit, and pre-programmed instructions about how to locate and collect 
discarded cans (Brooks's 'explicit goal representations').  Herbert does, however, 
represent some aspects of its environment which serve as cues for the particular 
movements it makes (i.e. avoiding approaching people by moving backwards, 
activating the grasping mechanism in the presence of something suitably coke can-
shaped, etc).  These minimal representations are distributed throughout Herbert's 
circuitry rather than housed in a CPU, but there is no non-chauvinistic reason for 
supposing that their location is of any importance. Recall from chapter I that Clark 
(1997) helpfully dubs these minimal, context-sensitive, action-guiding 
representational states  'action-oriented representations', which are 'representations 
that simultaneously describe aspects of the world and prescribe possible actions, and 
are poised between pure control structures and passive representations of external 
reality' (Clark 1997 p.49, cf. Wheeler 2005 pp.195-200). Why does this matter? 
Because Herbert's action-orientated representations satisfy Adams and Garrisons 
definition of a system-centred reason. Herbert  moves around and initiates the 
particular movements it does because the required motor commands are triggered by 
states which represent certain features of his local environment. So while Herbert 
may lack an explicit representation of the overarching goal of collecting cans, it does 
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utilise representations of simpler, action-specific goals constructed on the fly.  Of 
course Herbert isn't conscious of any reason for acting, Herbert isn't conscious of 
anything. But, ex hypothesi, this is irrelevant. To be clear, I am not claiming that 
Herbert is genuinely intelligent, or even that it deserves to be called a cognitive 
system. I remain agnostic on both fronts. The intended moral here is simply that 
Adams and Garrison's criterion doesn't even work in the context of their own 
example.  
Thus far I have argued that Adams and Garrison's revised mark of the cognitive is 
vaguely formulated, poorly argued for, and unequipped to do the work they take to 
be required of it. But the crucial question is whether this mark has any bearing on the 
extended mind thesis, as Adams and Garrison maintain. I conclude this section by 
arguing that even if they are correct in holding that cognitive systems necessarily 
have system-centred reasons, this causes no problems at all for the  extended mind 
theorist  
Let us accept for the sake of argument that genuinely cognitive systems, such as 
those found in humans, cats, and whatever sorts of possible technologies Adams and 
Garrison are happy to allow, must of necessity be capable of behaviour in their 
stipulated sense of bodily movements caused by system centred reasons. 
Furthermore, let us be charitable yet again and suppose that all the issues raised 
about their method of argument and their conclusions regarding Brooks's robots can 
be adequately resolved. Would wholesale acceptance of Adams and Garrison's 
account in any way exclude Clark and Chalmers' coupled systems from qualifying as 
genuinely cognitive? The answer has to be a resounding 'No'. This is because Adams 
and Garrison's revised mark of the cognitive has absolutely no bearing on extended 
cognition whatsoever unless internalism is presupposed.  
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Consider our staple examples of Otto and his notebook and Kirsh and Maglio's 
videogamers. Both are clearly involved in forms of reasoning. Otto is planning a 
route to the Museum of Modern Art, and the videogamers are solving geometrical 
puzzles. Furthermore, both satisfy the more technically defined notion of a system 
centred reason. Otto's behaviour - his walking to the museum - is caused by a 
representation of his desired goal state, namely the location of the museum as 
depicted (in words, diagrams, or whatever) in his notebook. It just so happens that 
the goal state is represented in an external medium. The motor commands required 
for perambulation are caused by his processing, in this case via visual perception, of 
the representations in the notebook. Otto and his notebook, construed as a single 
coupled system, therefore satisfies Adams and Garrison's necessary criterion and 
qualifies as a cognitive system. The criterion can only serve to exclude Otto and his 
notebook if it is assumed that representations of goal states must be internal to the 
brain, which would beg the question, as well as ruling out from the armchair the sorts 
of possible mind-extending technologies they wish to allow for (Adams & Garrison 
2013 footnote 22). Note that the extended mind theorist can even comply with 
Adams and Garrison's characterisation of the represented goal state as 'internal' to the 
system. The goal state is indeed 'internal', it is just 'inside' a more physically 
distributed system. 
Similar morals apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Tetris example. Recall that the key 
moral of Kirsh and Maglio's Tetris study is that players use epistemic actions to 
manipulate the shapes displayed on the screen themselves in order to identify the best 
shape of fit for falling puzzle pieces without relying on an internally-generated model 
of the puzzle and the outcomes of possible moves. Once we have rejected the 
classical picture of detailed internal models of the puzzle pieces in favour of active 
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agents manipulating the task space itself, the objects comprising the task space take 
over the functional role of some internal goal states. Recall that Kirsh and Maglio 
found that players do not process the outcomes of specific moves before making 
them; outcomes of particular moves are discovered via the skilful manipulation of the 
shapes rather than being calculated in advance. If there are no prior decisions 
regarding the outcomes of specific moves, then are no goal states of this kind to 
account for. Nevertheless, there is a representation of puzzle pieces and an indication 
of where they will land given their current alignment and orientation: it's just not in 
the players' heads, but on the screen.  This external representation is the cause of the 
player's act of hitting 'enter'. Again, this satisfies Adams and Garrison's definition of 
a system centred reason. Only internalistic prejudices, or recourse to further 
necessary conditions like a strengthened version of Adams and Aizawa's dead-in-the-
water content argument, or some other and as-yet unoffered criterion, could do the 
work required to rule out extended systems while preserving wholly internal ones. 
When subjects enhance their reasoning processes via complex couplings with 
environmental structures, the makeshift systems which emerge still satisfy Adams 
and Garrison's allegedly 'necessary' criterion for cognition. Their mark of the 
cognitive: mark two is as impotent against the extended mind thesis as Adams and 
Aizawa's original.    
 
13. Mars Aattacks! 
Attempts to undermine the extended mind thesis by appeal to a mark of the cognitive 
fail even under the most charitable and conciliatory of readings. A novel line of 
objection along very different lines is pursued by Mark Sprevak (2009), who takes 
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issue with Clark and Chalmers' liberal version of functionalism. Recall that 
according to the parity principle, only coarse-grained isomorphisms between internal 
brain-bound cognitive states and processes and their externally distributed 
counterparts need hold in order for the latter to qualify as genuinely cognitive, a 
point Clark is at pains to emphasise (Clark 2008 p.88). To bolster the case for their 
argument from parity, extended mind theorists often appeal to possible beings - 
hitherto undiscovered aliens or animals, futuristic cybernetic organisms, and the like 
- whose internal cognitive machinery might well be very different from our own, but 
which enabled them nevertheless to entertain mental states and processes sufficiently 
similar to ours. The intuition underling such examples, which depending on the way 
in which it is deployed is either a fortunate consequence or a motivating factor 
behind  functionalism about cognition, is that creatures could exist who are capable 
of entertaining the same sorts of mental states and processes as us despite these being 
implemented via some very different hardware (see Chalmers (1993) for a thorough 
discussion of implementation and multiple realisability). Sprevak dubs this the 
'Martian intuition' (Sprevak 2009 p.8). In the context of the debate over extended 
cognition, the Martian intuition is often deployed by extended mind theorists in the 
following sort of argument: given that we would be happy to grant that these enjoy 
cognitive status, there is no non-chauvinistic to deny that status to an extended 
human process that works in the same way. Sprevak takes issue with this use of the 
Martian intuition52. He argues that the particularly liberal brand of functionalism at 
play in the argument from parity is too permissive, and that this undermines the use 
                                                          
52 Sprevak ultimately concludes with an expression of scepticism not just over the 
extended mind thesis, but functionalism about the mind generally. Addressing this 
far stronger and more 'metaphysical' conclusion would take me too far afield, but for 
a discussion and response, see Drayson (2010). 
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of the Martian intuition to support the extended mind thesis. This is supposedly 
because we can easily imagine many forms of alien (or cybernetic, or whatever) 
cognition which when recast in terms of an analogous pairing of human agents with 
external props, in accordance with Clark and Chalmers' insistence that only a course-
grained isomorphism between the two is sufficient to secure parity between the two 
cases, radically violate our intuitions about what deserves to be called cognitive and 
what does not.  
Sprevak uses the Martian intuition to provide a reductio ad absurdum against the 
extended mind thesis. He suggests that the Martian intuition, combined with the 
parity principle, yields the extremely undesirable conclusion that simply by picking 
up a book, I come to believe everything in it: 
The justification is as follows. Consider a Martian [...] who encodes 
memories using ink marks. As well as acquiring beliefs via its senses, it 
seems possible for such a Martian to be born with innate beliefs. 
Furthermore, it seems possible for an organism to have innate beliefs that it 
has not examined yet - a library of data that is hard-wired into the organism 
by developmental processes, which the organism has not yet had cause to 
employ. Imagine that [...] [t]he Martian has ink marks inside its head that, if it 
were significantly diligent, would guide its action in appropriate ways; I have 
ink marks just outside my head that, if I am significantly diligent, would 
guide my actions in appropriate ways. The difference [...] is that it has the 
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ink-marks inside its head, while I have ink-marks outside. By the [parity 
principle]53, if the Martian has the beliefs, then so do I. (ibid. p.21) 
Given that, ex hypothesi for the extended mind theorist, spatial proximity is 
irrelevant to an external item's being part of a cognitive system so long as it has the 
requisite functional poise, the scope of the reductio is even more damningly broad. If 
this Martian example is accepted, then the whole university library could potentially 
count as part of my mind (ibid. p.22-3)! 
If Sprevak's argument is successful, then the extended mind theorist is in deep water. 
Thankfully, however, a satisfactory rebuttal comes courtesy of Wheeler (2010). 
Wheeler points out that Sprevak's reductio rests heavily on the assumption that the 
Martian's innate and unexamined internal ink marks do indeed constitute a cognitive 
resource. But what reason is there for believing this? None is offered. In fact, as 
Wheeler highlights, what Sprevak does is to imagine particular examples which 
nobody, extended mind convert or not, would admit as an instance of cognition, 
transport it into the head of his Martian, then attribute the error to the extended mind 
theorist. As Wheeler himself puts it 
What Sprevak does [...] is take what he assumes to be the noncognitive, 
externally located elements in a distributed process, place them inside the 
head of a Martian, and conclude that they now deserve to be rewarded with 
cognitive status. But where is the justification for suddenly counting these 
elements as themselves cognitive? Apart from their spatial location, nothing 
                                                          
53 Sprevak himself uses the term 'the fair-treatment principle', but I have reverted to 
Clark and Chalmers' original terminology for the sake of consistency. 
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about them has changed from when they were judged to be noncognitive. The 
only new factor is their recently acquired-in-the-head-ness. (ibid. p.263) 
Ironically, the only way such an argumentative strategy could work would be if it 
was assumed that a process counted as part and parcel of cognition purely by dint of 
its occurring inside a creature's head - that 'in-the-head-ness' is the mark of the 
cognitive - a claim which even Adams and Aizawa reject as ridiculous. Hence, 
'Sprevak's argument depends on a form of the Martian intuition that is significantly 
more radical than the one he explicitly formulates as part of his conceptual backdrop' 
(ibid. italics removed). Once it is acknowledged that no one in their right mind, 
extended or otherwise, would admit mere vicinity in relation to a library as an 
instance of extended cognition, Sprevak's argument from the Martian intuition 
collapses.  
Recall that Clark and Chalmers' use of the parity principle begins with the 
identification of a paradigmatic example of a cognitive process, such as remembering 
the location of a building or solving a geometric puzzle, then moves a part of the 
process outside the boundary of skin and skull. A question remains as to what, 
exactly, justifies the identification of some sorts of process - recalling information, 
spatial reasoning - as cognitive, but not others (and we are no longer accepting non-
derived content as an answer!). Here Clark and Chalmers' rely heavily on 
commonsense intuitions. Making these intuitions explicit and defensible requires 
more philosophical heavy lifting. But unless Sprevak or someone acting on his behalf 
is prepared to produce a more nuanced account of these which justifies the inclusion 
of proximity to a bookshelf by itself on the same list as (inter alia) perceiving, 
believing and remembering, extended mind theorists can continue to hold that Otto 
believes the Museum of Modern Art is on 53rd Street, but not the entire contents of 
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the New York public library, without being guilty of, as Sprevak puts it, 'behaving 
like a NIMBY'54 (Sprevak 2009 p.14).  
 
14. Conclusion 
This chapter explored and defended the extended mind thesis - the thesis that 
cognition does not take place in brains alone, but oftentimes is distributed via 
cognitive processing which loops across brain, body and world. Following Clark and 
Chalmers, I argued that cognition extends beyond the boundaries of skin and skull 
when embodied agents skilfully offload some of the processing that would otherwise 
have to take place internally onto external structures. A mix of empirical and 
theoretical examples were provided in support of extended cognitive processing 
during problem solving, and also of extended cognitive states, namely beliefs partly 
constituted by extra-neural objects. I addressed a wide range of objections to the 
extended mind thesis and found all of them wanting. Preston and Weiskopf's 
objections to the notion of extended beliefs fail because they aim to undermine 
extended beliefs by highlighting features they lack, but fail to appreciate that there 
are common instances of internal beliefs which also lack these features. Adams and 
Aizawa's tripartite critique of the extended mind thesis was also unsuccessful. Their 
science argument, it transpires, is straightforwardly empirically false. Their coupling-
constitution argument accomplishes nothing on its own, as it presupposes a principle 
of demarcation it does not provide. Rupert's systems-based critique fails for the same 
reason. Adams and Aizawa's attempt to provide such a criterion, their content 
argument, does not provide the requisite conceptual resources to resist extended 
                                                          
54 'Not in my back yard'. 
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cognition, even if the various questionable assumptions underlying it are granted. 
Neither does Adams and Garrison's alternative criterion. In fact, extended cognitive 
systems easily satisfy these criteria. Finally, it was shown that Sprevak's objection to 
the extended mind thesis rests on a sleight of hand. There is simply no good reason 
not to think that minds are, at least sometimes, extended. 
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V. Extended Consciousness? 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I defended the extended mind thesis, according to which the 
physical basis of mental states and processes can and sometimes does extend beyond 
the boundaries of brain and body by virtue of agents' couplings with external objects. 
In chapter II, I defended a sensorimotor approach to visual perception, which 
emphasises the ways in which perceivers' embodiment shapes the content of their 
experience. Despite some prima facie affinity between the extended mind thesis and 
the sensorimotor approach, sharing as they do a heavy emphasis on the centrality of 
action, embodiment, and the contributions of the surrounding environment to certain 
mental phenomena, the two camps are currently at war over the issue of the 
localisation of consciousness. In a nutshell, the central question driving the debate is 
this: is conscious experience something that happens in the world or inside the head?  
The examples of extended cognition typically found in the extended mind literature - 
playing Tetris, computation distributed across pen and paper, notebooks as external 
memory sources, and the like - tend to focus on low-level, non-conscious aspects of 
mentality. It is, after all, common wisdom in both contemporary cognitive science 
and philosophy of mind that a great deal of cognitive processing occurs below the 
threshold of conscious awareness. Because of this, there are many defenders of the 
extended mind thesis who remain keen to draw a sharp line between these sorts of 
mental phenomena, which they are happy to admit may be constituted by physical 
processes not confined solely to the brain and full-blown conscious experience which 
they insist, for reasons explored below, is still solely the accomplishment of neural 
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processes locked away inside the subject's skull. Even for some philosophers 
impressed by the arguments in favour of extended cognition, the notion of extended 
consciousness is just one step too far. According to what I shall call the extended 
conscious mind thesis, however, the physical basis of consciousness is not confined 
exclusively to the brain either, but incorporates parts of the world in which it is 
situated also. This is the topic of this chapter. 
The extended conscious mind thesis is enjoying growing support among 
philosophers inspired by both the sensorimotor approach to perception and the 
extended mind thesis. Although it has obvious parallels with the extended mind 
thesis, the extended mind thesis' originator and most prominent defender (as well as 
the hero of my previous chapter), Andy Clark, argues that extended mind theorists 
can and should reject the extended conscious mind thesis, and offers an alternative 
internalist account which admits a causal but non-constitutive role for bodily 
engagements with the world. In this final substantive chapter I examine how well this 
claim fits with some of the key commitments of his extended mind thesis, and the 
implications for the extended mind theorist who wishes to deny the extended 
conscious mind thesis. I argue that Clark’s position is unsustainable; his extended 
mind theorist does not, in fact, have the resources to reject the extended conscious 
mind thesis, and the extended conscious mind thesis deserves to be taken far more 
seriously.  
 
2. The extended mind thesis and the extended conscious mind thesis 
As we have seen, the sensorimotor approaches to perception characterises perceptual 
experience as a temporally extended bodily engagement with the environment, 
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mediated by practical understanding of the effects of movement on sensory 
experience. One alleged philosophical consequence of this approach (by, e.g. Ward 
2012 and Noë 2004 ch. VII) is that the ‘vehicles’ that physically realise conscious 
experience might not be confined to the brain. Some authors urge that if it is indeed 
the case that perceptual experience is closely dependent on bodily engagements with 
the world, then the implicated patterns of environmental interaction should count 
among the physical constituents of perceptual experience. Following a convention 
found in the sensorimotor theory literature, I shall refer to these patterns of 
environmental interaction as sensorimotor dynamics.  
One of the most ardent defences of the extended conscious mind thesis can be found 
in the closing chapter of Noë’s Action in Perception:  
What I have been defending […] is externalism about the vehicles of content 
of experience. I have been arguing that, for at least some experiences, the 
physical substrate of the experience may cross boundaries, implicating neural, 
bodily and environmental features. (Noë 2004 p.221, italics removed) 
[B]rain, body and world work together to make consciousness happen […] 
Experience is not caused by and realised in the brain, although it depends 
causally on the brain. Experience is realised in the active life of the skilful 
animal. (ibid. p.227) 
And something very much like it is heavily implied, if not explicitly endorsed, by 
Noë's former collaborator, O'Regan, in his latest book55. For example, O'Regan 
writes: 
                                                          
55An Adaptive Behaviour referee suggested that attributing the extended conscious 
mind thesis to O'Regan slightly misrepresents his position, as his developed view is 
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Admittedly there is some information being built up in the brain, namely the 
information about all the things I can do with my eyes and the changes that 
will occur as I move them around. You could argue that this information 
constitutes a kind of representation. But the seeing is not caused by the 
existence or “activation” of this information or representation. It is caused by 
–I had better say constituted by- being engaged in making use of this 
information to explore or visually manipulate the visual scene. (O'Regan 
2011. p.28, italics in original) 
And later: 
If we abandon the idea that feels [O'Regan's term for the qualitative aspects 
of sensations] are the kind of thing that are generated, and instead take the 
view that they are constituted by skilled modes of interaction with the 
environment, then the […] mysteries about feel dissipate. Indeed we can 
explain why feels have these mysterious characteristics. (ibid. p.115, my 
italics) 
Versions of the extended conscious mind thesis are also defended by (inter alios) 
Kiverstein & Farina (forthcoming), Loughlin (2012), Ward (2012), Manzotti (2011), 
Rowlands (2010a; 2003), McCulloch (2003), and Hurley (1998), and are seriously 
                                                                                                                                                                    
that perceptual consciousness consists in higher order cognitive access to what he 
calls 'feels' - the qualitative aspect of experience. I disagree. Although O'Regan 
maintains that higher order cognitive access is necessary for a subject to be conscious 
of a feel, and this is presumably the work of certain neural mechanisms, this doesn't 
change the fact that on his view, the 'what-it-is-like-ness' of vision and other senses is 
not internal to the brain, but is constituted by sensorimotor interactions, as he makes 
apparent with his analogy between visual qualities and the 'spongeyness' of a sponge. 
(O'Regan 2011 ch. VIIII).. Hence, there is an undeniable element of externalism 
inherent in his account.  
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considered, though not fully endorsed, by Hutto and Myin (2013), Wheeler (2010), 
Chalmers (2008) and Wilson (2004). 
Note that the extended conscious mind thesis does not claim that the vehicles of all 
forms of consciousness extend into the environment. Its proponents can (and do: e.g. 
Noë 2004 pp. 213-4) readily accept the existence of forms of consciousness the 
material basis of which are entirely internal/neural. The extended conscious mind 
thesis pertains to perceptual experience in particular. In keeping with recent 
literature, I shall focus exclusively on vision, though I see no principled reason why 
similar morals might not be drawn, mutatis mutandis, for at least some other sensory 
modalities, such as touch. Head and Holmes' (1911) classic example of the blind man 
using a cane to directly perceive the path in front of him, discussed previously, could 
arguably provide one such example. I will therefore be using ‘perception’ as 
shorthand for ‘visual perception’ throughout. Other forms of extended consciousness 
may be possible, perhaps even actual, but for reasons of brevity these are not 
examined here. To be absolutely clear, note also that the extended conscious mind 
thesis certainly does not claim that the brain is not necessary for conscious 
perception, nor does it deny that the brain is the most important or most scientifically 
challenging part of consciousness' physical substrate, only that it is not its sole 
physical constituent. Just as, contra Adams and Aizawa, no extended mind theorist 
would claim that a pencil coupled to a mathematician thinks about sums, no extended 
conscious mind theorist would claim that an object in a perceiver's surroundings is 
itself a subject of experience. 
Recall that according to the extended mind thesis, cognition can and frequently does 
extend beyond the brain to incorporate structures in a subject’s environment. 
Extended mind theorists are wont to claim that external objects like notebooks or 
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mobile phones can partly constitute the physical basis of a mental state such as a 
belief, providing they are suitably coupled to an agent. For instance, the information 
therein must be readily available, generally reliable, automatically endorsed upon 
retrieval, and guide the agent’s behaviour in the relevant way (Clark & Chalmers 
1998 p.17). Similarly, the extended mind thesis has it that subjects’ capacities for 
action and perception allow them to use information in their surroundings in place of 
detailed internal representations by offloading some of the brain’s workload onto the 
environment, thereby expanding the physical basis of cognitive processing. Clark 
and Chalmers illustrate this claim using the well-known  experiments by Kirsh and 
Maglio (1994) showing that players of the retro videogame Tetris, rather than acting 
on prior decisions based on the formation and rotation of mental images, identify the 
best shape of fit for falling puzzle pieces on a computer screen by manipulating the 
shapes themselves. On Clark and Chalmers' interpretation of Kirsh and Maglio’s 
data, the physical basis of the thought process by which the puzzle is solved literally 
comprises the shapes displayed on the screen and the actions by which they are 
manipulated.  
It might appear reasonable to suppose that if the extended mind thesis is accepted 
then similar morals could apply with respect to sensorimotor dynamics and conscious 
perception. For example, Wilson (2010) points out that Clark and Chalmers’s own 
criteria for something’s being coupled to an agent, and therefore comprising an 
extended cognitive system, are satisfied by perceivers’ environments. We have a 
tendency to automatically endorse our basic perceptual beliefs (ceteris paribus). 
These guide our action, and are reliably caused by our environment, which is readily 
available for visual inspection. And as Menary (2010c; 2007) stresses, the vast 
majority of cognitive couplings arise from sensorimotor engagements, suggesting a 
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strong prima facie affinity between the sensorimotor approach of perception and the 
extended mind thesis. Such an affinity is clearly evidenced in the empirical literature 
on vision by O'Regan's (1992) characterisation of the external world as an external 
memory store accessed by visual attention. Clark, however, resists the application of 
extended mind-style reasoning to the topic of consciousness. Though Chalmers has 
since expressed some openness, at least in principle, to the idea of extended 
consciousness (Chalmers 2008), in their original Analysis paper he and Clark stress 
that their arguments are intended to apply only to unconscious, low-level cognitive 
processing only 
Some find this sort of externalism unpalatable. One reason may be that many 
identify the cognitive with the conscious, and it seems far from plausible that 
consciousness extends outside the head in these cases. But not every 
cognitive process, at least on standard usage, is a conscious process. It is 
widely accepted that all sorts of processes beyond the borders of 
consciousness play a crucial role in cognitive processing [...]. So the mere 
fact that external processes are external where consciousness is internal is no 
reason to deny that those processes are cognitive. (Clark and Chalmers 1998 
p.10) 
In response to the burgeoning literature in favour of the extended conscious mind 
thesis, Clark has recently published two papers arguing that not only do arguments in 
favour of the extended mind thesis fail to generalise to support the extended 
conscious mind thesis, but extended mind theorists can and should reject the 
extended conscious mind thesis in favour of an internalistic alternative whereby 
sensorimotor dynamics causally contribute to, but in no way constitute, perceptual 
experience (Clark 2012b; 2009). In what follows I respond to Clark’s critique and 
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defend an interpretation of sensorimotor dynamics in line with the extended 
conscious mind thesis.  
Responses to Clark’s original 2009 critique of the extended conscious mind thesis 
have tended toward one of two methodologies. One tactic has been to appeal to 
empirical findings that might be taken to support it. Loughlin (2013), for example 
appeals to neuroscientific research on perceptual binding (specifically Revonsuo 
(1999)) to argue that there are experimental data on vision which do not 
straightforwardly lend themselves to internalistic interpretation. And Kiverstein and 
Farina (forthcoming) offer an account of sensory substitution technologies in line 
with the extended conscious mind thesis. I am sympathetic to Kiverstain and Farina's 
conclusion but, as noted in chapter III, I suspect that their conflation of the user's 
body schema with a body image might prevent their argument from establishing 
externalism about consciousness. The other tactic involves making a case for a 
personal-level conception of perceptual experience as active, embodied, and 
environmentally embedded, then inferring that something like the extended 
conscious mind thesis follows regarding the sub-personal level. Ward (2012) makes 
this latter move. However, neither of these addresses the crucial issue of whether or 
not the extended mind thesis and the extended conscious mind thesis really are as 
easily divorceable as Clark claims, or engages directly with the framework for 
understanding the sub-personal machinery of perceptual consciousness Clark has 
since developed at length (Clark 2013; 2012c) and which he takes to establish his 
internalism, so in what follows I pursue a slightly different strategy. I argue that 
given some of the wider commitments of the extended mind thesis and the 
concessions Clark is prepared to make concerning the contribution of sensorimotor 
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dynamics to perceptual experience in his 2013 and 2012 papers, a denial of the 
extended mind thesis is ultimately untenable for his extended mind theorist.  
There is one technical difference between the extend mind and extended conscious 
mind theses worth clarifying before proceeding further. According to certain 
formulations of the extended mind thesis, including one found in Clark and 
Chalmers’s seminal Analysis paper, the mind extends when external media are 
utilised in a manner coarsely functionally isomorphic to an ordinarily brain-bound 
cognitive process. This version of the extended mind thesis still allows for – in fact it 
presupposes – a stable package of internal cognitive capacities which may be 
extended outwards through intelligent behaviour. From the perspective of the 
extended conscious mind thesis, there is no analogous stable package of visual 
consciousness to extend from. Rather, because perception consists primarily in a 
dynamic sensorimotor engagement with the world, it extends beyond the brain by its 
very nature. It is in this sense that consciousness can be said to be ‘extended’. Again, 
proponents of the extended conscious mind thesis need not necessarily deny there 
can be perception-like states which are constituted entirely neurally (hallucinations 
may be one such example). The point is that in the active exploration of an 
environment, the physical process underling perceptual experience is not just caused 
by dynamic interactions between agent and environment, it includes them.   
 
3. The horizonal structure of perception and action-oriented predictive 
processing  
As aforementioned, the sensorimotor approach to visual perception tends to get 
started with the phenomenological fact that perceptual experience outstrips what is 
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strictly present to the eyes at any given instant. Despite not being located in the 
visual field, occluded sides and unattended perceptible features of objects are 
experienced as present and accessible – we anticipate further presentations of that 
object (for an insightful early discussion of this phenomenon, see Husserl 1999b). I 
have called this  anticipatory aspect of perceptual experience its horizonal structure. 
The sensorimotor approach cashes out the horizonal structure of perception in terms 
of perceivers’ implicit understanding of the potential changes in experience that 
would result from further exploration of their environment through action. On such a 
view, the occluded objects are understood implicitly in experience as ‘available to 
perception through appropriate movement’ (Noë 2012 p.58, italics removed). 
Experience is therefore construed not as a linear succession of static representational 
states, but as a temporally extended process of environmental probing. On an 
interpretation in line with the extended conscious mind thesis, the exercise of such 
embodied capacities and the implicated sensorimotor dynamics are as constitutive of 
the experience as the accompanying brain processes. Clark resists this conclusion, 
urging instead that sensorimotor dynamics are not constitutive of experience, but 
merely causally impinge upon what is genuinely constitutive of experience, namely 
certain structures in the brain. Hence, despite being a renowned champion of 
externalism about the vehicles of cognition, Clark is a conservative internalist about 
the vehicles of consciousness 
I do think that there is something right about [the extended conscious mind 
thesis]. What is right is the idea that experience, as it unfolds in most normal 
daily (awake) circumstances, is directly world-revealing, and involves a 
crucial and complex dance between sensory transduction and real-world 
action [ …] But it does not follow that the material (sub-personal processing) 
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basis of that experience must then extend to encompass its own objects. 
Instead, the material apparatus can still quite reasonably be thought to be 
wholly internal, consisting in the way neural systems both elicit and respond 
to signature perturbations in the environment. (Clark 2012b p.3) 
This position is fleshed out using the action-oriented predictive processing 
framework Clark outlines in detail elsewhere (2013; 2012c). Drawing from an 
impressive and convincing range of empirical studies using predictive coding56 to 
study the visual cortex (e.g. Rao & Ballard 1999), Clark suggests that the horizonal 
structure of perceptual experience is best understood in terms of the brain’s capacity 
to predict its own sensory states using stored knowledge (learned or innate, or a 
combination of the two) of generative models of the external world. Incoming 
sensory signals are modulated by sensorimotor dynamics and the top-down 
predictive processing is refined through learning in a familiar connectionist style by 
means of the back propagation of error57. Clark explains, ‘The key idea is that the 
brain uses prediction-driven processing routines to acquire and deploy hierarchical 
generative models of the hidden causes (sometimes called latent variables) that best 
explain the changing patterns of sensory input that impinge upon the agent’ (Clark 
2012b. p.8). By acting in such a way as to drive along the relevant neural process by, 
for example, turning one’s head or eyes or an object closer to one's body, the 
perceiver plays an active role in structuring the flow of information responsible for 
the content of their (internally realised) perceptual experience, which incorporates an 
expectation of further presentations of whatever the subject is currently looking at. 
Borrowing a term from Pfeifer et al (2007), Clark characterises this intelligent use of 
                                                          
56 Software which makes uses a relatively small amount of inputted information, to 
make accurate generalisations or 'predictions' about a wider range of information.  
 
57 I.e. Using current input to retroactively correct errors. 
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action to induce one’s own sensory content as a form of informational self-
structuring (Clark 2012b p.10). The intended upshot of the application of the action-
oriented predictive processing framework is to accommodate the contributions of 
sensorimotor dynamics to perceptual experience, and account for perceptual 
experience's horizonal structure, without conceding the truth of the extended 
conscious mind thesis. As Clark puts it, ‘Embodiment and action fit very naturally 
within such a framework. Embodiment matters because embodied agents are active 
agents, and active agents can systematically alter their own sensory input streams in 
ways that can drive faster and more successful prediction-based learning’ (ibid).  
For the remainder of this chapter, I grant that the horizonal structure of perceptual 
experience owes to the brain’s capacity to predict its own sensory states. Indeed, not 
only does Clark (2012c) present an impressive wealth of compelling empirical 
evidence for this, its truth would be conducive to the extended conscious mind thesis 
and the sensorimotor approach generally, as it puts the horizonal structure of 
perception on a firm neurocomputational footing hitherto absent from the discussion. 
Having defended it at great length in the previous chapter, I also grant the truth of the 
extended mind thesis, that is, that under certain conditions cognitive processing 
occurs partly beyond the boundaries of brain and body. What I shall question, and 
ultimately reject, is the claim that the extended mind theorist who endorses the 
action-oriented predictive processing framework can coherently and 
unproblematically reject the extended conscious mind thesis.  
 
4. Perceptual cognition and informational self-structuring 
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As the extended conscious mind thesis concerns perception, one obvious tactic for 
refuting it would be to argue that unlike the extended cognitive processing described 
by extended mind theorists, the cognitive processing underlying perception does not 
extend. This would nip the extended conscious mind thesis in the bud. As discussed 
previously, in earlier writings Clark has explicitly denied cognitive extension in the 
case of perception by appealing to Milner and Goodale's dual streams hypothesis, 
according to which vision and action have separate underlying cognitive 
architectures, to drive some conceptual elbow room between vision and sensorimotor 
dynamics. These arguments notwithstanding, Clark’s 2012b paper represents 
something of an unacknowledged concession. It is an unnoticed consequence of 
Clark’s position that the extended mind theorist who endorses the action-oriented 
predictive processing framework cannot deny extended perceptual cognition on pain 
of inconsistency. This is because the centrality of informational self-structuring to 
the action-oriented predictive processing, when considered in light of some key 
commitments of the extended mind thesis expressed by Clark elsewhere, unwittingly 
commits the extended mind theorist to an extended physical basis of perceptual 
cognition.  
In his book Supersizing the Mind, Clark presents informational self-structuring as a 
paradigm case of cognitive extension in action, as a central tenet of his version of the 
extended mind thesis is that actions, when undertaken to alleviate some of the brain’s 
workload for the sake of improved cognitive performance, qualify as partly 
constitutive of that cognitive processes. Clark appeals to experimental work by the 
likes of McNeil (2005) and Goldin-Meadow (2003) on gesture to support an 
extended mind-style interpretation of informational self-structuring (Clark 2008 
pp.123-35. cf. Wheeler 2013). These studies teach us that gestures both encode 
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information over and above what is represented in the brain, as occurs in cases of 
‘speech-gesture mismatch’ (see Goldin-Meadow & Singer 2003), and play a crucial 
role in the information transformation required for self-expression and consequently 
communication. Clark repeatedly asserts that only dogmatic internalistic prejudices 
disbar us from counting gestures as partly constitutive of the cognitive processing in 
which they are implicated 
[...] the key distinction between “merely impacting” some inner cognitive 
process and forming a proper part of an extended cognitive process looks 
much less clear (...) in cases involving the systematic effects of self-generated 
external structure on thought and reason. (Clark 2008, p.126 italics in 
original) 
These are cases when we confront a recognisably cognitive process, running 
in some agent, that creates outputs (speech, gesture, expressive movements, 
written words) that, recycled as inputs, drive the cognitive process along. In 
such cases, any intuitive ban on counting inputs as parts of mechanism seems 
wrong. Instead, we confront something rather like the cognitive equivalent of 
a forced induction system. (ibid. p.131) 
As these quotations clearly indicate, informational self-structuring is not confined to 
gesture. To give but one example, complementary findings come from Villegas, 
Castro and Gutierrez (2009), who found that undergraduate mathematics students’ 
verbalisations significantly increased the efficiency with which they solved a set of 
optimisation problems58. The students quite literally boosted their own thought 
processes by talking to themselves about the steps they were taking to solve the 
                                                          
58 The task of finding the best feasible solution to a given mathematical problem. 
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problems. In light of Clark’s take on informational self-structuring, it follows that for 
the extended mind theorist these and analogous performances, by functioning to self-
structure internal processing, also qualify as genuine constituents of cognitive 
processing. On the anodyne assumption that perceptual processing is part and parcel 
of cognitive processing, the same must go for the environmental interactions required 
by the action-oriented predictive processing framework, for these are also deliberate 
intelligent performances undertaken for the sake of driving along one’s internal 
cognitive processing and alleviating the need for the detailed bottom-up 
representations of the external world envisioned by the likes of Marr (1982) (Clark 
2013 p.2). Hence, contra Clark, the extended mind theorist is committed to 
sensorimotor dynamics being partly constitutive of perceptual cognition.59 This is, in 
effect, precisely the sort of conception of perceptual cognition advocated by 
sensorimotor theorists like O'Regan  
Seeing and perceiving are not achievements of an isolated head or brain, 
quietly humming along on its own. The organism moves its eyes, repositions 
its body to get a better perceptual grip on the objects that surround it, and 
thereby attempts to advance in the execution of the hierarchy of ongoing 
projects it is engaged in. The locus of perceptual processing includes the 
world rather than being just confined to the head. (O'Regan & Myin 2009, 
italics added) 
To reiterate: according to the action-oriented predictive processing framework, the 
horizonal structure of perception is best explained by the brain’s apparent ability to 
anticipate its own sensory states, and this process is driven along by perceivers’ 
                                                          
59 Not all extended mind theorists are hostile to the idea of extended perceptual 
cognition. Rowlands, a defender of both the extended mind and extended conscious 
mind theses, argues for such a view (2010a; 2010b pp.107-34).  
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bodily interactions with the world by means of actions such as head-turnings, eye 
saccades, and generally manoeuvring oneself in relation to the object. As such, 
perceivers actively induce the content of their own perceptual experience by self-
structuring their internal cognitive-sensory states. Following Clark’s own extended 
mind characterisation of informational self-structuring, then, these interactions with 
the objects of perception are also constitutive parts of the mechanisms of perceptual 
cognition. The extended mind theorist who endorses the action-oriented predictive 
processing framework is therefore barred from denying extended perceptual 
cognition in order to reject the extended conscious mind thesis outright. If extended 
perceptual cognition is granted, what is required of the extended mind theorist who 
still wishes to reject the extended conscious mind thesis is a principled reason for 
distinguishing between the parts of these extended perceptual mechanisms 
constitutive of conscious experience, and what we might call the ‘merely cognitive’ 
parts which are not, without which any such distinction will be arbitrary and possibly 
question-begging. The remainder of the paper considers the extent to which the 
extended mind theorist who wishes to maintain internalism about consciousness can 
meet this challenge. 
 
5. The coupling-constitution fallacy revisited 
In his initial treatment of the extended conscious mind thesis prior to publishing his 
formulation of the action-oriented predictive processing framework, Clark (2009) 
accuses its defenders of deploying the sort of erroneous reasoning attacked by 
Adams and Aizawa's coupling-constitution argument. Recall that the fallacy they 
attack, the 'coupling-constitution fallacy', is 
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[A] tacit move from the observation that process X is in some way causally 
connected (coupled) to a cognitive process Y to the conclusion that X is part 
of the cognitive process Y. The pattern of reasoning here involves moving 
from the observation that process X is in some way causally connected 
(coupled) to a process Y of type ϕ to the conclusion that X is part of a process 
of type ϕ. (Adams & Aizawa 2009 p.81)  
In the context of the debate over extended consciousness, the alleged fallacy consists 
in inferring from the fact that sensorimotor dynamics impact upon conscious 
experience that they are therefore constitutive of that experience (Clark 2009 p.981). 
Indeed, there are examples of defenders of the extended conscious mind thesis 
apparently committing this fallacy. Here is a particularly unfortunate passage from 
Noë: ‘if ever there was a plausible candidate for a psychological state that is driven 
and so partially constituted by the environment, it is perceptual consciousness’ (Noë 
2008 p.460, quoted in Clark 2009 p.982, italics in Original). Elsewhere, as noted in 
the previous chapter, Noë even attributes such a view to Clark and Chalmers in what 
appears to be a severe misreading of their case for the extended mind thesis: 
‘according to [the extended mind thesis], the environment can drive and so partially 
constitute cognitive processes’ (Noë 2004 p.221, my italics). Here Noë misrepresents 
Clark and Chalmers’ case for extended cognition, which appeals to functional 
isomorphism between internal and external information-carrying structures, rather 
than any inference from coupling to constitution, then recasts it as an argument for 
extended consciousness.   
Clark is certainly correct to point out that as with the extended mind thesis extended 
consciousness cannot be established purely on the basis of an inference from causal 
interaction to constitution. But trivially, however the mind works and wherever and 
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however it is physically realised, it will encompass a range of causally interacting 
physical states and processes. So there is seemingly no a priori obstacle to the 
defender of the extended conscious mind thesis simply chalking up these instances of 
the coupling-constitution fallacy to careless wording on Noë’s part and recasting 
their thesis purely in terms of constitution. And as Clark himself notes, one major 
problem with debates over the boundaries of the mind is that opposing arguments 
often depend heavily for their plausibility on extant internalist or externalist 
prejudices, resulting in dialectical stalemate (Clark 2009 p. 981). In an attempt to 
block such a move and alleviate this threat of stalemate, Clark offers an empirical 
argument for demarcating the constitutive from the casually related in terms of the 
internal (neural) and external (bodily/worldly) for consciousness in a way that differs 
from the standard coupling-constitution arguments against EM.  
We have seen that coupling-constitution arguments against the extended mind thesis 
presuppose a prior account of cognitive demarcation, without which the distinction 
between what does and does not count as constitutive of cognition within a coupled 
system is arbitrary. Hence the controversy over the ‘mark of the cognitive’- an 
elusive criterion that would ground the causal/constitutive distinction by providing a 
necessary and sufficient condition (or conditions) for a state or process to qualify as 
genuinely cognitive. By parity of reasoning, then, an analogous ‘mark of the 
conscious’ is required to ground a coupling-constitution argument against the 
extended conscious mind thesis. Clark’s candidate for a mark of the conscious is 
processing power. Adapting an argument due to Eliasmith (2009), Clark suggests 
that unlike the brain with its billions of neurons and trillions of synapses, non-neural 
states and processes have nowhere near the bandwidth required to support a rich 
stream of conscious experience. For example, nothing at all like the 40-70Hz 
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oscillations in the cerebral cortex purportedly demonstrated as necessary for 
perceptual binding by Crick and Koch (1990) occurs outside of the brain. This is 
supposed to give reason for thinking that it is a contingent empirical fact that 
consciousness, unlike low-level nonconscious cognitive processing which need not 
be subject to the same bandwidth constraints, is constituted entirely neurally 
[I]n the special case of arguments for [the extended conscious mind thesis], 
we can begin to discharge this obligation [to provide a criterion of 
demarcation]. For if indeed the physical machinery of consciousness requires 
fast timescale operations and processing, and the non-neural body acts as a 
low-pass filter preventing external (…) signals from directly entering into 
such operations and processing, then such signals are fit to play only a causal 
role, driving the neural systems within which the right kinds of fast binding 
and processing can occur. In such cases, one might all manner of complex 
couplings without thereby producing an extended material base for conscious 
experience. (Clark 2009 p.986) 
It seems uncontroversial that nothing like fast high-bandwidth neural processing 
occurs on the non-neural side of perceptual processing, but there is reason to be 
sceptical as to whether this fact alone suffices to ground the causal-constitutive 
distinction the extended mind theorist who wishes to deny extended consciousness 
needs to neatly distinguish the conscious from the ‘merely cognitive’ parts of the 
extended perceptual mechanisms they are forced to concede. While certain neural 
features will doubtless be necessary for conscious experience to occur, we cannot 
infer from this fact alone that they are sufficient to secure the phenomenology of all 
or even any form of consciousness (a point made by Ward 2012). At best, this only 
shows that the relevant fast neural processes must be implicated in every mechanism 
226 
 
underlying an experience; it does not prove that these neural processes are the sole 
physical constituent of that experience, nor does it automatically licence the 
inference that all other parts of a mechanism in which a state that has that feature is 
implicated are ipso facto non-constitutive of the associated experience.  
The fact that high bandwidth neural processing is required for perceptual experience 
does not by itself establish internalism about consciousness. Merely pointing to the 
fact that consciousness requires fast neural processing does not suffice to provide a 
mark of the conscious. What is required is an account of what neural processes 
actually do that renders the wider mechanisms in which they are embedded 
constitutively redundant.  Clark’s second paper against the extended conscious mind 
thesis (Clark 2012b) invokes details of his action-oriented predictive processing 
framework, absent from his 2009 treatment, which he takes to do just this. Hence, in 
the next section I consider whether or not appealing to the action-oriented predictive 
processing framework can establish internalism, answering in the negative.  
 
6. The stuff dreams are made of? 
Some predictive coding enthusiasts take the results of its application to the scientific 
study of vision as evidence for an indirect theory of perception (e.g. Hohwy 2007). 
Perception is said to be ‘indirect’ if its objects are not the actual things in the world 
experience purports to present us with, but mental intermediaries like ‘sense-data’ 
(see e.g. Moore 1953, Russell 2001) or something similar (e.g. Jackson 2004), and 
'direct' if its objects are not mental intermediaries, but the objects themselves (see, 
e.g. Stoneham 2008, Martin 2002 and Austin 1962). In this instance, the intermediary 
mental objet would be ‘the brain’s best hypothesis, as embodied in a high-level 
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generative model, about the causes in the outer world’ (Hohwy 2007 p.323). 
Accepting the indirectness of perception as a consequence of the action-oriented 
predictive processing framework would be a quick and easy way of establishing 
internalism about perceptual consciousness. If the world of experience comprises 
mental objects locked away inside the skull, then it makes little if any sense to 
suggest that the physical basis of that experience extends beyond it. But Clark is 
eager to distance himself from such a view, insisting that perception according to the 
action-oriented predictive processing framework would be better described as ‘not-
indirect perception’ (2013 p.27), whereby stored generative models are not the 
objects of perception, but sub-personal states which enable us to perceive the world 
itself 
[W]e may still reject the bald claim that “what we perceive is the brain’s best 
hypothesis,” Even if our own prediction is indeed (…) doing much of the 
heavy lifting, it remains correct to say that what we perceive is not some 
internal representation or hypothesis but (precisely) the world. We do so 
courtesy of the brain’s ability to latch on to how the world is by means of a 
complex flow of sub-personal processes. (Clark 2012c p. 54) 
Having dismissed as erroneous and ‘Cartesian’ any dichotomy between the world of 
experience inside the head and the actual world outside of it, much like sensorimotor 
theorists, what is left to motivate Clark's internalism? For Clark, it is the ‘super-tight 
empirical link’ (Clark 2012b p.18) between perception and phenomenologically 
similar yet paradigmatically internally-constituted experiences like imagination and 
dreaming. The quasi-visual imagery of dreams and other imaginings exhibits a 
horizonal structure much like that of perception, which the action-oriented predictive 
processing framework explains in terms of a common underlying cognitive 
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architecture. The basic idea is that in waking perception, when all goes well, the 
brain matches the appropriate generative model to its distal cause(s) by adjusting for 
error in the incoming sensory signal (Clark 2012c pp.44-55). In forms of vision-like 
experience which fall short of perception, there is no stable incoming sensory signal 
to fine-tune the generative model. So despite their shared architecture, perceiving and 
dreaming can differ phenomenologically  
[N]othing in [the action-oriented predictive processing framework] requires 
that the system, when simply cycling, in the sleep or imagining state, in the 
absence of ongoing driving external inputs, will typically support the very 
same kinds of stability and richness of experienced detail that daily sensory 
engagements offer. (Clark 2012b p.16) 
These differences in stability and richness are worth elaborating upon. Contrary to 
the well-worn fantasies of epistemological scepticism and popular science fiction, it 
is in fact fairly easy to tell whether or not one is dreaming, though doing so can 
require a period of training. The phenomenon of lucid dreaming testifies to this. 
Though lucid dreaming can be made to sound like pseudo-spiritualist mumbo-jumbo, 
and is often unfortunately presented as such in popular culture, there is in fact 
nothing anti-physicalist or mystical about it, and it is a subject of serious scientific 
study by psychologists, neuroscientists and medical practitioners (for a thorough 
scientific review, see Hobson 2009). Though experimental studies of lucid dreaming 
are unavoidably plagued by the sometimes-unreliable methodology of first-person 
report, there is widespread agreement that the phenomenon is genuine. Lucid 
dreaming occurs when people become aware that they are dreaming and regain a 
sense of agency within their dream. Lucid dreams usually happen (that is, when they 
do) during REM sleep (LaBerge 1990), and there is evidence that they tend to occur 
229 
 
more frequently in children than adults (Voss et al 2012). However, adults can 
become lucid dreamers by learning to recognise telltale signs that they are dreaming 
by routinely performing ‘reality checks’ while awake. These involve deliberately 
attending to some features of the world that are largely absent from dreams. For 
example, the constancy of perceived properties of objects and the stability in the 
layout of one’s environment present in perception break down in dreams. Lucid 
dreamers learn to distinguish dreams from waking perception on this basis by 
habituating themselves to the practise of regularly attending to features of their 
surroundings like the contents of containers, the reliable compliance of contraptions 
like windows and doors, and the consistent readability of texts, signs and clock faces. 
Following a period of regular interrogation of the surrounding world several times a 
day, these reality-checking routines are instinctively initiated when ‘cycling’ in 
sleep, allowing skilled reality-checkers to notice these phenomenological 
discrepancies as they unfold (Metzinger 2009 pp.133-48, LaBerge 2004)60. With 
enough practice, lucid dreamers can even communicate with experimenters while 
dreaming through a previously agreed upon series of eye movements prompted by 
conditioned stimuli, usually light (LaBerge 1990).  
Lucid dreaming research teaches us that dreaming is not just phenomenologically 
different to perceiving, it is phenomenologically impoverished, or rather: dreaming 
differs phenomenologically from perceiving because it is relatively impoverished. 
                                                          
60 In the spirit of ‘experimental philosophy’, I have experimented with these 
techniques myself with some success, though I often find myself waking up shortly 
after the moment of realisation in a kind of ‘short-circuiting’ effect. My favourite 
finding thus far has been that the removal of my glasses in a dream (the presence of 
which is interesting in itself, seeing as I’ve only worn them for a few years) made no 
difference to the quality of the image.  
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This phenomenological insight is discussed at length by Jean-Paul Sartre in The 
Imaginary, where he argues that mental images are characterised by an 'essential 
poverty' (Sartre 2004 p.16) that is not shared by the ordinary objects of perception. 
Much of Sartre's reasoning on this subject has been rehearsed more recently in the 
contemporary analytic tradition by Colin McGinn (McGinn 2004). Similarly, 
O'Regan and Noë remark 
A hallmark of dream-like experiences is the unstable and seemingly random 
character of dreamt detail...This suggest that without the world to serve as its 
own external model, the visual system lacks resources to hold an experienced 
world steady. (O'Regan and Noë 2001 p.947) 
The key observation here is that dreams lack the rich detail and reliable structure 
proper to waking perception, and the fact that it can take a modicum of training to 
appreciate this is no more a counterargument than somebody’s inability to 
distinguish a Metallica song from an Iron Maiden song is a counterargument to the 
(perfectly truthful) assertion that they sound completely unalike.61 Note that, as with 
differentiating two pieces of music, differentiating dreaming from perceiving cannot 
always be done instantaneously or over an arbitrarily short period of time, or indeed 
without the required skill. If all one is allowed to hear is an E5 chord and a single hit 
of a snare drum, then the differences between the two songs may be present and 
available but still go unnoticed (note that there may still be detectable differences 
here - in guitar tone or production style, for example, - to the suitably skilled 
listener). Similarly, the differences between the experiences of glancing at an 
imaginary table for two seconds in a dream and glancing at an actual table for two 
seconds can go unappreciated. But, if one knows what one is looking for, the 
                                                          
61 This example is adapted from Noë’s discussion of hallucination (Noë 2004 p.80).  
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phenomenological differences will be made salient through a slightly longer process 
of exploration and interrogation. If perception is ‘not-indirect’, then these 
phenomenological differences between dreaming and perceiving are explained by 
what is in the world. Again, O’Regan’s (1992) characterisation of the perceived 
world as an external working memory is instructive in this regard, as the stability of 
waking perception is explained not in terms of sameness of intermediating 
representational content, but in terms of the stability and continual availability of 
information in the world itself. 
Returning to the debate over the extended conscious mind thesis, at this juncture the 
threat of dialectical stalemate resurfaces. Both advocates of the extended conscious 
mind thesis and extended mind theorists who reject it can agree that the 
phenomenological differences between perception and dreaming owe to the presence 
(in waking perception) or absence (during sleep) of the extended sensorimotor 
dynamics, modulated by the active informational self-structuring needed to fine-tune 
the brain’s generative model. In other words, the poverty of the experience owes to a 
poverty of sub-personal mechanism. With extended perceptual cognition now in 
place for both extended conscious mind and extended mind theorists, and having 
ruled out an appeal to the mark of the conscious as a clear cut deciding factor, the 
onus is on the extended mind theorist who rejects the extended conscious mind thesis 
to show why these important phenomenological differences in richness and structure 
are not constituted by extended sensorimotor dynamics as well as the tokened 
generative model.  
How are we to decide what does and does not deserve constitutive status with respect 
to consciousness? Having deliberately bracketed what he dubs ‘more metaphysical’ 
versions of this question (Clark 2012b; 2009), Clark’s chosen (though largely 
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implicit) strategy is to identify reliable correlations between conscious experiences 
and the sub-personal physical states and processes which accompany them. Hence, 
the job required of the action-oriented predictive processing framework, if it is to 
establish internalism, is to provide an answer to what Chalmers (1995; 1996) calls an 
‘easy problem’, as opposed to the ‘hard problem’, of consciousness. That is, rather 
than addressing the perplexing puzzle of why or how any physical process should 
give rise to any experience at all, the extended mind theorist who wants to hang onto 
internalism about consciousness needs only to indicate which physical processes are 
the most suitable candidates for the vehicles of experience. If the presence of a 
particular physical process secures the phenomenology, then it is extraneous to 
include wider processes in which that state or process is embedded in a description of 
the physical basis of the experience in question.    
If this is the approach taken, however, the extended conscious mind thesis will win 
out. To see why, consider a simple internalistic analogy. Imagine a neuroscientist 
investigating the neural correlates of a particular experience. Here I follow 
Chalmers’ instructive definition of a ‘direct’ neural correlate of consciousness 
N will be an NCC when (1) the states of N suffice for the corresponding 
states of consciousness, and (2) no proper part M of N is such that the states 
of M suffice for the corresponding states of consciousness. In this way, we 
pare down any potential NCC to its core: any irrelevant material will be 
whittled away, and an NCC will be required to contain only the core 
processes that suffice for the conscious state in question [where N is a neural 
state and NCC is a neural correlate of consciousness]. (Chalmers 2000 p.25)  
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Having identified a particular pattern of neuronal spiking in a test subject as 
correlating reliably with the experience in question, the neuroscientist then attempts 
to artificially recreate that experience by applying trans-cranial magnetic stimulation 
or some similar technique to the identified cortical region(s). Let’s say that the 
experiment is successful and that by reproducing the previously identified neural 
state in the test subject, the experience is reproduced in its entirety. Prompted by 
doubts that she may have oversold the contribution of one part of the brain to the 
experience under investigation, the neuroscientist then performs a second test, 
stimulating only an isolated section of the previously identified cortical region(s). 
When quizzed, her test subject reports that the induced experience differs 
phenomenologically to the original experience. The reasonable conclusion for the 
neuroscientist to draw at this point is that as the original experience is not reproduced 
by stimulation of only part of the initially identified cortical region(s), that part of the 
cortex, though implicated in the original experience, is not properly speaking its 
correlate; there is something about the simultaneous presence of – or more likely the 
interaction between – the isolated region and the rest of the initially identified 
cortical area(s), that determines the phenomenology of the original experience. The 
isolated cortical area taken in itself is the correlate of an experience – a different but 
similar experience – but the neural correlate of the original experience must be the 
wider pattern of cortical activity identified initially, as this is what ensures the 
phenomenology.  
This is, admittedly, a philosopher’s caricature of neuroscientific research, but it’s not 
too much of a distortion as to be uninstructive (see e.g. Tong 2003, and the essays 
collected in Metzinger 2000 for some actual examples of this sort of approach in 
action). Assuming it’s a reasonably accurate caricature, however, we can draw some 
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tentative morals regarding extended consciousness and Clark's action-oriented 
predictive processing framework. By parity of reasoning, for internalism to remain 
plausible given the apparent necessity of sensorimotor dynamics and informational 
self-structuring to rich, stable perceptual experience, its phenomenology would have 
to be secured solely by the activation of the internal parts of the mechanism 
responsible for deploying the generative model. But as there apparently are 
phenomenal features which are occurrent only when the stable sensory signal 
afforded by sensorimotor dynamics is present, this suggests that the internal 
machinery of consciousness is only a part (albeit the most important part) of the 
physical basis of conscious perception. What secures the phenomenology of 
perception is not the tokening of a generative model, or the self-modulation of a 
driving sensory signal via the active self-structuring of information, but the dynamic 
interplay between the two. It follows that the physical correlate of experience – and 
therefore the best candidate for its vehicle – includes the sensorimotor dynamic in 
which the relevant predictive neural state is embedded. The action-oriented 
predictive processing framework is not only compatible with the extended conscious 
mind thesis, it supports it.  
 
7. Conclusion: putting experience back into the world 
I have argued that once it is accepted that sensorimotor dynamics are integral to 
maintaining perceptual experience, and some basic tenets of the extended mind thesis 
are granted, internalism about perceptual consciousness becomes increasingly 
difficult to maintain. The coupling-constitution fallacy loses its bite once it becomes 
apparent that Clark’s action-oriented predictive processing framework commits his 
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extended theorist to an extended physical basis of perceptual cognition. The extended 
mind thesis does commit her to this, because it construes actions performed in order 
to boost cognitive performance as constituents of an extended cognitive process, and 
the action-oriented predictive processing framework grants a significant role to 
sensorimotor dynamics which perform precisely this function. The appeal to the 
brain’s processing power as a ‘mark of the conscious’ fails to ground the 
causal/constitutive distinction required to demarcate within these extended 
mechanisms the boundary between the conscious and the merely cognitive, because 
at best it only provides a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for the physical 
realisation of perceptual consciousness. And the brain’s tokening of a top-down 
generative model does not secure the phenomenology of waking perception, whereas 
the tokening of the model plus the active self-structuring of sensory information 
does, suggesting that, contra Clark, the extended conscious mind thesis does hold at a 
sub-personal level, and not just at a personal level of description given a conception 
of experience as active, embodied ad environmentally embedded.  
In the closing chapter of Supersizing the Mind, Clark remarks that minds only appear 
‘extended’ relative to an impoverished picture of cognition as something locked 
away inside the skull (Clark 2008 p.219). Though it would certainly be premature to 
deny outright the possibility of formulating alternative arguments for rejecting 
extended consciousness while holding unto the extended mind thesis, nothing Clark 
has said shows that the same is not true of conscious experience also.  
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Conclusions 
 
To summarise: chapter I introduced the concept of the body schema - a system of 
bodily dispositions and capacities which structure our behaviour and experience, and 
which exhibits its own particular kind of intentionality. This was contrasted with the 
notion of a body image, which is a mental state that has the subject's own body as its 
intentional object. I presented a view of the body schema as flexible, capable of 
incorporating extra-corporeal objects by virtue of the plasticity of the sub-personal 
neural representations underlying it, while resisting the identification or reduction of 
the body schema to these neural representations. Chapter II deployed this notion of 
the body schema in a defence of the sensorimotor approach to visual perception, 
according to which perceptual content owes to the possession of sensorimotor 
understanding. I argued that the body schema plays an essential role in the 
constitution of this sensorimotor understanding. Chapter III combined the role of the 
body schema in structuring the content of perceptual experience as outlined in 
chapter II and the flexibility of the body schema as outlined in chapter I to develop a 
phenomenological interpretation of perceptual experience via tactile-visual sensory 
substitution technologies. Chapter IV ventured beyond the body to defend the 
extended mind thesis, according to which thought itself often takes place partly 
outside of the head, in the world. Arguments against the extended mind thesis were 
found to be unconvincing, often relying for their feasibility on undefended 
internalistic prejudices. Finally, in chapter V, I revisited the sensorimotor approach 
and considered whether something similar might also be the case with visual 
consciousness. I argued that, if certain assumptions are granted, then the physical 
basis of perceptual experience also encompasses components eternal to the brain. 
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Throughout the thesis, I have gradually pushed the boundaries of consciousness and 
cognition further and further outwards from the head and into the world, via the 
body, tacitly advocating a view of the mind as a product of a heterogeneous and 
highly malleable collection of physical states and processes. Doing so did not 
necessitate anything as radical as the rejection of any received knowledge about the 
inner workings of the brain, or an overhauling of the methods of the cognitive 
sciences. On the contrary, a good deal of mainstream empirical work can be invoked 
in favour of such a view. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly from a 
philosophical point of view, such a view of cognition does better justice to the 
realities of our ordinary lived experience. Phenomenological analysis, such as that 
undertaken by Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, teaches us that we are 
embodied beings at home in a shared world of habitual practices and practical 
significations. Contemporary cognitive science teaches us that our mental capacities 
are, like everything else amenable to empirical investigation, constituted out of 
physical process. Ultimately, given these two most fundamental of facts about our 
minds, the claim that they may not be firmly locked away behind our eyes should 
hardly seem all that surprising to begin with.  
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